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Chapter 1
Introduction
1
1.1 Historical context
The rise of China has rightfully attracted attention. Its development has already started to change
the geopolitical and economic “rules of the game”. More than once though, predictions of the
emergence of a new world hegemon have proved wrong (e.g. Japan in the 1980s). To which
extent an economic and cultural dominance is still possible in today’s world, as for instance
Europe before WWI or the US following WWII, is an open question. Fears that China may
soon reach that point are unfounded. Historically speaking, China is still even far from having
regained its initial largely favorable position. It is well known that this country was far more
advanced than Europe in the Middle Ages both from an economic and technological perspective.
As a matter of fact, any economist faced with the choice of designing the future world power
prior to the industrial revolution would have sovereignly pointed his finger east, not west.1
The fascinating aspect about China is that it forcefully shows what can happen when “things
go wrong”. Starting in the middle of the 19th century, China was ravaged by 100 years of nearly
uninterrupted catastrophies, involving foreign aggressions (e.g. the Opium Wars and the Sino-
Japanese Wars) as well as internal upheavals and civil wars (e.g. Taiping Rebellion, Xinhai
Revolution, Communist Uprising). As the CCP (China’s Communist Party) definitely came to
power in 1949, the country could at best be qualified as a “subsistence economy”. The Commu-
nist rule brought the system to collapse during the Great Leap Forward famines. The disruptions
created by the Cultural Revolution were perhaps effective in destroying a substantial part of the
Chinese cultural heritage and last remnants of social coherence but were far from bringing the
expected economic take-off. Under Mao’s rule, inequality may have reached an all time low
(sic).2
Still, there were some minor successes achieved by the CCP. Gross National Product per
capita is (optimistically) estimated to have grown at reasonable rate (4.2%) over the 1950-1975
period (Brandt and Rawski, 2008, chapter 1). Progresses were recorded in the heavy industry that
initially benefited from Russian technology transfer. Putting the ideological aspect of training
and school closures aside, access to education improved, particularly for girls and in rural area
(Brandt and Rawski, chapter 7). Agricultural production timidly increased on average but could
barely keep pace with population growth. Furthermore, it did not generate enough surpluses for
industrialization and urbanization. Even in the 1970s, China was still massively importing grain
and wheat that were vital for the population’s survival (Brandt and Rawski, chapter 13). Prior to
economic reforms, China’s GDP per capita was lower than Nigeria’s (Storesletten and Zilibotti,
2014).
1Albeit it is broadly accepted that the industrial revolution was key to the emergence of Europe, recent research
has shown that fertility patterns may already have changed due to the Black Death, the ensuing switch toward land-
intensive farming and the related increase in female labor demand (Voigtlaender and Voth, 2013a). European speci-
ficities such as increasing urbanization, frequent wars and intensive trade kept mortality high, reinforced the effect of
the Plague and raised income, enabling the escape from the Malthusian trap (Voigtlaender and Voth, 2013b).
2Data are scarce but it seems that inequality within villages/cities was low. Interprovincial and urban/rural differ-
ences were already considerable (Brandt and Rawski, 2008, chapter 18).
2
The following decades are a case in point of “things going right”. Even if the reform path was
bumpy, cautious “trial and error” policies and a pragmatic approach to the economy were fun-
damental to the emergence of China. Main impulses came from the progressive incentivization
of agricultural production, the decentralization of economic decisions and the opening up of the
economy to foreign investment and technology (Brandt and Rawski, 2008). Western observers
have been struck by the fact that such a fast development has been achieved in spite of institutions
and a political system that have not been known to be supportive of growth before. Ironically,
by stubbornly ignoring IMF’s advices at the time, China fared well. At the initial stage, it re-
frained from the Big Bang strategy of the 1990s that crippled the GDP of most Eastern European
economies (Brandt and Rawski, 2008, chapter 3). Then, it kept its capital account closed and
did not borrow against its high growth potential, which largely spared it from the 1997 Asian
Financial Crisis. However, one decision compatible with economics textbooks was to become a
key aspect of the economic take-off: the accession to the WTO in 2001.3 To many obervers, in
2007/08, its financial backwardness again minimized direct financial disruptions while the US
and Europe were drawn into the Great Recession.4
The long run costs of warding off the crisis have already started to materialize in the form
of high local government debt, increasing capital misallocation and losses on foreign assets. On
top of that, it postponed the structural rebalancing of the economy. All the same, the drivers
of Chinese growth are firmly entrenched in the principles of the market economy but mixed
with “socialist” particularities. That is what makes China especially interesting for research. As
of 2014, many see China as being at a crossroad. Without speculating on future development
paths, I touch upon specificities of the Chinese economic system and discuss some of the factors
that contributed to the emergence of large internal and external imbalances. Then, I put my
dissertation into perspective and provide an overview of the results.
3In fact, WTO membership was a confirmation of an adopted long run policy rather than a paradigm change. China
had already been relatively open to trade and have had low de facto tariffs since the mid-1990s due to exceptions for
foreign-related firms, processing trade and strategic industries (Brandt and Rawski, 2008, chapter 16).
4China experienced no full-blown crisis but got ripples of the shockwave: growth slowed down and the current
account was drastically reduced. The (volatile) stock market was hardly hit but the low participation of households
and private firms in financial markets tamed the impact. Fiscal, and to a lesser extent monetary policy were massively
used to avert a hard landing.
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1.2 Internal and external imbalances in China
Since the mid-2000s, the issue of global imbalances has been a resurgent topic in academics
and occasionally shaped the political agenda. At the world level, Western Offshoots (the US,
Australia, Canada and New Zealand) and, to a lesser extent, Emerging Europe have been ac-
cumulating large current account deficits. These capital imports have largely been provided by
China, the Middle East, Russia and Japan as they accumulated large current account surpluses
(i.e. excesses of domestic saving over domestic investment). In particular, the fact that a devel-
oped country (the US) had a large saving-investment deficit provided – and even financed – by
an emerging economy (China) fostered sustained research.
The factors driving internal and external imbalances in China are increasingly well-understood.
Since Premier Jiabao’s famous 2007 speech acknowledging the unsustainability of the Chinese
growth model, the awareness that rebalancing is a central issue has established itself. The West
has been critical about the slow pace of reforms. Often though, the interconnections of factors
driving internal and external imbalances were not embedded in the analysis. Dealing with them
separately may end up destabilizing the entire economic system. In fact, as I argue thereafter, the
task of rebalancing the Chinese economy truly is daunting.
As suggested by Johansson (2012), the financial repression environment plays a key role
in imbalances: the managed floating exchange rate system forces the PBC (People’s Bank of
China) to expand monetary mass. In the process of sterilization, harsh reserve requirements are
imposed on state-owned banks to keep inflation in check (Lardy and Borst, 2013). In compen-
sation, the PBC sets a higher bound on deposit rate and a lower bound on lending rate, thus
guaranteeing a large spread favorable to SOBs (state-owned banks). As they earn low or nega-
tive real interest rates, households end up indirectly subsidizing lendings to SOEs (state-owned
enterprises) via SOBs. Credit controls and entry barriers secure a dominant position of the “Big
Four”on the banking market.5 Capital account restrictions hinder agents to internationally es-
cape the low interest environment. The intransparent and super volatile home stock markets are
no credible alternative while bonds issuance has just been emerging as an alternative to bank
financing (Hansakul et al., 2009). Thus, the financial repression and the exchange rate policy fa-
vor capital-intensive SOEs and the manufacturing sector as opposed to services (Johansson and
Wang, 2011).
The mispricing of capital relative to labor is another factor contributing to external imbal-
ances in China. State-controlled prices of specific factors of production are an implicit subsidy
to the secondary sector (Huang, 2010). The pass-through of oil and electricity price variations
to firms is limited (Lardy and Borst, 2013). Land is used as a strategic development tool by lo-
cal authorities as property rights are weak and compensations low. Environmental costs are not
priced in production and impair on households’ life quality.
5Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and Agricultural Bank of
China.
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An essential aspect of internal imbalances is the primer of state and local investment over
private consumption. In addition to the integration into the world economy, capital accumulation
has been one of the pillars of China’s growth (e.g. regional development plans or the massive
stimulus during the Great Recession). Examples of ghost cities and train tracks to nowhere abund.
Nevertheless, some argue that China still has a low capital to output ratio and huge infrastructure
needs (HSBC, 2012). If the case for overinvestment is debatable, the capital misallocation issue
is less controversial. SOEs are provided with more capital than private firms (Brandt and Zhu,
2010). Until recently, SOEs did not pay out dividends to the state, hindering any public good
financing as compensation for their favorable position (Borst, 2012c). The bulk of ambitious
investment targets are set by the central government but have to be implemented at the regional
level with little help in financing.
The limited fiscal autonomy of local governments is another fundamental issue for internal
rebalancing. They bear the rising burden of investment and social expenditures but have limited
control on revenues. Local authorities can directly set up opaque and highly leveraged LGFVs
(Local Government Financing Vehicles) to have access to cheap financing and issue bonds (Soh
and Wang, 2011). Furthermore, high levels of SOE corporate debts (mostly bank loans) add to
the local government-related implicit garantees and amount to substantial hidden extra-budgetary
risks for the central government. Since its liberalization in the end of the 1990s, the housing mar-
ket has become a major source of investment and provided a welcome store of value for trapped
household savings. Preventing this (rational) bubble from getting out of control is made difficult
by the fact that land rent and sales are a substantial source of financing for local governments
(Borst, 2012a).
The tragic dichotomy of the rural and urban class contributes to imbalances as well. The in-
dustrialization of the East Coast has spurred the “largest voluntary migration” in human history
(Chan, 2013). Remnants of the Communist era’s land rights put a dent in agricultural produc-
tivity. Rural households and migrants lack most of the social security and insurances urban
dwellers have access to (the Hukou registration system heavily restricts access to social secu-
rity, insurances, basic political rights and higher education). Urbanization has thus remained a
shallow driver of consumption (Borst, 2012d).
At last, we turn to the pivotal role of household saving and their influence on external im-
balances. High level of household savings rate is likely to be sustained for a long time to come
without further improvements in the social security system. The “breaking of the iron rice bowl”
(SOE reforms of the 1990s) left households with lower insurance and pension benefits. The
looming end of the demographic dividend is a ticking bomb and – at least partly – justifies high
savings rates. Still, the potential contribution of reforms to rebalancing should not be overem-
phasized: alternative surveys found that more than half of all households have no or little savings
(University and People’s Bank, 2012). Massive saving accumulation seems to be a phenomenon
limited to the urban upper-class.
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Taken together, the preceding points help to understand why China has developed into the
“factory of the world”, an economy with high investment and even higher saving (i.e. current
account surpluses). I will discuss how the literature rationalizes these patterns in the third chap-
ter.6 Paradoxically, as of 2014, China started to reform the economic model that has been serving
its purpose so well for three decades. More than ever, daring to “take the visible hand off the
bicycle seat” is a true challenge. On the one side, it may increase the likelihood of a hard landing
of the Chinese economy in the short run (Yongding, 2012). On the other side, the status quo
may imply a deepening of current internal and external imbalances, lower long run growth and a
further increase in inequality, building the socle on which revolutions rise.7
Alexis de Tocqueville suggested that old regimes only fall to revolutions when they attempt
reform but yet dash the raised expectations they have evoked (Economist, 2013). This seems
particularly relevant these days as aspirations towards higher life standards are embedded in
new generations. “It is not during periods of great deprivation or rapid growth that political
disturbances usually occur, rather it is when a period of growth and rising expectations are
suddenly reversed".8
6I contribute by showing in a formal framework that the non-state and the international sector drive high saving
while the state sector drives high investment (see chapter 3).
7In my opinion, the progressive relaxing of financial repression has to be concomitant with a higher flexibility of
factor prices, a progressive income tax to finance social security reforms and most importantly, a major reform of the
fiscal system (i.e. more control on financial resources at the local level). However, by doing that, the CCP may “pull
the Dragon’s tail” and initiate a reaction that could well lead to its own demise.
8James C. Davis quoted in (Borst, 2012b).
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1.3 Thesis focus
Global imbalances occupied a prominent position in the academic debate in the 2000s. Over the
last decade, the literature disproportionately discussed the issue through the lens of US interests.
At the onset of the prophetic Great Rebalancing, the focus was increasingly laid on China. In
policy discussions and economic studies, it tends to be considered as a uniform macroeconomic
entity.
In 2010, Chinese provinces were, as one would expect, as large as typical developing coun-
tries (e.g. Indonesia, Thailand or Colombia). Fortunately, a substantial part of national statistics
is available at the regional level as well. Putting aside quality issues for the moment, this provides
us with a sample of 31 economies at different stage of development (from India to Slovakia).9
Over more than three decades of economic reforms, in spite of sharing common characteris-
tics typical of the national economic system (e.g. financial repression and a strong presence of
the state), the provinces became fully-fledged emerging markets with rich variation in economic
DNA. For example, the extent to which state-related enterprises and state-owned banks affect
economic activity, the integration into the world market via international firms, the economic
structure or even demographic factors typically vary a lot among regions. Therefore, they pro-
vide an ideal research laboratory to answer questions that are central to better understand the past,
present and future contribution of China to global imbalances. It is the impetus that jump-started
this thesis.
1.3.1 First paper
Chinese data are known to be noisy. The dissertation project therefore involved considerable
start-up costs in terms of time used in data preparation work. In the second chapter, I document
this effort and present some important stylized facts on regional macroeconomic data and capital
flows in China. To my knowledge, if a large literature on differences in regional development
and the potential explanatory factors exists, the issue of external regional imbalances has never
been adressed systematically. While certainly not publishable per se, this chapter allowed me
to outsource major data issues encountered in later works. In fact, it is this knowledge about
available data and key empirical facts that paved the way for the more advanced empirical and
theoretical studies of chapter three and four.
Concretely, I shed light on issues related to data quality and aggregation properties of Chi-
nese regional macroeconomic figures. Large discrepancies between regional and national official
components of GDP expenditure aggregates are observed. Investment errors are the key driver
of differences between provincial and national output: regional “phantom investments” system-
atically exceeded national statistics since the mid-1990s. This clear trend has been a statistical
9See The Economist’s interactive maps for more (http://www.economist.com/content/all_parities_
china).
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companion of emerging China over the 1990s and 2000s. As a consequence, cumulated provin-
cial net exports end up being lower than national values. For example, assuming regional data
are correct, the historical 2007 8.8% peak in national net exports over GDP would be levelled
down to 3.5%. Still, the match between aggregated local net exports and national values has been
reasonable from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s and dynamics of aggregates and national values
are highly correlated, even in recent years.
In terms of GDP per capita, the clear north-south divide of the 1950s morphed into an east-
west divide as coastal regions were the first to become integrated into the world economy. A
decrease in terms of output per capita disparities among regions during the initial reform period
is observed but it turns out to be largely driven by City-Provinces (i.e. Beijing, Tianjin and
Shanghai). In fact, the cross-regional variability in relative output per capita has been on the rise
since the 1990s at least, in spite of large migration flows, investment programs and the recent
progressive integration of the hinterland into the world supply chain. Geographically, saving
rates follow an east-west divide. Investment rates form a north-south divide. Historically, relative
saving was highly related to the level of economic development. By contrast, relative investment
was not.
I explore to which extent regional light intensity in China is related to real GDP figures at
the provincial level. By using data from US Army satellites, I am able to show that once one
controls for the huge differences in regional size, light intensity seems to be positively correlated
with GDP in Chinese regions in a roughly concave fashion.
The principal part is devoted to external balance statistics. To start with, I focus on net exports
surpluses and deficits (i.e. the difference between saving and investment). The coastal regions
have indeed accumulated surpluses since the opening up of China. Interestingly, some other
regions have even larger saving-investment gaps. City-Provinces and Manchuria started with
large surpluses and converged towards a neutral position during reforms. Over the last decades,
Central China has had roughly balanced net exports. West and South China have been running
huge deficits.
An alternative indicator of external balance is international trade data. They have good ag-
gregation properties since 1992. Imbalances in international trade are less dramatic than in net
exports: with the exception of the East Coast, most provinces have been running small surpluses.
Two lessons can be drawn from these empirical facts. First, large discrepancies in net exports
seem to be driven by interregional flows. Second, in absolute terms, only the East Coast re-
gions truly matter for international capital flows. This specialization pattern may explain why
the variability of cross-regional international trade balance has been increasing since the 1990s.
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1.3.2 Second paper
In the third chapter, I relate capital flows to regional productivity in a more formal framework
using a small open economy model. I show that a capital allocation puzzle is present inside
China: provinces that caught up relative to national productivity had surpluses of saving over
investment (capital outflows) while the opposite happened for provinces that benefited less from
economic reforms. This results is reminiscent of the findings of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013)
at the international level.
Starting from that empirical finding, I follow up by identifying the drivers of that pattern using
a standard neoclassical model with two frictions in the mould of Gourinchas and Jeanne. The
first one takes effect at the aggregate level of the economy and influences capital accumulation. It
is an investment wedge that affects gross return on aggregate capital. It is identified in matching
an empirical with a theoretical decomposition of investment rate. I find an investment puzzle:
regions that caught up relative to the rest of China seem to have higher wedge (lower investment
rate), while provinces that fell behind implicitly subsidized investment. This is a first blow to the
baseline neoclassical framework and stands in sharp contrast with international patterns.
The second friction (the saving wedge) is comparable to a tax on capital income of house-
holds. It is identified in matching an empirical with a theoretical decomposition of cumulated
relative capital flows (i.e. net exports). As on the international level, we find a saving puzzle: the
relationship between productivity catch-up and saving wedges is negative and very significant.
Provinces that caught up are the ones that implicitly subsidized saving, causing a saving glut that
translates into capital outflows. This is a second blow to the neoclassical model. As opposed to
investment wedges, saving frictions are the main driver of the capital allocation puzzle.
In a next step, I investigate whether the estimated long run wedges are related to usual sus-
pects proposed in the literature. The regional cross-sectional variability of the wedges seems
useful in shedding light on the general patterns of capital flows. Some characteristics related to
the investment structure of the economy robustly account for a high part of the cross-regional
variation in investment wedges: a high share of the state in investment in fixed assets or in con-
struction gross output value and a marked presence of the formal, state-near financial sector –
loans in financial institutions – seem to foster investment.
Turning to saving wedges, there seems to be an ubiquitous effect of the state’s involvement
in the economy (e.g. state-owned share of gross industrial output value) in repressing saving.
By contrast, a greater importance of multinational firms, privately-owned enterprises and a larger
industrial sector are all associated with higher saving compared to the neoclassical model. Fi-
nancial development – deposits and loans in financial institutions – seems to put a dent in saving.
I conclude that the capital allocation puzzle is driven by both the visible hand (the state) and
the private sector. By constructing non-state sector net exports, I show that more marketized
regions with a strong presence of private and international firms (i.e. the East Coast and the City-
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Provinces) have a large non-state saving surplus while other regions have balanced non-state net
exports on average. In fact, massive state net exports deficits are largely responsible for large
capital imports (i.e. a negative saving - investment balance) in the Chinese hinterland. An impor-
tant part of this chapter is devoted to robustness checks using alternative data, parametrization
and extensions of the baseline methodological framework.
1.3.3 Third paper
The last subproject of my thesis is undertaken jointly with Prof. Mathias Hoffmann. While
the methodology used in chapter three enabled to identify the long run drivers of capital flows
for Chinese regions, the cross-sectional information was obviously limited by the number of
provinces. Exploiting time-variation in external balance and explanatory factors might be infor-
mative. Furthermore, a theory-based decomposition of the different driving forces of regional
net exports would enable us to be more specific in testing factors proposed by the literature. We
build on a recent paper by Hoffmann (2013), to study the dynamics of China’s province-level net
exports and to correlate regional patterns of external adjustment with different characteristics in
a theory-based panel framework. This gives us detailed insights into what types of frictions drive
the accumulation of internal imbalances.
Our analysis follows the tradition of the intertemporal approach to the current account (Sachs
et al., 1981; Bergin and Sheffrin, 2000; Kano, 2008). We apply and extend the empirical frame-
work used in these studies to intranational data by introducing a saving wedge. Concretely, we
end up with four channels of net exports adjustment. The first term reflects the intertemporal
consumption smoothing channel that is emphasized by basic versions of the neoclassical model
(intertemporal variation in quantities or net output). The second term is the effect on intertem-
poral substitution of expected changes in the local price of non-tradables (i.e. intratemporal
substitution). The third and fourth terms capture how variation in the domestic real rate of inter-
est and in the impact of the excess return on the foreign bond – the saving wedge – respectively
affect province-level capital flows.
We back up in-sample expectations with a reduced-form VAR and identify three (a priori
unknown) deep parameters of the model (coefficient of relative risk aversion, discount factor and
degree of financial repression) based on a three-dimensional grid-search procedure. Our simple
model can account for 85 percent of the variation in a panel of 30 province-level net exports
over the 1985-2010 period. By using the four channels of our structural panel, we focus on
characteristics that the literature has emphasized as potentially important in explaining China’s
persistent surpluses since the 1990s: i) the relative importance of private and state-owned en-
terprises (SOEs) and the differential access of these types of firms to finance, ii) a province’s
degree of integration into the world economy in terms of openness to FDI or trade, iii) sectoral
composition and iv) demographics.
We find that there are major differences in the patterns of adjustment across provinces. In
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particular, the relative importance of SOEs and private enterprises for the local economy has a
major bearing on the patterns of external adjustment. Intertemporal variation in net output is
particularly important as a driver of capital flows in provinces with a strong presence of private
firms, as is the domestic interest rate. This pattern is consistent with theories that see financial
repression as a major source of China’s persistent surpluses: under financial repression, private
firms do not have access to bank finance and therefore have to finance investment from retained
earnings. As a result, surpluses are better at predicting decreases in net output (via increases in
investment) in provinces with a large share of private firms. The absence of access to international
finance also means that the domestic (financially repressed) interest rate is the relevant driver of
saving decisions of households and private firms.
Furthermore, we show that a higher integration into the world economy – international open-
ness and FDI – is strongly related to a rising importance of the international interest rate channel
and to a decrease in intertemporal variation in quantities (net output). Foreign participation
thus possibly alleviates financing issues of the private sector. We also find that variation in non-
tradable prices is an important driver of net export variation in less developed regions, suggesting
that housing is particularly important as a savings vehicle when there is a lack of investible assets.
By reconstructing Chinese net exports from the inside, we find that most of the 2000s run-
up and the successive adjustment is driven by intertemporal variation in net output. During
this period, financial repression makes a persistent and positive contribution to China’s surplus.
Variation in the world interest rate plays only a relatively minor (but increasing) role overall
while internal price pressure on non-tradable goods has a major dampening effect on China’s
burgeoning external surplus.
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Chapter 2
Regional External Imbalances in
China: Data and Stylized Facts
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2.1 Introduction
Global imbalances occupied a prominent position in the academic debate in the 2000s. That
issue came back on the agenda in the wake of the eurozone crisis. Over the last decade, the
literature disproportionately discussed the issue through the lens of US interests. At the onset of
the prophetic Great Rebalancing, observers and experts increasingly laid the focus on China. In
policy discussions and economic studies, it tends to be considered as a uniform macroeconomic
entity.
Enlightened observers are keen to remember how disparate the regions are. A large literature
on differences in development between coastal and inner provinces exist and the potential factors
explaining them have been largely discussed. Still, surprisingly little attention has been devoted
to within-country discrepancies in external imbalances. In our opinion, a better knowledge of the
available data and the exposition of key empirical facts could pave the way for further empirical
and theoretical works.
This paper sets the stage for a better understanding of Chinese – and presumably global –
imbalances. We discuss issues related to regional data availability and quality of output as well
as three indicators of external balance: net exports, international trade and interregional capital
flows. Our second contribution is to shed light on their cross-regional patterns. Concretely, we
focus on geographical distribution, persistence over time, variability and on their correlation with
regional level of economic development.
We find that regional investment has been increasingly overestimated compared to national
values. As a consequence, aggregate provincial net exports are lower than national data suggest.
Furthermore, while the northern part of the country seemed more developed in the 1950s, the
eastern part now leads in terms of real GDP per capita. By using nighttime light intensity, we
find that the broad patterns of development correspond to official data.
Moreover, we observe a complete scope of different and persistent regional saving-investment
balances with South and West China being typical capital importers while the East Coast has been
exporting capital all along. Focusing exclusively on international trade reveals that only a few
provinces in the eastern part of the country are the drivers of the Chinese contribution to global
imbalances. Our indicator for interregional flows suggests that regions in Manchuria, the Bohai
Economic Rim and the Yangtze Delta have been providing capital to the rest of China over the
1992-2004 period.
The structure of the paper is as follows. To begin with, we discuss the related literature and
general data issues in the rest of Section 2.1. Next, in Section 2.2, we turn to the components
of regional economic aggregates (i.e. output, saving, investment and net exports). Then, we use
satellite nighttime light data to test the quality of provincial output aggregates in Section 2.3. In
Section 2.4, we investigate patterns of international trade data. Finally, we propose an indicator
for interregional capital flows in Section 2.5 and conclude in Section 2.6.
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2.1.1 Related Literature
This paper is linked to four distinct strands of the Chinese-specific literature: the quality of
data, the imbalances among regions in level of development, the factors driving these regional
discrepancies and the patterns of provincial trade. To our knowledge, no study has exclusively
focused on cross-provincial patterns in external imbalances.1
A small circle of scholars investigated data quality. This issue is as old as the Communist
Party itself: the Great Leap Forward famines of 1958-1962 were a direct consequence of over-
reports of grain output by local officials for fear of the Anti-Rightist movement (Cai, 2000). The
resilience of the Chinese economy during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis raised scepticism about
growth figures (Smith, 2001). More recently, in 2011, excess coal reserves and electricity pro-
duction did not seem to corroborate the optimistic GDP growth figures in some regions. There
have been reports of officials using electricity consumption, rail cargo volume or bank loans as
indicators of economic activity rather than official GDP figures (Bradsher, 2012).
Output statistics mostly came under close scrutiny: Adams and Chen (1996) reassessed real
GDP growth over the 1978-1994 period using energy consumption. It halved official growth
figures. In the same spirit, Rawski (2001) argued that official 1997-2001 GDP figures have
been overrated. Rawski and Mead (1998) found that data massively overestimated Chinese farm
workers (the notorious “phantom farmers”) from 1979 to 1993, causing a large bias in sectoral
output estimation. Following official instructions of the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS),
Holz (2004b) reconstructed private consumption between 1997 and 2001 but it rarely matched
official data.
Rawski (2000) points to the long Chinese tradition of literacy and to the systematic record-
keeping of the socialist state. Central planning necessitates an extensive array of data. Chow
(2006) opines that statistics are by and large reliable. Still, there is a general agreement that the
1990s saw a near collapse of the statistical system. Xiaolu and Lian (2001) observe that during
the era of central planning and the initial phase of reforms, dominant state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) managed their production according to official plans, which made data collection easy
and transparent. Incentives to overreport GDP originated in the 1990s, when this indicator be-
came a central criterion to assess performance of local officials. Incentives for misreporting are
not obvious: some regions may benefit from substantial help if they do not live up to expecta-
tions while others may be penalized (Cai, 2000). The suggestion that “officials make statistics
and statistics make officials” has been made by former officials of the NBS themselves (Rawski,
2000).
Another difficulty arises from the frequent redefinition of variables. Reporting categories
change over time and sometimes cause statistical breaks in time series. Until 1993, China used
1In their influential paper, Song et al. (2011) found a positive relationship between relative net surpluses (S-I over
GDP) and domestic private employment share at the provincial level between 2001 and 2007. In a risk sharing paper,
Li (2010) noticed great discrepancies in the average provincial net exports over GDP.
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the Material Product System typically adopted by planned economies (Campbell, 1985).2 The
introduction of the System of National Accounts enabled to better keep track of the growing
economy. The problems of the 1990s to capture the rapid growth in private productive units led
to two major revisions of the statistical system (1993 and 1998). The revised laws reduced the
role of the reporting system in favor of censuses as basis for revision of yearly data (Holz, 2004a).
There is little evidence that regional data are worse than at the national level: the 2004 Economic
Census validated provincial GDP data and invalidated national ones (Holz, 2008).
On the one hand, the domination of the Communist Party seems to guarantee a stability over
time of institutions. On the other hand, the statistical system was not adapted to adequately record
the take-off of the private sector in the 1990s. All things considered, there are many reasons to
doubt the exactness of the NBS data. All the same, one has to acknowledge that general data
coverage is impressive. With respect to statistical standards, the World Bank report (WB, 2002)
ranked China as a typical top-tier developing country (as e.g. South Africa or Russia).
There is a large literature on the level and dynamics of output and income disparities in
China. Fleisher and Chen (1997) found a conditional convergence of per capita production across
provinces from 1978 to 1993.3 Historically, a large part of regional income disparity seems to
be attributable to the rural-urban income gap (Chang, 2002). As noticed by Kanbur and Zhang
(1999), the inland-coastal contribution to total inequality hugely increased in the 1990s. Since
the reforms started, the coastal regions grew faster while Central China lost momentum and
converged toward Western China (Yao and Zhang, 2001). An acceleration of the process was
observed since the mid-1990s.
The Maoist development strategy was to eradicate regional industrial disparities and invest-
ments were mostly promoted in interior provinces for strategic reasons (Yang, 2002). Ideally,
each region had to be able to survive in autarchy. Limited investment in transportation and heavy
restrictions on labor mobility were ubiquitous (Brandt et al., 2012). At the same time, the low
prices imposed on agricultural production and resources harmed interior provinces and the rural
population. Jian et al. (1996) found that real income among provinces was stable from 1952 to
1965, diverged during the Cultural Revolution (1965-1978) but began to equalize in the initial
reform period thanks to a rise in rural productivity. Disparities started to grow again with the
integration of coastal provinces into the world economy in the 1990s. As argued by Brun et al.
(2002), it seems that spillover effects from coastal regions have not reduced inequalities in the
1990s.
The factors explaining these differences are numerous. Using data from Chinese cities, Alder
et al. (2013) found that the establishment of special economic zones (SEZs) led to a substantial
increase in the level of GDP. Other studies point to the key role of preferential policies. Coastal
2The economy then only consisted of “socialist productive enterprises” and households. Services – most of them
were free – and smaller independent enterprises were part of the “non-productive sector”.
3They controlled for physical investment share, employment growth, human capital investment, FDI and coastal
location.
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regions were the first to benefit from special tax treatments and FDI-friendly legislations (De-
murger et al., 2002). They have higher TFP level (Brandt et al., 2012), possibly due to their
openness to FDI and trade (Jiang, 2011). Demurger (2001) used provincial data over 1985-1998
and identified differences in geographical location and infrastructure endowment (transport and
communication). According to Brandt and Rawski (2008, chapter 17), the pre-reform impor-
tance of the state in a region may matter as it could influence successive capital allocation and
economic policy.4
Human capital disparities certainly play an important role as well: Hannum and Wang (2006)
found large and rising geographic inequality in access to education in China. They link it to rising
economic inequality and large disparities in educational spending due to fiscal decentralization.
Liu and Li (2006) found that growth imbalances over 1984-1998 were strongly related to the fi-
nancial source or ownership type of capital. Domestic bank loans and foreign-owned enterprises
are important in coastal provinces while state appropriation or state-owned enterprises rule the
roost in inner provinces. Jia (2012) found that history matters as prefectures where treaty ports
had been established between 1840 and 1910 developed faster during the reform period. As suc-
cessful explanatory factors, she suggests human capital (education) and social capital (attitudes,
norms and culture towards the market economy).
At last, we turn to the literature on discrepancies in trade patterns. Naughton (2003) found
evidences of a large inter-provincial trade in 1992 that seemed to be dominated by intra-industry
trade in manufactured goods. Barriers to movement in factors of production and trade in services
as well as intermediate goods were still large. The evolution of intranational trade between 1987,
1992 and 1997 is tackled by Poncet (2003) who found an increasing importance of provincial
boundaries. Indeed, some observers early argued that reforms could have encouraged the creation
of local clusters protecting their market with the blessing of regional authorities. Poncet (2005)
mentioned the fear of high unemployment and the protection of loss-making state-owned firm as
well as fiscal revenues maximization as potential reasons. Girardin and Owen (2011) discuss the
highly asymmetric regional distribution of the share of multinational enterprises in international
trade. They argue that China’s high trade surplus is associated with FDI inflows and international
production structures. At last, we recommend Gaulier et al. (2011) for a careful discussion of the
different components of Chinese foreign trade and their dynamics.
2.1.2 General remarks
When not mentioned otherwise, data used in this chapter are from the National Statistical Year-
books of the People’s Republic of China and from the Provincial Statistical Yearbooks of the
4For example, southern provinces benefited from large state-driven investments in the 1960s and 1970s as a result
of the Third Front Campaign that aimed to relocate industrial and military sites in the secure hinterland. These regions
thus already had high state share compared to the East Coast when reforms started.
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22 provinces, 5 autonomous regions and 4 municipalities of Mainland China.5 The China Data
Center (CDC) of the University of Michigan provides electronic access to the yearbooks and
made main statistics conveniently available.6 For most provinces, our online access only covers
regional statistical yearbooks in the 1990s and 2000s. Thus, it happens that the data are some-
times incomplete. We will primarily rely on data directly retrieved from recent online yearbooks
and complete possible gaps with CDC sheets. This allows us to take account of revisions as much
as possible. When necessary, we briefly discuss particular data issues at the beginning of each
section.
Table 2.1 summarizes our subdivision of China into six larger entities and provides some
basic statistics (respective share in output and population). We try to keep the balance between
geographical and economic coherence.7 Figure 2.1 provides an overview of the relative real
output share for recent decades. The striking patterns are the rising GDP share of the East Coast
and the decline of Metropolises (City-Provinces). Moreover, migration flows largely contributed
to an increasing share of total population of the East Coast and the Metropolises, principally at
the cost of the Center, Manchuria and the South (see Table 2.1). Interestingly, the West seems to
be an exception as its relative GDP was on the rise in the 2000s while its population share staid
relatively constant.
2.2 Regional expenditure components
2.2.1 Aggregation properties
Before discussing empirical facts, we first want to focus on the aggregation properties of the
data. Ideally, the sum of provincial aggregates should be roughly equivalent to national values,
keeping in mind that measurement errors and sample gaps probably hinder a perfect match. The
question of interest is to which extent discrepancies appear to be systematic. It is an important
step towards understanding key patterns of provincial aggregates. In the end, it should enable us
to have a better grasp of potential consequences for our later findings.
To get an intuitive error indicator, we substract national values from cumulated provincial
ones and weigh the result with national GDP for each year. A positive result thus means that
5The autonomous regions are Tibet, Xinjiang, Guangxi, Inner Mongolia and Ningxia. The cities of Beijing,
Tianjin, Shanghai as well as the region of Chongqing are municipalities. Thereafter, the term province will be used as
general qualifier.
6http://chinadataonline.org/. The CDC reports data values as soon as they are published in the corre-
sponding yearbook. Although data have sometimes been subject to official revisions in later years, the CDC did not
systematically adapt past values.
7Our subdivision of China goes one step further than usual in the literature, which typically focuses on three
blocks: East, Center and West. For our part, we think that considering separately the South and the West may be
informative. Another deviation is to separate Metropolises (City-Provinces) from other (larger) coastal regions. At
last, we consider the Chinese Rustbelt (Manchuria) separately from other coastal regions. The attribution of Shanxi
and Inner Mongolia to the West is more controversial. We make that choice on the ground that they share strong
economic similarities with other western regions (large mineral resources, high investment and a strong presence of
the state sector).
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provincial data overestimate national values. Inevitably, as the data availability across regions
improves over time, we expect initial gaps to fade out towards the end of the sample. The errors
of GDP are decomposed into private consumption, government consumption, investment and net
exports errors.
In Figure 2.2, one sees that aggregated provincial output has been underestimated compared
to national values with an average of 7% in the initial part of the sample (1975-2000). It is at least
partly explained by the fact that some large provinces only have GDP data from 1978 onward.8
By taking missing regions into account – substracting their 1978 weight from the average error –
and extending the sample (1952-1999), the pattern would look similar: a sizeable part of national
output hovering around 5% is not captured in provincial statistics. Surprisingly, this pattern
reversed during the 2000s: provincial aggregates toppled national GDP value in 2003 and ended
up overestimating it by 11% of GDP in 2010. No new region entered the sample over this period.
Obviously, a yet unidentified factor has been at work that either led provinces to report too high
output, national statistics to report too low output or a combination of both.
We delve into the components of output in the hope of identifying the factor responsible for
the marked trend in output errors. Private consumption errors are relatively stable.9 After having
reached roughly the same value as its national counterpart in the early 1980s, they followed a U-
pattern reaching -7% in 1999 and converged towards near neutral position by 2007. Government
consumption errors follow a positive trend from under- to more precise estimation.10 In a word,
both private and government consumption do not seem to have played a major role in the recent
trend in output errors. As for investment, many incomplete provinces enter the sample simulta-
neously in 1978. Still, the improvement in aggregate errors is only gradual.11 Over the sample
period, investment errors follow a clear positive trend: they reversed from more than -11% in
the 1970s to nearly zero a decade later. In 2010, the overestimation was massive (13% of GDP).
Therefore, it seems that errors in investment induced the trend in output errors.
Obviously, provincial data have poor aggregation properties. The trend in investment error
is particularly troubling as it contaminates output and biases net exports far more than errors in
saving, which are large but roughly stationary. Being a small part of output compared to other
components, net exports are severely affected. Between 1985 and 2005, the sum of regional
external positions was relatively close to the national counterpart with an average error of 0.31%.
Net exports became increasingly underestimated at the provincial level in the following years
to reach 5.9% of GDP in 2010. National data suggest a net exports surplus of around 4%. As
a result, regional data would imply that China in fact run a small deficit in 2010! In the same
8There is a high heterogeneity in the availability of GDP: at reporting start in 1978, Guangdong and Sichuan
accounted for no less than 5.4 and 5.1% of national output. The impact of smaller provinces is negligible: Hainan and
Ningxia made up about 0.5 and 0.4% of GDP in 1978. Tibet only starts in 1992 with an impact of 0.1%.
9They decrease as Guangdong, Hainan, Sichuan and Ningxia enter the sample in 1978, followed by Jiangxi in
1980 and Tibet in 1992.
10There are no differences in sample entry compared to private consumption.
11Jiangxi, Guangdong, Hainan, Sichuan and Ningxia start in 1978. Tibet in 1992.
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spirit, assuming regional data are correct, the historical 2007 8.8% peak in national net exports
over GDP would be levelled to 3.5%. At first sight, it seems to be supportive of Zhang (2008)
who convincingly made the point that misinvoicing of exports and imports has been biasing the
Chinese trade balance upward in the 2000s (i.e. only if local statistics are less affected). Still, the
dynamics of aggregates and national values are roughly similar: the correlation of their absolute
first difference between 1985 and 2010 amounts to 0.80.
As a consequence of the problems encountered in this section, one has to remain cautious
when interpreting the results of this study, particularly with statements concerning absolute val-
ues. An empirical check of the exactness of regional macroeconomic figures would necessitate
considerable resources. Potential indicators could be light intensity, electricity consumption or
cargo transports. At this point, we have no choice but to rely on a fingers-crossed argument.
In Section 2.3, we use light intensity to evaluate GDP data quality. Thereafter, the focus lies
on cross-section characteristics of Chinese provinces. Thus, the errors should not invalidate our
conclusions as long as they occur randomly or with the same intensity. In the following sections,
we remain cautious and typically concentrate on the relative ranking of provinces rather than
interpreting absolute values.
2.2.2 Nominal and real GDP per capita
Nominal GDP data are available from 1952 onward for 26 out of 31 regions and for all but Tibet
by 1978. Nevertheless, the surprisingly good availability should be relativized: the transition
from a planned economy – in which the private sector was practically inexistent – to a market
economy certainly makes any direct times series comparison hazardous. Thereafter, we divide
GDP per capita by the national value reported for the corresponding period for two reasons.
First, it enables us to ignore methodological changes affecting level values across the board (e.g
statistical system reforms). Second, it makes comparisons easier.
Chinese population data are a topic of their own. Two main problems are plaguing them:
the underreported birth numbers as a consequence of the one child policy (Scharping, 2001)
and the “largest (voluntary) migration in human history” (Chan, 2013). We tried to address
the second issue. Basically, three sources of population estimates exist. The Hukou Household
Registration System population data is reported by the Public Security Authorities.12 It can be
considered as a de jure statistic because it does not capture migration flows adequately. Typically,
richer coastal provinces have an underestimated population and hinterland provinces a too high
population (Chan and Wang, 2008). An alternative is the use of regular sample surveys of around
1% of the population and population censuses (1982, 1990, 2000 and 2010). They should better
approximate resident population but unfortunately, the time of the survey as well as the definition
of permanent residents and migrants is not always consistent over time. They are usually referred
12The Hukou aims at limiting rural migration by restricting access to welfare goods and services for non-urban
residents such as health care, insurances or education (Chan, 2010)
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to as de facto data.
The yearbooks population data often are a combination of the three sources that we have al-
ready mentioned. We carefully compared CDC data, recent yearbooks, sample surveys, censuses
and existing studies to at least avoid sudden jumps due to changes in definition and assemble our
own population time series. We tried to consider de facto data as much as possible, particularly
for provinces traditionally heavily influenced by migration.13
To start with, we focus on relative output inside China in the initial years of the communist
era. In Figure 2.3, we provide a map of the mean of nominal relative output per capita from 1952
to 1959. A clear north-south divide in output per capita relative to national value stands out. The
Metropolises (Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai) were the richest provinces by far, with values more
than two and a half times national ones. Manchuria (Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang) was eco-
nomically more developed as well. Apart from large oil resources, it potentially benefited from
the Japanese occupation from 1931 to 1945 in terms of a massive increase in railway network
(Chou, 1971) and an early heavy industrialization (Eckstein et al., 1974). It was to become the
main industrial base of China for the next decades. Other resource-rich regions (mainly coal)
such as Inner Mongolia and Shanxi had higher level of GDP per capita. In the western part of the
country, where mineral resources are also relatively abundant, provinces were more developed
as well (e.g Xinjiang with its large oil reserves). The rest of the country was more dependent on
agriculture. This broad pattern in relative GDP persisted until the onset of economic reforms in
the 1970s.
In a next step, we focus on the recent geographical distribution of real GDP per capita.14 In
Figure 2.4, we observe a major shift of regional patterns compared to the 1950s. The north-south
divide morphed into an east-west one.15
First, the large gap between the Metropolises and national values has narrowed considerably.
Second, with Liaoning (1.41), Jilin (1.13) and Heilongjiang (0.89), Manchuria lost some ground
but still figures in the upper part of the ranking. Third, a well-known and largely discussed surge
in output quickly followed the creation of SEZs and the progressive opening to FDI and foreign
firms on the East Coast. Not surprisingly, these regions are highly active in international trade.
As a result, the wealthiest provinces are now located on the coastline. Guangdong (1.18) in the
Pearl River Delta is known to have benefited from investment windfalls thanks to its proximity
13Central China as well as Chongqing and Sichuan have been the main outflow regions. Shanghai, Guangdong and
to a lesser extent other eastern provinces have been net recipients (Chan, 2013).
14We compute real GDP from 1984 onwards using official regional CPI data as a proxy for the development of
prices over time and the price of a living expenditure basket of Brandt and Holz (2006) to correct for the initial
difference in price level. Revised data have been used as much as possible. The choice of CPI as deflator is justified as
follows: first, it is broadly available. Second, no (official) explicit GDP deflator on the regional level exist (see Brandt
et al., 2012). Third, alternatives such as retail price index, price of investment in fixed asset, services price index or
producer price index of manufactured goods seem too specific to be used as output deflator.
15Clearly, this shift in patterns is to be taken cautiously as it remains unclear to which extent it only is a byproduct
of the transition from the Material Product System to the System of National Accounts.
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to Hong-Kong and Macau. In the same spirit, Fujian (1.31) has close links with Taiwan. An-
other production hub is the Yangtze River Delta comprising Shanghai (1.76), Zhejiang (1.63)
and Jiangsu (1.63). In the north, the area bordering the Bohai Sea is a major economic hotbed
with Beijing (1.72), Tianjin (2.03), Hebei (1.03) and Shandong (1.39). Fourth, most regions of
the West lost their relatively comfortable position: with the exception of Inner Mongolia (1.55),
data reveal that Xinjiang (0.77), Qinghai (0.67), Gansu (0.50), Ningxia (0.84), Shanxi (0.79) and
Shaanxi (0.83) are all below national value. Statistics for Tibet (0.46) have only been available
since the mid-1990s. Fifth, Southern China still is the least developed cluster: agrarian and
rugged regions like Guizhou (0.40), Yunnan (0.45) and Guangxi (0.67) as well as Hainan island
(0.62) lag behind. Notable exceptions are the large Sichuan (0.72) and the recently created mu-
nicipality of Chongqing (1.08), two regions on the come that are increasingly being integrated
into the world economy. At last, the populous, largely agricultural provinces of Central China
are below national values as well (Henan (0.88), Hubei (0.91), Hunan (0.73), Anhui (0.72) and
Jiangxi (0.72)).
To shed light on the evolution of disparity in output across provinces over time, we compute
the cross-sectional standard deviation and the coefficient of relative variation of relative nominal
GDP per capita from 1952 to 2010 weighted by population share (Figure 2.5).16 The same
indicator is computed for real GDP starting in 1984. The disparities dropped dramatically in
the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) and the slump it provoked. Obviously,
provinces were levelled and convergence took place (sic). Pre-reforms levels were nearly reached
by the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Then, we observe a sustained decrease in
discrepancies as the first reforms begin to take effect. It seems to corroborate findings of the
literature discussed in Section 2.1.1. As an explanation, the initial flexibilization of agricultural
production (the Household Responsibility System) and the decentralization of economic planning
are typically invoked (Brandt and Rawski (2008), chapter 1 and 19). Hinterland regions may have
particularly benefited from these reforms.
Cross-provincial disparities in relative terms then started to increase again in the 1990s, pos-
sibly driven by the (inequal) emergence of foreign trade and FDI investment as key drivers of
economic development. Interestingly, the cross-regional volatility is on a downward trend again
since the mid-2000s and reached its lowest level ever. It contrasts with the recent increase in
regional income inequality recorded in the literature. However, the pattern is not robust to the
exclusion of Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai. In that case, the same indicators would suggest a
sustained increase in discrepancies across provinces since 1990.
16The practice of dividing them by national values enables us to ignore the tremendous growth experienced by all
of these economies and focus on the disparities relative to the nation as a whole. Measuring income inequality is not
the goal of this study and it should be obvious that a decrease in our indicator does not mean a change in inequality
per se. We only investigate cross-regional variation at the macroeconomic level.
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2.2.3 Saving and investment
In order to set the stage for the external imbalances part in Section 2.2.4, we look into the patterns
of the components of net exports (i.e. saving and investment). Both are expressed relative to
output to facilitate comparison across provinces and periods. During the pre-reform era (1952-
1978), high saving to GDP ratios were typically observed in the Metropolises and Manchuria as
well as in some western provinces (e.g. Inner Mongolia and Shanxi). The reform era (1979-2010)
saw the emergence of a coastal saving glut while southern and western provinces experienced far
lower rates (Figure 2.6). Although these regions already had low rates before reforms, the pattern
has become even more clear-cut. Northern regions lost the lead and joined central provinces in
the middle group. Obviously, an east-west divide is observable. Relatively wealthier provinces
seem to have higher saving to output ratio.
In a next step, we focus on investment. Geographical patterns differ markedly. West and
South China experienced high rates in the pre-reform era relative to the East Coast. In Figure
2.7, it seems that a south-north divide materialized in the following decades with the bulk of
southern provinces switching to the lowest investment category. Some hinterland provinces may
have benefited from the Western Development Plan.17 Officially launched at the turn of the
new millenium, it actually encompasses the South as well. The CCP intends to follow a similar
strategy for Manchuria (Northeast Area Revitalization Plan18) and the Center (Rise of Central
China Plan19).
In Figure 2.8, we observe that the rank correlation between saving rates and real GDP per
capita oscillates around a mean of 0.7 over the sample and is very persistent. Thus, historically,
provinces with high saving rate have had a higher output in per capita terms, even prior to eco-
nomic reforms. By comparison, there is no persistent link of investment rate with the distribution
of GDP (the mean correlation barely differs from 0). In Figure 2.8, we observe that the relation-
ship was clearly negative in the 1960s and 1970s. This may be a manifestation of the visible
hand allocating investment to less developed regions (e.g. the Third Front Campaign). The ini-
tial phase of reforms pushed the correlation to 0.6 in the mid-1990s but the positive relationship
waned and reached negative pre-reform levels in the 2000s.20 Starting the rank correlation later
– in 1980 instead of 1953 – enables to add new regions to the sample but does not influence
patterns.
17Massive investments in infrastructures, mainly transportation and power generating facilities ( http://www.
chinagate.cn/features/Western_Development/node_7084033.htm).
18For more, see http://english.gov.cn/special/ne_index.htm.
19For more, see http://www.bjreview.com.cn/17thCPC/txt/2007-10/16/content_80952.htm.
20Interestingly, the drop in correlation of investment seems to correspond to the “Go West” strategy initiated by the
Chinese government in the late 1990s. In that sense, the visible hand may be back. The progressive redistribution of
FDI toward inner provinces is another potential explanation for this pattern: FDI to GDP ratio typically peaked in the
mid-1990s for most eastern regions while it started to rise only recently in less developed provinces.
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2.2.4 Regional external balance
In the regional expenditure approach statistics, each entity is considered as a country with its
own GRP (gross regional product). Net exports figures should therefore be informative about
external balance at the regional boundary (i.e. interregional and international flows in goods and
services).21 Thereafter, net exports and output of the 31 regions are aggregated into six larger
areas as defined in Table 2.1.
In Figure 2.9, a clear pattern emerges from the comparison of different periods in the sample:
prior to reforms, more industrialized Manchuria and the Metropolises had large surpluses. Theses
regions experienced a large drop in subsequent decades and ended up being net importers of
capital in 2010. Remarkably, central provinces have had roughly balanced position all along.
Eastern regions already had large surpluses averaging more than 10% of their GDP in the 1960s
and 1970s. The initial reform era brought them to a near neutral position by the mid-1980s. Since
the opening up to foreign trade, this region steadily increased its surplus to reach more than 10%
in 2006-2008. Southern China initially markedly reduced its deficit but this trend reversed in the
1990s. Historically, it has been a net importer of capital (16% of output in 2010). Similarly, the
West has had large negative net exports all along as well with a negative mean value of 12% from
1975 to 2010. For more, see Figure 2.10 where we provide a detailed geographical representation
of the mean value of relative net exports at a disaggregated level.22 All in all, our results suggest
a large volume of interregional capital flows among provinces, a large cross-sectional variation
in net position as well as a high persistency in the patterns of relative external balances.
To assess the relative contribution of regions to dynamics in national net exports, we focus
on the six clusters defined before but without normalizing by output (Figure 2.11). Interestingly,
the rapid increase in the Chinese current account in the 2000s seems to have been primarily
driven by the East Coast. By contrast, all other regions have had deteriorating external balance.
By cumulating them (AllnoEC line on the graph), one can observe a striking divergence in the
patterns of capital flows: increasing net surpluses in the eastern part of the country have been
concomitant with increasing net deficits in the rest. Obviously, a substantial part of negative
flows originated in the South and the West. To which extent this “Great Divergence” is driven by
statistical errors is an open question.23
Historically, as for relative saving, net export surpluses were related to the relative provincial
21Regional flow of funds data indeed confirm the presence of international and interregional capital flows in net
exports but only half of provinces – typically more developed ones – differentiate them. Definitions of net exports
made available by the statistical bureaus are identical across provinces and are similar to those used in National
Accounting.
22A clear pattern would emerge from the comparison of different periods in the sample at the provincial level: in
the 1950s, northern regions, Manchuria and the Metropolises mostly were capital exporters. Progressively, surpluses
converged east and five decades later, from Heilongjiang to Guangdong, large surpluses are observed on the entire East
Coast (with the exception of Jilin and Beijing that run a small deficit). Northern regions and Manchuria experienced
a drop in net exports. Over the last decades, central regions had near neutral values.
23The aggregation issue is obvious: by adding the green (East Coast) and the grey line (AllnoEC), we do not obtain
the blue line (China).
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output per capita (i.e. the relatively wealthier regions had large surpluses). In Figure 2.12, it
seems that the rank correlation dwindled during initial reform years. Still, it has been converging
back to high levels since the mid-1990s. As for the preceding sections, we focus on the pattern
of cross-provincial variability over time.24 The (population-weighted) standard deviation of net
exports was volatile in the pre-reform area (Figure 2.13). Then, it was decreasing in the 1980s
and stable in the 1990s. It progressively bounced back to higher level as the Chinese economy
became more and more integrated with the world supply chain.25
2.3 Light-predicted regional GDP
2.3.1 Data and methodology
Recently, using light intensity has been proposed as a strategy to test and improve the quality
of official GDP data (Chen and Nordhaus, 2010). Obviously, many channels associated with
economic structure could cast doubt on the validity of this proxy. On top of that, for technical
reasons, measured light is only an imperfect indicator for true light. The key advantage is that
as errors in GDP statistics and light measurement are likely to be uncorrelated, one could get
a better indicator by simply combining them (Henderson et al., 2011). Keeping the numerous
problems plaguing Chinese data in the back of our mind, two issues may be of interest. First, we
want to explore to which extent regional light intensity in China is related to real GDP figures at
the provincial level. Second, in our opinion, explore patterns of real growth and their potential
changes among regions is important. It may raise a red flag and point to some possible regional
misreports of output.
We use satellite data over the 1992-2010 period capturing light intensity in 64 categories
from 0 (no light) to 63 (maximal intensity).26 Light data are from US Air Force.27 We follow
the methodology used in a working version of Alder et al. (2013) where light data are used to
assess the effect of economic reforms in China at the city level.28 Whenever two satellites were
at disposal for the same year, the more recent one was chosen. In terms of real GDP and light,
all regions (31) are available. Our sample thus stretches from 1992 to 2010. As one can observe
in Figure 2.14, the levels of official real GDP statistics and light intensity are highly positively
correlated.29
GDP is predicted using the following model :
24In this section and the following ones, we do not compute the coefficient of variation because it fluctuates hugely
when the cross-sectional mean approaches zero.
25This “U-turn” pattern is more marked when considering non-weighted variability. Results are little affected by
the Metropolises. The later apparition of some large provinces is negligible in terms of additional variation.
26Some pixels take higher values but have been censored.
27Freely avaible on http://ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/.
28We gratefully thank the Chair of Macroeconomics and Political Economy of the University of Zurich for provid-
ing us with the light data structured by region.
29Note that one would need to calibrate the different satellites using a specific region to be able to compare light
data. We refrain from it but use time fixed-effects in the empirical analysis to address that issue.
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ln(GDPi,t) = β0+β1 ln(Areai,t)+β2 ln(Areai,t)2+
K=10
∑
k=3
βkLightSharek,i,t + τt + εi,t
where LightShare corresponds to the share of the regional area with light intensity between 1
to 10, 11 to 20, 21 to 30, 31 to 40, 41 to 50, 51 to 60, 61 to 62 and 63 and more. Zero light
intensity is the reference share. In this way, we allow for the relationship between light intensity
and GDP to be non-linear. The variable Area is the relative size of a region. Because of the huge
discrepancy in area among Chinese provinces, we allow it to enter with a quadratic term as well.
Results are available in Table 2.2. Both controls for size are highly significant. They suggest
a concave functional form. Regions smaller than Yunnan have an increasing positive relationship
between size and economic size while for bigger regions (e.g. Inner Mongolia or Xinjiang), the
effect decreases but still stays positive. Figure 2.15 provides a representation of the coefficients
of light intensity. Their impact on real GDP seems to be non-linear: it rises sharply from the
first to the second category, loses significancy for the third and fourth categories and peaks in
the fifth one. In the three subsequent categories, the effect then slowly decreases. All in all, the
coefficients on light intensity are positively, roughly concavely related to economic activity and
five of the eight categories are found to be highly significant. We suspect that the lack of evidence
for the impact of middle categories could be linked to the limited number of observations (589)
in the panel.30
2.3.2 Results
The predicted GDP obtained from the preceding model is positively and highly significantly
correlated with official data (correlation of 0.83). Henderson et al. (2011) used a comparable
methodology to improve data of countries having a score of 3 or less out of 10 possible points in
a World Bank report on statistical capacity (WB, 2002). China has a somewhat higher score of
5. All the same, one could consider a statistical worst-case scenario and pretend that it belongs
to the country group with weak statistical resources. By assuming GDP growth to be perfectly
measured in countries with good indicators, Henderson et al. (2011) found an optimal weight of
0.56 on official national output and 0.44 on light-predicted output. Therefore, one could use a
similar weight to construct an alternative GDP for Chinese regions.
To make comparison easier, we discuss differences between official GDP figures and light-
predicted output. Table 2.3 summarizes the results. The rank correlation of average growth
rate over the sample period is 0.50. A few outliers emerge: Shanghai had an official growth rate
30Using city-level data, Alder et al. (2013) found all light coefficients to be highly significant. Interestingly, the
impact of the middle-categories (21-30 and 31-40) was also found to be slightly lower than the 11-20 one. Another dif-
ference is that coefficients were increasing systematically over light intensity in higher categories. Their specification
did not feature a quadratic size term.
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slightly below average over the period while light-GDP suggests that it belongs to the fastest-
growing regions. The discrepancy is comparable for the island of Hainan. By contrast, Inner
Mongolia was at the top in official data but does not seem to have outperformed other regions
according to the alternative GDP indicator. The same is true for the small region of Ningxia.
In Figures 2.16, one can compare average growth rates of official and light-predicted real GDP
over 1992-2010. According to the new indicator, the Bohai Economic Rim and the Yangtze
Delta area have been the fastest-growing clusters. As discussed before, some hinterland regions
seem to have grown far slower than official data suggest (Inner Mongolia, Ningxia and Shaanxi).
Broadly speaking, there seems to be no massive regional patterns of over- or underestimation. In
this respect at least, regional GDP data seem to be of reasonable quality.
2.4 Regional international trade statistics
2.4.1 Aggregation properties
International trade flows data at the provincial level reported in dollars enable us to focus exclu-
sively on external imbalances of regions versus the rest of the world. Before 1992, we rely on
CDC data. From 1992 on, two sets of data exist. The first is international trade by location of
foreign trade managing unit (by location of importers/exporters). It is based on the place where
corporations are registered by local Custom Houses. In the second one, imports are ventilated by
place of destination (i.e. consumption or final destination) and exports by place of origin. For
provinces containing a high number of import/export companies such as Beijing or Shandong,
the difference between both concepts is considerable. Since 1992, CDC relied on the first con-
cept. We adopt the second one as it should better reflect the final direction of flows in goods and
services.
No specific data on provincial expenditure aggregates in dollars such as output exist. With
the help of national trade values available in both currencies, we derive an implicit exchange rate
and use it to to convert trade data into Renminbi.31 As in the preceding sections, aggregation
properties of the data can be inspected by dividing the difference between cumulated provincial
and national value by national GDP. The data availability is poor for initial decades.32 The bulk
of the considerable errors stems from regional imports: they are too low and this error increases
even as the sample availability improves over time. Exports are only slightly underestimated. As
a consequence, the provincial net trade saldo is massively overestimated during the time period
preceding economic reforms. Estimation improves in the second half of the 1980s and regional
aggregates have been corresponding to their national counterparts since 1992. In conclusion, data
only seem reliable for the 1990s and 2000s.
31Some regional yearbooks made results in dollars available but only for recent decades. To keep the sample as
large as possible and avoid exchange rate biases, we apply the national trade exchange rate to all results.
328 provinces out of 31 are available in 1952, 18 in 1964 and 26 in 1979. The full sample is available from 1992
onwards.
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2.4.2 International capital flows
In Figure 2.17, we provide a representation of international surpluses and deficits during the
reform period. The rising surplus of the East Coast, which peaked at 16% in 2007, is not sur-
prising given its well-known high involvement in international trade. Manchuria recorded large
surpluses in the 1980s before converging to a near neutral position. Similarly, foreign trade is
considerable in the Metropolises: they exhibited a high surplus of 14% of GDP from 1952 to
1990 before experiencing a sharp deterioration, which bottomed out at -19% in 2004. Other
clusters are less involved in trade: Central, South and West China had an average small surplus
of around 1.5, 0.7 and 1.6% over the 1975-2010 period. There is a striking difference compared
to external balances at provincial boundary from Figure 2.9: with the exception of the coastal
part of China, most regions have a roughly neutral international trade balance. It suggests that
interregional – rather than international flows – may be responsible for the large external deficits
observed in some areas.
All things considered, as for net exports, there are large and enduring differences in the
exposure to international trade and the relative trade position across provinces. However, in
absolute terms, only East Coast regions seem to matter at the international level. This is well-
illustrated in Figure 2.18, where we provide absolute supraregional aggregates of trade balance.
In Figure 2.19, we focus on the geographical distribution of surpluses and deficits for the
reform period and find a clear pattern: with the exception of Beijing, all eastern regions have a
highly positive mean trade balance. There is more variation in the remaining provinces. Virtually
all regions registered a positive or neutral mean saldo over the period apart from Beijing, Hainan
and Tibet. Interestingly, some western regions run international surpluses while, as we saw in
Figure 2.10, their total balance in net exports was strongly negative (e.g. Xinjiang, Qinghai and
Ningxia).
The correlation of the international trade saldo relative to GDP with real GDP per capita has
been lower during the reform era than before: in Figure 2.20, it hovered around zero in the 1990s
and 2000s. As a consequence, the link seems less strong than for net exports. In Figure 2.21,
the (population-weighted) cross-provincial variability follows an upward trend. The increase is
particularly strong in the 2000s. It seems consistent with the pattern of regional specialization
discussed in the literature.
2.5 Interregional capital flows indicator
2.5.1 Methodology
As data on net exports at provincial boundary (Section 2.2.4) as well as international trade (Sec-
tion 2.4) are available, an approximation of interregional flows in goods and services is possible
by substracting the latter from the former. Nevertheless, one should bear in mind that the data
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availability problem is more acute due to the linear combination of both variables. From 1992
onwards, aggregation errors in international trade are negligible. Errors for net exports have been
fluctuating around zero before worsening between 2005 and 2010. For these reasons, we restrict
our sample to the 1992-2004 period. Given the fact that international trade data are reliable and
regional net exports are on average underestimated by 0.08% of GDP over 1992-2004, we expect
our indicator to be too low (i.e. some provinces having a neutral or small negative balance could
actually have a positive one).
To begin with, we investigate aggregation properties to assess our estimation.33 Another
natural test for the goodness of our indicator is to confront it with official statistics on physical
capital flow transactions. Unfortunately, regional flow of funds data are not broadly available.
For the 1998-2002 period to which we have access, only 16 out of 31 provinces offer a sharp
distinction between capital flows stemming from outside the province (domestic) and from the
rest of the world. We compute the correlation over time for each region between our estimates
of interregional capital flows and the values of the flow of funds data. Our methodology fails for
5 provinces but seems to reasonably capture the dynamics and the absolute level of capital flows
for 11 regions.34
2.5.2 Interregional capital flows
Results are in Figure 2.22. Net exporters of capital are concentrated in the northeast of the coun-
try: Manchuria, the Bohai Bay region (Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei and Shandong) as well as Shanghai
and Jiangsu. To a lesser extent, some central provinces (Henan, Hubei) have been accumulating
internal surpluses as well. Most of the western and southern part of the country experienced cap-
ital inflows. In those regions, as suggested in preceding sections, small international surpluses
are overturned by huge interregional capital imports. Interestingly, some provinces with large
international trade surpluses on the southern part of the East Coast cluster end up being internal
net capital importers (e.g. Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong).
2.6 Conclusion
This paper discusses key empirical facts of regional Chinese external imbalances. We shed light
on issues related to data quality and aggregation properties of Chinese regional macroeconomic
33A few tests derived from simple theoretical considerations enable us to test our proxy. To begin with, the inter-
regional indicator using national values should not deviate persistently from zero. Indeed, no systematic difference
is observable as an average of 0.29% of GDP over the 1992-2004 period is obtained. Another test consists in simply
adding the absolute balance of all provinces (if intranational trade was sensibly estimated, the sum of regional values
should be approximately zero). It validates our methodology as errors in 1992-2004 were modest: 0.37% of GDP on
average.
34The average 1998-2002 correlation of both indicators over 11 regions is 0.89. We compare our own indicator
with flow of funds tables for Hebei (1997-2009) and Henan (2000-2009) that regularly publish data. The level and
dynamics of interregional capital flows seem to be well-captured by our proxy.
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figures. Large discrepancies between regional and national components of the expenditure ag-
gregates are observed. Investment errors are the key driver of differences between provincial and
national output: regional “phantom investments” have systematically exceeded national statistics
since the mid-1990s. This clear trend has been a statistical companion of emerging China over
the 1990s and 2000s.
As a consequence, provincial net exports end up being lower than national values. Still,
cumulated local net exports roughly correspond to national values from the mid-1980s to the
mid-2000s. However, it should be borne in mind that the fact that national data are better than
provincial ones is not established. Consequently, our findings could be interpreted the other way
round since national data have been taken as reference point. All in all, data quality certainly is
an issue, as shown by the impact of the 2004 Economic Census on the statistical system.
In the 1950s, the geographical distribution of output per capita followed a different pattern
than today. A clear north-south divide was observable and morphed into an east-west divide
as coastal regions were the first to become integrated into the world economy. We observe a
large decrease in terms of output per capita disparities among regions during the initial reform
period but it does not survive the exclusion of the Metropolises from the sample. In spite of large
migration flows, investment programs and the recent progressive integration of the hinterland
into the world supply chain, we find that cross-regional variability in relative output per capita
has been on the rise since the 1990s at least. Saving rates follow an east-west divide. During
the last three decades, investment rates in the northern and western part of the country clearly
overtook values of other regions, forming a north-south divide. Historically, relative saving was
highly related to the level of economic development. By contrast, relative investment was not.
The historical distribution of regional net exports surpluses and deficits (i.e. the difference be-
tween saving and investment) is informative. The coastal regions indeed accumulated surpluses
since the opening-up of China but already had large ones before reforms. Interestingly, some
other regions have even larger saving-investment gaps. In the communist era, the Metropolises
and Manchuria accumulated huge surpluses and converged towards a more neutral position dur-
ing reforms. Over the last decades, Central China has had roughly balanced net exports. West
and South China have been running huge deficits independently of the adopted economic system.
From the 1950s onwards, positive net exports have been persistently associated with high output
per capita, albeit with varying intensity: the initial domestic reforms lowered the strength of the
relationship but it then increased following the uneven integration of regions into the world econ-
omy in the 1990s and 2000s. The cross-provincial variability in relative net exports dwindled
considerably from the 1970s to the mid-1990s but has been on the rise since then.
By using light intensity data from US Army satellites, we were able to show that once we
control for considerable differences in regional size, light intensity seems to be positively corre-
lated with GDP in Chinese regions in a roughly concave fashion. Light-induced GDP leads to
minor changes in the growth pattern of provinces: the Bohai Rim and Hainan island grew compar-
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atively faster while other regions like Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi or Ningxia may have developed
less rapidly than official data suggest.
International trade data aggregate correctly since 1992. Imbalances in international trade are
less dramatic than in net exports: with the exception of the large deterioration of the Metropolises
and Manchuria of the early 1990s and the steadily increasing export surpluses of the East Coast,
most provinces have been running small surpluses. Thus, the bulk of the large discrepancies in
net exports seems to be driven by interprovincial flows. In absolute terms, only the East Coast
area truly matters for international capital flows. This specialization pattern may explain why the
cross-regional variability of international relative flows has been increasing since the 1990s.
We propose an indicator for internal trade that seems to do a reasonable job in approximating
internal capital flows between 1992 and 2004. It suggests that provinces of Manchuria, the
Bohai Economic Rim, the Yangtze Delta and some Central China provinces provided capital to
other provinces, particularly in the western and southern part of the country. Over this period,
the international export-oriented southeast coastal regions were internal net importers of capital
flows at the domestic level in spite of their large international trade surpluses.
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Table 2.1: Definition of regional clusters and relative size
East Coast Manchuria Metro West South Center
Hebei Liaoning Beijing Shanxi Chongqing Henan
Shandong Jilin Tianjin Inner Mong. Sichuan Hubei
Jiangsu Heilongjiang Shanghai Shaanxi Yunnan Hunan
Zhejiang Ningxia Guangxi Anhui
Fujian Gansu Guizhou Jiangxi
Guangdong Qinghai Hainan
Xinjiang
Tibet
East Coast Manchuria Metro West South Center
nGDP 1965 25.1 16.7 14.0 12.9 9.4 21.9
rGDP 1984 31.9 13.3 9.8 10.1 14.2 20.6
rGDP 2010 43.2 9.2 7.3 10.0 11.6 18.7
pop 1965 31.9 9.1 3.5 11.1 19.3 25.1
pop 1984 30.7 9.0 2.9 11.6 20.2 25.6
pop 2010 33.2 8.2 4.2 12.0 18.4 24.1
nGDP is nominal output (current prices in RMB), rGDP is real output (1984 national RMB), population data are from the Household
Registration System, sample surveys, censuses and own calculations.
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Table 2.2: Light regression
DepVar: ln(realGDP)
coeff t-val p-val
ln(Area) 2.22 5.28 0.00
ln(Area)2 -0.32 -3.78 0.00
LS1−10 2.08 4.13 0.00
LS11−20 6.01 2.83 0.00
LS21−30 3.65 0.44 0.66
LS31−40 4.98 0.39 0.70
LS41−50 9.44 2.82 0.00
LS51−60 8.40 3.72 0.00
LS61−62 7.03 2.55 0.01
LS63 6.71 1.59 0.11
Pooled OLS estimates using 589 observations, ad-
justed R2 of 0.673, time fixed-effects included,
inference based on standard errors clustered by
province (Liang and Zeger,1986).
Figure 2.1: Relative real output share, 1984-2010
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Real GDP of regional clusters relative to cumulated real GDP as defined in Table 2.1.
Deflators computed with official provincial CPI data and Brandt and Holz (2006) for
initial price level.
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Table 2.3: Official and light-predicted mean real GDP growth, 1992-2010
Official Rank LightPred. Rank
Beijing 0.12 10 0.14 7
Tianjin 0.14 2 0.22 1
Hebei 0.12 14 0.14 8
Shanxi 0.11 17 0.11 14
Inner Mongolia 0.15 1 0.07 28
Liaoning 0.10 23 0.11 13
Jilin 0.12 13 0.10 15
Heilongjiang 0.09 30 0.09 20
Shanghai 0.11 20 0.20 3
Jiangsu 0.13 7 0.20 2
Zhejiang 0.13 5 0.17 5
Anhui 0.11 16 0.13 10
Fujian 0.13 4 0.11 12
Jiangxi 0.12 15 0.09 21
Shandong 0.12 12 0.18 4
Henan 0.12 9 0.15 6
Hubei 0.11 21 0.09 18
Hunan 0.11 18 0.09 23
Guangdong 0.13 3 0.13 11
Guangxi 0.11 19 0.09 19
Hainan 0.09 29 0.14 9
Chongqing 0.12 11 0.09 17
Sichuan 0.10 22 0.08 26
Guizhou 0.10 25 0.08 25
Yunnan 0.09 31 0.08 24
Tibet 0.10 28 0.06 31
Shaanxi 0.12 8 0.10 16
Gansu 0.10 27 0.07 27
Qinghai 0.10 24 0.06 30
Ningxia 0.13 6 0.09 22
Xinjiang 0.10 26 0.07 29
Mean 0.11 0.11
Official real GDP growth rate and light-predicted real GDP growth rate.
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Figure 2.2: Aggregation errors of output (expenditure approach)
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Aggregation errors computed as provincial sum minus national value over national
GDP. A positive result means that cumulated provincial data overestimate national
values.
Figure 2.3: Nominal output per capita relative to national value, 1950s average
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Figure 2.4: Real output per capita relative to national value, 2010
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Figure 2.5: Cross-provincial variability of GDP per capita
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Cross-sectional standard deviation (STD) and coefficient of relative variation (CV) of
the relative nominal and real GDP per capita. Contribution of provinces weighted by
time-varying population share.
35
Figure 2.6: Mean of saving over GDP, 1979-2010
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Figure 2.7: Mean of investment over GDP, 1979-2010
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Figure 2.8: Rank correlation of S/Y and I/Y with real GDP per capita
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Figure 2.9: Net exports over GDP, 1975-2010
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Aggregate net exports over aggregate GDP for the six clusters defined in Table 2.1.
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Figure 2.10: Mean of net exports over GDP, 1979-2010 (in %)
Figure 2.11: Nominal net exports (100 million RMB), 2000-2010
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Absolute cumulated net exports of the six clusters defined in Table 2.1, in current RMB.
AllnoEC is the sum of all regions without the East Coast area.
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Figure 2.13: Cross-sectional standard deviation of net exports over GDP (population-weighted)
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Figure 2.12: Rank correlation of net exports with real GDP per capita
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Figure 2.15: Coefficients of light intensity categories
Coefficients of the light intensity categories of the regression ln(GDPi,t) = β0 +
β1 ln(Areai,t)+β2 ln(Areai,t)2 +∑K=10k=3 βkLightSharek,i,t + τt + εi,t .
Figure 2.14: Real GDP vs light intensity (non-calibrated)
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Light intensity is the sum of light value (0 to 63) across pixels within provincial bound-
aries.
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Figure 2.16: Average real GDP growth: data (first) vs light-predicted (second), 1992-2010
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Figure 2.17: International trade balance over GDP, 1975-2010
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010−0.2
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
 
 
China
East Coast
Manchuria
Metropolises
West
South
Center
Trade data in dollars converted using implicit national exchange rate. CDC data until
1991, trade by place of destination and origin from 1992 to 2010.
Figure 2.18: Nominal international trade balance (100 million RMB), 2000-2010
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Figure 2.19: Mean of trade balance over GDP, 1979-2010 (in %)
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Figure 2.20: Rank correlation of trade balance with real GDP per capita
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Figure 2.21: Cross-sectional standard deviation of trade balance over GDP (population-weighted)
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Figure 2.22: Mean of interregional capital flows over GDP, 1992-2004 (in %)
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Chapter 3
Capital’s Long March West: Saving
and Investment Frictions in Chinese
Regions1
1This chapter is currently under submission at the American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics.
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3.1 Introduction
Since the mid-2000s, global imbalances have been a resurgent topic in academics and occasion-
ally shaped the political agenda. The far-reaching implications of that issue fostered sustained
research. Still, the debate is far from over and most policy recommendations had much bark
but little bite.2 While imbalances undoubtedly came down since the Great Recession, the funda-
mental factors driving them are still subject to debate. Understanding to which extent external
imbalances are symptomatic of differences in underlying economic structure and policies is key
to assess when – and under which conditions – a convergence towards more sustainable patterns
would be possible. Over the last decade, the literature disproportionately discussed that issue
through the lens of US interests. At the onset of the prophetic “Great Rebalancing”, observers
and experts increasingly laid the focus on China.
The driving forces of Chinese imbalances are increasingly well-understood. Since Jiabao’s
famous 2007 speech acknowledging the unsustainability of the Chinese growth model, the aware-
ness that rebalancing is a decisive step towards sustainable economic development has estab-
lished itself. Often though, the interconnections of factors driving internal and external imbal-
ances were not embedded in the analysis. For a discussion on Chinese internal and external
imbalances, we refer to the first chapter of the thesis (Section 1.2).
With tremendous growth experienced over three decades, continental Chinese regions begin
to matter. Some of them already are GDP equivalent to big developing countries in terms of PPP
international dollar. For instance, as of 2010, Sichuan overtook Malaysia, Yunnan was roughly
comparable to Vietnam and Henan reached the level of Thailand. The output of Guangdong
in the Pearl River Delta is expected to overtake Indonesia’s one in the coming years.3 More
developped coastal regions long have the weight of small industrialized countries: Shandong
and Jiangsu stand for Switzerland, Zhejiang for Austria and Fujian for Ireland. On top of that,
they have become highly integrated into the world economy: in terms of total value, Jiangsu
exports roughly as much as Taiwan while Zhejiang is comparable to Thailand. The province of
Guangdong is on the same scale as South Korea in total export terms. These regions thus play
an important role in the world economy. Moreover, their contribution to global imbalances is
substantial, as is their potential impact on future adjustments.
While Chinese external imbalances have been largely discussed by practitioners, the aca-
demic literature on global imbalances rather focused on theoretical explanations. This paper is a
first try in bridging the gap between both. We discuss potential frictions in saving and investment
that emerged during the transition from a largely agricultural and planned to an industrial and
more market-based economy. We relate capital flows (i.e. cumulated net exports) to regional
2The blunt proposals to force countries with “excessive” current account surplus to adjust using the WTO as a
legal platform are a case in point.
3For more, see interactive maps available on The Economist’s website (http://www.economist.com/content/
all_parities_china).
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productivity in a formal framework. We show that a capital allocation puzzle is present inside
China: provinces that caught up relative to national productivity had surpluses of saving over in-
vestment (capital outflows) while the opposite is observed for provinces that benefited less from
economic reforms. This result is reminiscent of the findings of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) at
the international level.
Starting from that empirical finding, we follow up by identifying the drivers of that pattern
using a standard neoclassical model with two frictions in the mould of Gourinchas and Jeanne.
The first friction (the investment wedge) takes effect at the aggregate level of the economy and
influences capital accumulation. It affects gross return on aggregate capital and is identified by
matching an empirical with a theoretical decomposition of investment rate. We find an investment
puzzle: regions that caught up relative to the rest of China seem to have higher wedge (lower
investment rate), while provinces that fell behind implicitly subsidized investment. This is a
first blow to the baseline neoclassical framework and stands in sharp contrast with international
patterns.
The second friction (the saving wedge) is comparable to a tax on capital income of house-
holds. It is identified in matching an empirical with a theoretical decomposition of cumulated
relative capital flows (i.e. net exports). As on the international level, we find a saving puzzle: the
relationship between productivity catch-up and saving wedges is negative and highly significant.
Provinces that caught up are the ones that implicitly subsidized saving, causing a saving glut that
translated into capital outflows. This is a second blow to the neoclassical model. As opposed to
investment wedges, saving frictions are the main driver of the capital allocation puzzle.
In a next step, we investigate whether the estimated long run wedges are related to usual
suspects proposed by the literature. The regional cross-sectional variability of the wedges seems
useful in shedding light on the general patterns of capital flows. Some characteristics related to
the investment structure of the economy robustly account for a high part of the cross-regional
variation in investment wedges: a high share of the state in investment in fixed assets or in
construction gross output value and a marked presence of the formal, state-near financial sector
– loans in financial institutions – seem to foster investment.
Turning to saving wedges, there seems to be an ubiquitous effect of the state’s involvement
in the economy (e.g. state-owned share of gross industrial output value) in repressing saving.
By contrast, a greater importance of multinational firms, privately-owned enterprises and a larger
industrial sector are all associated with higher saving compared to the neoclassical model. Fi-
nancial development – deposits and loans in financial institutions – seems to put a dent in saving.
We conclude that the capital allocation puzzle is driven by both the visible hand (the state)
and the private sector. By constructing non-state net exports, we show that more marketized
regions with rapid TFP growth and a strong presence of private and international firms (i.e. the
East Coast) have large non-state saving surpluses while other regions have balanced non-state
net exports on average. The neoclassical model would predict the opposite pattern. In addition
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to that, we find that massive state net exports deficits are largely responsible for large capital
imports (i.e. a negative saving - investment balance) in the Chinese hinterland.
The paper is structured as follows. First of all, we briefly review the assumptions of the model
and discuss data issues in Section 3.2. Second, in Section 3.3, we establish the existence of a
capital allocation puzzle inside China and investigate to which extent discrepancies in external
balance arise from frictions in aggregate investment, aggregate saving or possibly both. Then,
in Section 3.4, we relate the wedges to a large number of “usual suspects” put forward in the
literature and compute state and non-state net exports. In a next step in Section 3.5, bearing in
mind that the data are known to be noisy, we discuss the effects on our general results of the use
of alternative data. In Section A.1.3 in appendix, the sensitivity of the estimates to alternative
parameter values is discussed. Eventually, Section 3.6 concludes. While we deliberately keep
the baseline framework straightforward, we propose extensions of the model in Section A.1.4.
3.1.1 Related literature
Since the mid-2000s, the issue of global imbalances has been largely discussed. Given the large
set of factors determining saving, investment as well as financial and physical capital flows, it is
no surprise that a vast theoretical and empirical literature has emerged and proposed numerous –
mostly non-exclusive – explanations of the phenomenon. Thereafter, we focus on the Asian side
of the coin (i.e. the “saving glut” of Bernanke (2007)).
A prominent strand of the literature invokes differences in financial development. Caballero
et al. (2008) highlight the central role played by heterogeneity in countries’ ability to produce
financial assets for global savers. Mendoza et al. (2009) introduce differences in the enforceabil-
ity of financial contracts. The limited access to credit of high-productivity private firms could
force them to rely heavily on self-financing and spur a rise in saving, as argued by Song et al.
(2011). Bacchetta and Benhima (2010) rationalize the observation of high saving and high in-
vestment by arguing that if liquid assets are needed at some stage of the production process (e.g.
to finance working capital), then credit-constrained firms increase foreign bond holdings follow-
ing a productivity shock. In Jin et al. (2012), financially constrained economies have a greater
share of savings arising from middle-aged than from young agents. As the former save more in
response to lower interest rates, it helps rationalizing asymmetric responses in capital flows to
growth shocks observed in the data.
While highly plausible for China, the empirical validity of the financial development argu-
ment does not seem to be established at the international level. Gruber and Kamin (2009) use a
large panel of countries over the last decades and find little explanatory power of various financial
development indicators on relative current accounts. Financial repression is seen as a potential
cause of external imbalances in China (Johansson, 2012). There indeed seems to be more evi-
dence about the influence of indicators broader than financial development: in an international
panel setting, financial repression seems to be strongly related to current account surpluses as
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argued in Johansson and Wang (2012). Huang and Wang (2011) found that financial repression
seemed to have positive effect on Chinese economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s. Interestingly,
the effect turned negative in the 2000s.4
Since the seminal work of Hsieh and Klenow (2009), the issue of capital allocation in China
has increasingly attracted attention. Brandt et al. (2012) measure the impact on aggregate TFP of
distortions in factor allocation across provinces and sectors. They find that capital misallocation
between the state and the non-state sector, rather than labor frictions, has been driving the recent
increase in distortions. They considerably impact on aggregate TFP growth. A 2005 firm survey
conducted by Dollar and Wei (2007) finds that private firms have difficulties to finance their
working capital and rely more on retained earnings and informal channels. Interestingly, returns
on capital increase with decreasing state share.5
Another branch of studies on capital allocation focuses on the relationship between provincial
saving and investment. In their extensive analysis of capital mobility in China, Boyreau-Debray
and Wei (2004) find that provinces with low capital productivity were the ones that experienced
capital inflows between 1984 and 2001. As opposed to non-state and international investment,
investment made through government budget and (state-owned) financial institutions seem to
react negatively to an increase in the marginal productivity of capital. They suggest that the
strongest determinant of capital allocation in China is the prominence of SOEs (state-owned
enterprises) in local economies. Thus, it seems that the government systematically allocates
capital away from more productive towards less productive regions. As shown in Chen and
Yao (2011), there seems to be a crowding-out effect of government infrastructural investment
on private consumption in Chinese regions. All in all, capital mobility in China is low and the
degree of financial integration even seems to have decreased in the 1990s (Boyreau-Debray and
Wei, 2004). In Li (2010), regional saving and investment have indeed been strongly related
between 1978 and 2006. To our knowledge, it is one of the few papers where large discrepancies
across provinces in external positions are noticed, albeit in a side remark. Xu (2008), Curtis and
Mark (2010) and Ho et al. (2010) all find a low level of consumption risk sharing among Chinese
provinces.
The capital allocation issue is obviously related to global imbalances. Gourinchas and Jeanne
(2013) observe that developing countries whose productivity grew faster had capital outflows
between 1980 and 2000. By introducing an investment and a saving wedge in an otherwise
standard small open economy model, they identify saving wedges as the key driver of this pattern.
The finding of Song et al. (2011) that regions with faster growth in private employment seem to
4In an environment of incomplete information, market failure and financial instability, keeping interest rate, credit
allocation and capital account in check could well be welfare improving. In a later phase of development, the costs
of distorted capital allocation, efficiency loss and insufficient access to international financial markets begin to rise
(Huang and Wang, 2011).
5Collectively-owned firms are an exception: they have high returns in spite of large local government share. They
argue that the fact that returns on capital are comparatively lower in West and South China suggests an efficiency loss,
certainly due to inward investment channelling by authorities.
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have larger external surpluses and higher GDP per capita growth rate suggests the existence of a
similar pattern inside China. Dadush and Stancil (2011) argue that the capital flows conundrum
could be explained by differences between industrialized and emerging markets pertaining to
entry costs, real returns on investment, risk, availability of investment projects or assets and the
predominant role of government in the accumulation of foreign reserves. Indeed, the Gourinchas
and Jeanne puzzle is less marked once one accounts for public aid flows and reserve accumulation
because current account typically is a poor proxy to adequately capture capital flows (Alfaro
et al., 2011). In their study, private capital indeed seems to behave more in accordance with the
standard model.
It has been suggested that Chinese current account data are not reliable. Large measurement
errors driven by hidden capital inflows – underestimated returns on foreign investment and mis-
reporting of exports/imports – are supected since the mid-2000s (Zhang, 2008). Against such a
background, it should not come as a surprise that China is a natural suspect in explaining why
the world has been running current account surpluses over the past few years (Economist, 2011).
An increasing number of studies using household sample surveys try to identify factors driv-
ing high savings in China. Aziz and Cui (2007) point to the progressive decline in household
disposable income and their decreasing labor share in the economy. Chamon and Prasad (2010)
rely on annual household survey data and find that savings rate increased in all demographic
groups as a consequence of the “breaking of the iron rice bowl”.6 In another study, Chamon
et al. (2013) establish that the last decades saw an increase in income uncertainty and a decline
in pension replacement rate.
These results contrast with household studies focusing exclusively on demographic factors.
Life-cycle motives seem partly successful in explaining high household saving (e.g. Modigliani
and Cao, 2004; Curtis et al., 2011). Interestingly, the life-cycle hypothesis does far better if one
includes motivation to invest in housing (Chao et al., 2011). A strong effect of property prices on
consumption spendings using city level data is found in Chen et al. (2011). Demographic gender
structure seems to matter as well. The exogenous decline in fertility in the early 1970s enabled to
estimate that urban households having had daughter at the time increased saving as they provide
less elderly support (Banerjee et al., 2010). Du and Wei (2010) suggest that intensified compe-
tition in the marriage market due to the gender gap could be held responsible for up to half of
recent current account imbalances.
If household saving have been under close scrutiny, corporate and government saving rate
have contributed to imbalances as well (Ma and Yi, 2011; Yang et al., 2011). Kuijs (2006)
points to the fact that corporate and government saving are indeed high relative to international
standards. For Anderson (2009), the recent surge in Chinese current account in the 2000s is
6Shift of expenditures on education, housing and health care from state-owned enterprises to households during
reforms.
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linked to a massive capacity build-up of state-owned firms in resources and heavy industries
(steel, chemicals, oil, construction), which took over domestic demand and even began to export.
The massive surpluses could be related to the trade and production structure of the Chi-
nese economy. Jin (2012) shows that capital-intensity of a country’s export and its production
structure affect its demand for financial capital and determine the global allocation of capital.7
Johansson and Wang (2011) suggest that the slow Chinese structural change from secondary to
the tertiary sector and the large weight of industry and manufacturing in the Chinese economy
may be a byproduct of financial repression. China’s exports are part of a quite persistent chain of
production: the importance of processing trade implies that the current account is expected to be
robust against fast appreciation (Girardin and Owen, 2011).
Export-led growth policy is another potential explanation for the capital allocation puzzle.
Aizenman and Lee (2010) propose a growth model based on exports supported by a mercantilist
hoarding of reserves. The key element is the introduction of learning by doing externality in
exports. The direct importance of exports in value-added terms seems to be modest on the na-
tional level (Anderson, 2007).8 Still, the key potential role of technology transfers and positive
externalities (e.g a higher competitivity in the domestic sector) are not considered in such fig-
ures. For some export-led growth cases in point like Japan, South Korea and China, Aizenman
and Lee (2008) find evidence for financial mercantilism (i.e. financial repression and heavy state
involvement in capital allocation) rather than monetary mercantilism (i.e. real exchange rate ma-
nipulation). In another study, using a large sample of emerging and developed economies, Aizen-
man and Lee (2007) show that exposure to potential financial crisis and sudden stops seems to be
more decisive than exchange rate manipulation for explaining reserve accumulation. It somewhat
rationalizes the strategy of systematic hoarding of foreign reserves adopted by the PBC9 since
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.
At last, the quality of institutions and the legal system could potentially play an important
role too. Aguiar and Amador (2011) show that external surpluses and asset accumulation can
be obtained as political economy outcome of a limited commitment toward non expropriation of
international investment position and competition for political power.
7It depends on the trade-off between the composition effect (capital flows towards economies becoming more
specialized in capital-intensive goods) and the standard convergence effect. As the real capital intensity of Chinese
exports is low, savings are invested abroad in more capital-intensive economies.
8Using total exports to GDP ratio as an indicator is misleading. Anderson suggests that one has to substract imports
and convert that domestic content share into value-added terms by subtracting input purchases from other domestic
sectors. At around 10% of GDP in 2006, the value added from exports in China was half that of Taiwan or Thailand
and only slightly higher than India’s.
9People’s Bank of China.
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3.2 Model framework and data
3.2.1 Model set-up
The baseline version of the small open economy model used in this paper is similar to the one
developed in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013). Time is discrete and there is no uncertainty. A
single homogeneous good is produced.
The production function is of the Cobb-Douglas type:
Yt = Kαt (AtLt)
1−α
Factor markets are competitive. The aggregate BC of the economy is
Yt =Ct + It +R∗Dt −Dt+1
where R∗ is the world gross interest rate and D the external debt.
Capital inflows (i.e. an increase in debt) correspond to the gap between investment and saving:
Dt+1−Dt = Ct + It +R∗Dt −Yt −Dt
= It − (Yt −Ct −Dt(R∗−1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
St
The dynamics of capital over time is
It = Kt+1− (1−δ )Kt
Gourinchas and Jeanne introduce an investment or capital wedge (τk) that impacts on gross return
(Rt):
(1− τk)Rt = R∗
The marginal product of capital net of depreciation is
Rt = α(kt/At)α−1+1−δ
where k is capital per capita. Plug the former into the latter expression to find the capital stock
per efficient unit of labor:
k˜t =
K
AN
=
(
α
R∗
1−τk +δ −1
) 1
1−α
= k˜∗
Countries have an exogenous productivity path bounded from above by the world productivity
frontier, which grows at rate g∗:
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At ≤ A∗t = A∗0g∗t
For a finite period of time, a country’s TFP could grow faster than world’s TFP. The evolution
over time of domestic relative to world productivity is captured by the technology catch-up pa-
rameter (i.e. a positive pi means that a country catches up relative to the world):
pit =
At
A0g∗t
−1
Representative households maximize a CRRA utility function:
Ut =
∞
∑
s=0
β sNt+su(ct+s)
u(ct) =
c1−γt
1− γ
subject to the following budget constraint
Ntwt +Ntzt =Ct +Kt+1− (1− τs)R∗Kt −Dt+1+(1− τs)R∗Dt
Wages (w) are equal to the marginal product of labor. A saving wedge (τs) is introduced at the
household level. It can be interpreted as a tax on capital income. Revenues generated by the
wedges (zt = τkRtkt + τsR∗(kt −dt)) are redistributed in a lump-sum fashion.
The Euler equation is
c−γt = βR∗(1− τs)c−γt+1
= β (1− τk)Rt(1− τs)c−γt+1
It is assumed that the rest of the world is composed of steady-state advanced economies with the
same preferences and no saving wedge:
R∗ =
g∗γ
β
3.2.2 General remarks
When not mentioned otherwise, data used in this chapter are from the National Statistical Year-
books of the People’s Republic of China and from the Provincial Statistical Yearbooks of the 22
provinces, 5 autonomous regions and 4 municipalities of Mainland China.10 The China Data
10The autonomous regions are Tibet, Xinjiang, Guangxi, Inner Mongolia and Ningxia. The cities of Beijing,
Tianjin, Shanghai as well as the region of Chongqing are municipalities. Thereafter, the term province will be used as
general qualifier.
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Center (CDC) of the University of Michigan provides electronic access to the yearbooks and
made main statistics conveniently available.11 For most provinces, our online access only covers
regional statistical yearbooks in the 1990s and 2000s. Thus, it happens that the data are some-
times incomplete. We will primarily rely on data directly retrieved from recent online yearbooks
and complete possible gaps with CDC sheets. This allows us to take account of revisions as much
as possible.
The quality of provincial and aggregate Chinese National Accounts data is an important issue
that we explore in the second chapter of the thesis, where we focus on some stylized facts and
discuss the quality and aggregation properties of the data. This analysis revealed large discrep-
ancies between aggregate statistics and the sum of provincial statistics. For example, the sum
of province-level GDPs was about 11 percent higher than the officially published national value
in 2010. The bulk of this large error stems from an excess of regional over national investment,
which has been widening since the mid-1990s. Conversely, the discrepancy between cumulated
provincial saving and national saving shows no clear trend over time. Still, the sum of province-
level saving overestimated national values by around 7 percent of China’s GDP in 2010. All
things considered, it suggests that, since the mid-2000s, the sum of province-level net exports
will generally be lower than the corresponding official aggregate statistics. Other authors have
argued that China’s current account surplus is overstated for a variety of reasons (see Zhang,
2008). Whether regional data are more affected than national ones is an open question (e.g.
the 2004 Economic Census validated provincial GDP data and invalidated national ones (Holz,
2008)).
But while there is considerable uncertainty concerning the levels of aggregate and regional
statistics, our exploratory analysis also shows that that the sum of province-level aggregates
is generally highly correlated with movements in national statistics. Even though yearly level
data are noisy, our empirical analysis focuses on cross-sectional patterns over three decades of
economic reforms. For that reason, we are reasonably confident that our province-level data
capture important aspects of long run external balances in China’s regions. Tibet is excluded
for data availability reasons. Information on the computation of capital stock (Section A.1.2.1),
productivity (Section A.1.2.2) and capital flows (Section A.1.2.3) is available in appendix.
3.3 Regional investment and saving wedges
3.3.1 Productivity catch-up
Regional abbreviations used in the graphics as well as employment growth rates and productivity
catch-up parameters are available in Table 3.1 (main results). Regional TFP growth rates are in
11http://chinadataonline.org/. The CDC reports data values as soon as they are published in the corre-
sponding yearbook. Although data have sometimes been subject to official revisions in later years, the CDC did not
systematically adapt past values.
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Table 3.6 (detailed results). The geographical distribution of catch-up parameters is best appreci-
ated using a map where provinces are classified per quartile (Figure 3.1). Catch-up values range
from -0.45 to 0.86. We observe a high heterogeneity in TFP with 18 regions having a negative
value and 12 a positive one.
As expected, more open coastal regions – where preferential policies were implemented first
– generally have a positive catch-up parameter relative to China’s productivity growth.12 In
the Pearl River Delta, Guangdong is known to have benefited from foreign investments and a
shift of productive capacities from Hong-Kong and Macau. It has the lead with a value of 0.86.
Bordering Taiwan, Fujian recorded a high growth of productivity over the sample period as well
(0.34). Likewise, the regions of the Yangtze Delta (e.g. Jiangsu (0.51) and Zhejiang (0.17)) have
been catching up with the exception of a slight decrease for Shanghai (-0.17). The last cluster
of emerging provinces locates around the Bohai Sea: Tianjin, Shandong and Hebei have values
ranging between 0.12 and 0.34. Puzzlingly, Beijing has been falling behind (-0.26), possibly due
to the presence of the non-productive state sector.
The northeastern “Chinese Rustbelt” (Manchuria), although known as being still relatively
wealthy, benefited less from economic reforms with values between -0.30 and -0.08. In the South,
with the exception of Chongqing (0.05), provinces fell behind relative to national productivity
growth although already counting among the poorest regions at the time reforms started (e.g.
Guizhou -0.45, Yunnan -0.26). Among western provinces, Xinjiang (0.06), Shaanxi (0.14) and
Inner Mongolia (0.34) managed to improve their relative position while the rest experienced
a deterioration (from -0.17 in Ningxia to -0.44 in Qinghai). In Central China the situation is
heterogeneous as well with some provinces being roughly neutral (e.g. Henan (0.01) and Jiangxi
(-0.04)) and others having negative value (Anhui (-0.33), Hubei (-0.26) and Hunan (-0.37)).
At this point, it is worth mentioning that all regions massively caught up compared to world
TFP. To put it differently, the convergence of Chinese productivity to the world frontier is char-
acterized by a concomitant internal divergence in regional TFP.
3.3.2 China’s internal capital allocation puzzle
In Figure 3.2, we plot the catch-up parameters discussed in the preceding section and in appendix
(A.1.2.2) against the final relative changes in capital flows (Section A.1.2.3). A clear pattern
emerges: provinces that caught up relative to national TFP had capital outflows while those that
fell behind had capital inflows. The relationship is highly significant. Thus, there seems to be a
capital allocation puzzle at the regional level inside China. Remarkably Gourinchas and Jeanne
found it to be a case in point of the puzzle: China happened to locate right on the international
regression line (i.e. in the southeast quadrant). We suspect that this “Russian Doll-like” pattern
could well repeat itself at lower administrative level.
12We discuss the choice of the reference TFP growth rate in Sections A.1.2.2 and A.1.3.1.
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Starting from that empirical fact, this chapter focuses on the following set of issues:
1. What drives the internal capital allocation puzzle? Is it investment-driven, saving-driven
or a combination of both? (rest of Section 3.3)
2. Are our estimated long run wedges related to usual suspects proposed by the literature
on global imbalances? Is the regional cross-sectional variability of the wedges useful in
shedding light on the general patterns of capital flows? (Section 3.4)
3. To which extent are the general results robust to alternative data (Section 3.5), parameter
assumptions (Section A.1.3) and model extensions (Section A.1.4)?
3.3.3 The Investment Puzzle
Gourinchas and Jeanne introduce an investment wedge on gross return defined as
(1− τk)Rt = R∗
where R corresponds to the marginal product of capital net of depreciation and R∗ = g∗γ/β by
assumption.
The steady-state capital stock per efficiency unit of labor is
k˜∗ =
(
α
R∗
(1−τk) +δ −1
) 1
1−α
Thus, as they assume common parameters among provinces, differences in k˜∗ exclusively arise
from different τks. To identify the wedges, they propose a decomposition of average investment
over GDP of the following form (see detailed derivation in Section A.2.1):
i =
1
T
k˜∗− k˜0
k˜α0︸ ︷︷ ︸
convergence
+g∗
pi
T
nk˜∗(1−α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
catch−up
+(g∗n+δ −1)k˜∗(1−α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
trend
Investment is deflated using the same index as for gross fixed capital formation (GFCF): we use
the consumer prices index (CPI) and the price of investment in fixed assets (PIFA) as soon as
available. GDP is deflated using CPI. By implementing a grid-search, the k˜∗s (and related τks)
needed to match observed is are identified.13 From the decomposition formula, one can easily
see that their methodology implies that provinces with high relative investment are attributed a
high capital per efficient unit of labor.14 Differences in k˜∗ drive most of the variations in the three
channels and determine investment wedges. Note that a higher k˜∗ implies a lower τk:
13As in the original paper, we assume γ = 1, δ = 0.06, α = 0.30 and β = 0.96. Other variables are estimated from
the data.
14For example, the western region of Xinjiang with high investment rate has a bigger k˜∗ than the more developed
Guangdong (5.3 vs 2.1).
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τk = 1− R
∗
α
k˜∗1−α
−δ +1
We are primarily interested in the wedge estimates rather than in the respective channels
of investment (see the following footnote for a discussion of the decomposition).15 Thereafter,
we use the qualifier of implicit or wedge-adjusted returns as (1− τk)Rt by holding R constant
for convenience. For example, a province with a highly negative wedge is said to have high
implicit return and high investment relative to the model. In fact, it is an abuse of language:
the wedge-adjusted returns should always correspond to the reference return R∗ because perfect
capital mobility is assumed. Thus, in the preceding example, the negative wedge means that
this region has a lower ex-ante home return R and a friction makes it higher in order for it to
correspond to R∗. Either way, it can be interpreted as an investment subsidy.
Results of average investment rates and investment wedges are in Table 3.1 (main results).
See Table 3.6 (detailed results) for information on capital stock and the channels. Investment
wedges are mostly negative and range from -9.10 to 0.15%. In Figure 3.5, we provide a map
of the wedges to make the discussion more convenient. The geographic distribution follows
a clear pattern: the West and the Metropolises have the highest implicit rates of return (more
negative wedges or, to put it differently, the lowest ex-ante returns) while the Center and the East
Coast have lower returns (less negative wedges or higher ex-ante returns). In fact, the spatial
distribution resembles the one of average investment over GDP.16
In Figure 3.3, there is a noisy – but nevertheless positive – relationship between investment
wedges and productivity catch-up: provinces with higher productivity growth have lower ab-
solute distortions (less negative wedges), lower implicit returns and lower investment. In other
words, regions growing faster implicitly subsidize less gross returns on capital. Thus, there seems
to be an investment puzzle at the regional level in China (i.e. no negative relationship between
investment wedges and productivity).17
At first sight, our results are somewhat counterintuitive. In Gourinchas and Jeanne, countries
with negative catch-up parameter had lower average investment rate than richer countries. Thus,
15The convergence component is the initial investment necessary to reach the steady-state capital stock starting
from the initial capital in efficiency units. Its distribution is broadly similar to the one of i (and k˜∗). On average, it
accounts for a little more than one fifth of average investment. For its part, the catch-up or productivity channel is the
investment required by falling behind or catching up compared to reference TFP. It closely follows the distribution of
the productivity catch-up parameters: provinces that have been lagging behind have large negative values while we
note a positive contribution in regions with high technology growth. At last, the trend channel captures the amount of
investment needed to compensate for capital depreciation. It captures the bulk of i (around 80% on average) and is
highly related to the spatial distribution of relative investment.
16Interestingly, the level of investment over GDP (i) is not related to productivity (pi) per se (correlation of 0.01
vs 0.40 for the wedges). This is an important point: our approach seems to convey different information than raw
investment rate data. As a results, it may enable us to identify the frictions that drive investment patterns away from
the small open economy model.
17The positive slope coefficient of Figure 3.3 is significant at the 6% confidence level using jackknife standard
errors. Note that it loses significancy once Guangdong (GD, East Coast) is excluded from the sample. Excluding the
second outlier as well (Hunan, HA) would preserve significancy at the 5% level.
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they were attributed a low k˜∗ and a high τk, meaning that their implicit return was lower (i.e. their
ex-ante return on domestic capital needed to be higher than the world interest rate). In our case,
we find the opposite pattern. Some relatively poor provinces experienced high investment rates
over the period. They were therefore attributed a high k˜∗ and a low (more negative) τk.
In Table 3.2, we aggregate the frictions of the 30 regions into 6 larger areas. It confirms
the broad geographical pattern that we identified: City-Provinces (Metropolises) and the West
subsidize investment more while the East Coast and Manchuria have less negative values. We
discuss the possible determinants of investment frictions in Section 3.4.1.
This result is a first blow to the baseline neoclassical framework and stands in sharp contrast
with Gourinchas and Jeanne where investment wedges were negatively related to development in
productivity, following the intuitive mechanism that countries with less frictions – à savoir less
positive wedges and lower implicit taxes – catch up in terms of TFP. The positive relationship that
we observe should attenuate the positive correlation of the catch-up parameter and capital inflows
predicted by the neoclassical model and thus make the capital allocation puzzle less stringent.18
At first blush, one would naturally suspect the strongly negative investment wedge value
of some regions (e.g. Xinjiang, Qinghai, Ningxia or Inner Mongolia) to be a consequence of
Xibu Kaifa (“Develop the Great West”). It consists in massive investment programs in infras-
tructures (mainly transportation, natural resources extraction and power generating facilities).19
Indeed, Brandt et al. (2012) found an increasing infrastructure share of capital stock in hinter-
land regions. According to them, the bulk of these investments ended up in (less productive)
state-related enterprises. They argue that, even accounting for infrastructure investment, the in-
creasing misallocation of capital made already high initial differences in TFP worse. Therefore,
Brandt et al. convincingly made the point that Xibu Kaifa was the key driver of the increase in
productivity distortions since the mid-1990s.
On the one side, this may explain why we find that regions that lose ground in terms of pro-
ductivity seem to enjoy higher investment subsidies. On the other side, they find that internal
capital misallocation (state vs non-state) – rather than the interregional one – contributed to the
recent increase in distortions. As a matter of fact, they argue that interregional frictions were
considerable but constant between 1985 and 2007, the lion’s share originating in persistent labor
rather than capital misallocation. That may explain why the cross-regional correlation of invest-
ment frictions and productivity is not that salient. Furthermore, investment and capital intensity
of these economies could already have been high before Xibu Kaifa due to the strong presence of
the state.20 The large and negative investment wedge value for Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai is
18We find that regions with high productivity tend to have higher investment wedges. Thus, they have lower
investment rate, higher net exports and lower capital inflows (or more outflows).
19Officially launched in 2000, it actually encompasses the southern regions as well. In fact, all regions except
the East Coast will be concerned: the CCP intended to follow a similar strategy for Manchuria (Northeast Area
Revitalization Plan) and the Center (Rise of Central China Plan).
20In our subsample estimations of Section 3.5.1, we see that the positive correlation is strongest for the early period
(1984-1997), before the “Develop the Great West” policy was implemented.
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less surprising: they are geographically small, highly dynamic urban areas.
3.3.4 The Saving Puzzle
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) decomposed relative capital flows into four channels.21 A step by
step explanation of their methodology is available in Section A.2.2. We implement a grid-search
procedure to identify the saving wedges required by the model to match the empirical capital
flows (i.e. so that the sum of the four channels corresponds to cumulated relative flows data).22
Results of the capital flows decomposition are available in Table 3.6 (detailed results). As for
investment wedges, we focus on frictions rather than discussing the importance of the channels.23
Capital flows and saving wedges are available in Table 3.1 (main table). They range from -3.50
(Guangdong) to 2.58% (Guizhou). By focusing on the geographical distribution of the identified
saving wedges, an obvious pattern emerges (map in Figure 3.6): from Tianjin to Guangdong, the
entire coastal area has a highly negative saving wedge. Paradoxically, most of these regions have
been catching up compared to China and the rest of the world. Thus, households should have
been borrowing to raise their consumption. The negative net exports resulting from lower saving
would then be interpreted as capital inflows. However, it is not the case: these provinces have
massive capital outflows. In order to make the model consistent with data, a large implicit saving
21The convergence term captures the amount of capital necessary to reach the steady-state capital per efficiency
unit of labor:
∆Dc
Y0
=
k˜∗− k˜0
y˜0
(ng∗)T
External borrowing needed to finance domestic investment is captured by the investment channel (i.e. a region that is
catching up necessitates more capital inflows):
∆Di
Y0
=
k˜∗
y˜0
(ng∗)Tpi
The next term gathers the cumulated debt inflows required to hold the relative debt ratio constant (trend growth):
∆Dt
Y0
=
k˜0(ng∗)T − d˜0
y˜0
+ψ(τs) [ng∗φ(τs)]T
d˜0− k˜0
y˜0
At last, the saving term captures the intertemporal consumption decision of households (given a positive catch-up
parameter, they will borrow on international markets to raise consumption):
∆Ds
Y0
=
w˜+ z˜k
y˜0
ψ(τs)
R∗
[ng∗φ(τs)]T
T−1
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t [
φ(τs)t−T (1+pi)− (1+pit)
]
22As in Gourinchas and Jeanne, we assume log utility (γ = 1). Section A.1.3.2 investigates the impact of alternative
CRRA values. The k˜∗ identified in the investment wedge computation are used. Furthermore, pi = piT and a linear
convergence to the steady-state catch-up is assumed (pit = f (t)pi with f (t) = min( tT ,1)≤ 1).
23The convergence and investment components remain similar independently of the type of flows used as they do
not depend on the saving wedge (given the same assumed g∗and thus identical pi and R∗). The convergence channel
is correlated with steady-state capital stock (and thus average investment and investment wedges). The investment
channel is strongly related to the distribution of catch-up parameters. The distribution of the trend channel closely
follows initial external positions. With the convergence channel, the saving channel accounts for a large chunk of
capital flows. It ends up driving most differences in the patterns of flows and is highly correlated with the final
distribution of saving wedges.
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subsidy (i.e. a negative saving wedge) is needed.
Some resource-abundant western provinces (e.g. Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and Shaanxi)
have a negative saving wedge as well. Central China, Manchuria, southern provinces as well
as some western regions have roughly neutral or positive saving wedges (i.e. they tax savings).
In Table 3.2, we provide results for average distortions over regional clusters. The East Coast
provinces have the lowest saving wedges (GDP-weighted average of -2.73%), followed by the
Metropolises (-0.93%). The Center and Manchuria have a low positive value. Savings in the
West are implicitly subsidized on average (-0.85%) but there is no homogeneous geographical
pattern. For instance, Qinghai has a positive value while Shaanxi is found to be clearly negative.
The South has the highest saving wedges on average (0.49%), with Chongqing being the only
region subsidizing savings.
In Figure 3.4, as in Gourinchas and Jeanne, the capital allocation puzzle manifests itself
through a highly significant negative relationship between productivity catch-up and saving wed-
ges. Provinces that have been catching up are the ones that implicitly subsidize savings more,
causing a saving glut that translates into capital outflows. There seems to be a saving puzzle
at the regional level in China. Standard theory predicts that provinces with high productivity
should experience capital inflows (lower saving and positive saving wedge). Thus, all but four
provinces are in the “wrong” quadrant.24 The relationship between both variables is as marked
as in Gourinchas and Jeanne, where China figured close to the international regression line in the
southeast quadrant. The identified frictions are more correlated with productivity than cumulated
capital flows (-0.94 vs -0.63). It makes us confident that these frictions are more useful – or
at least convey different information – in explaining deviations from the baseline neoclassical
model than raw capital flows data. We have a significant negative constant while Gourinchas and
Jeanne had a near zero one. This is only a byproduct of our parametrization.
3.4 Beyond the wedges
We established the existence of an investment and a saving puzzle inside China. This capital
allocation puzzle is reminiscent of the patterns found at the international level in Gourinchas
and Jeanne. Importantly, investment wedges alone are not sufficient to generate the negative
relationship between capital flows and productivity of Figure 3.2. As in the original paper, using
our empirical estimates of investment wedges and switching off saving wedges – assuming them
to be zero – leads to predicted capital flows being strongly positively correlated with TFP. Thus,
as on the international level, saving frictions are the main driver of the puzzle.
In this part, we intend to investigate whether variables mentioned in the literature (Section
3.1.1) are related to the identified frictions. To start with, by regressing the wedges on a large
24Jilin (Manchuria), Jiangxi (Center), Shanxi (West) and Shanghai (Metropolise) have a negative catch-up and
saving wedge. They are thus compatible with the prediction of the standard model that falling behind in terms of
productivity implies capital outflows (higher saving).
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number of “usual suspects”, we aim at testing to which extent our estimates convey useful infor-
mation. Moreover, their (limited) cross-sectional long run variability could help us identifying
important explanatory variables. In a first step, we discuss univariate regressions of the wedges.
Next, we allow for one additional control to at least partly alleviate the omitted variable issue (the
level of economic development proxied by real GDP per capita). In a third step, we account for
the variability of the wedges using combinations of selected factors. At last, we estimate saving
wedges for three subsamples and construct a panel of frictions. A list of the available provincial
characteristics is in appendix (Section A.1.1). At this point, it should be emphasized that this
is only an exploratory, mainly descriptive step towards better understanding external imbalances
inside China. The limitations of our approach are manifold.25
3.4.1 Potential explanatory factors of investment wedges
Before starting to explore how provincial characteristics correlate with the wedges, one may
wonder how the frictions are linked to the level of economic development (i.e. the average of
real GDP per capita relative to national value).26 It is per se not significantly correlated with the
wedges but once its squared value is added, its coefficients turn out to be highly significant. The
relationship is concave: economic development initially increasingly makes a dent in investment
but after a certain level (roughly 100% of national value), the relationship turns increasingly
negative and investment is more and more subsidized relative to the baseline model.
Coefficients of potential explanatory factors of investment wedge normalized by their cross-
sectional mean and jaccknife p-values are available in Table 3.3.27 A summary of the factors
is available in appendix in Section A.1.1. The ownership structure of investment in fixed assets
(SOInvFA) seems to be highly negatively correlated with investment frictions. A larger share of
state-owned investment in fixed assets has a strong negative effect on the wedges. The presence
of the state thus seems to foster investment. The effect becomes larger once one controls for
development level. In Figure 3.7, we provide a scatter plot of the negative relationship between
SOInvFA and τk. On the graph, it is obvious that Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai are outliers
251.The model only delivers one long run wedge for each province over the entire sample period. Subsamples
estimates allow us to construct a panel but the noisiness of data impairs the estimation quality of short time-length
and the model’s framework makes less sense. 2.Most factors used on the right-hand-side are not available over the
entire period. What is more, changes in definition or recording methodology are observed over time. We thus focus
on the 1997-2009 period for all factors (2010 is the steady-state and does not enter in the investment and capital flows
indicator). 3.Our measure of flow is a rough approximation of current account using only goods and services. 4.The
conceptual mapping from frictions to wedges is not straightforward and is a convolution of many frictions. 5.What
makes sense on the microeconomic level does not necessarily mean that the cross-provincial variability is informative.
6.We ignore endogeneity issues but control for economic development to at least alleviate the omitted variable issue.
7.Expectations are ignored as we develop no structural model to justify the impact of explanatory factors on the
wedges.
26We construct population data from multiple censuses and sample surveys available in regional and national year-
books. See the second chapter for more.
27We choose the HC3 heteroskedasticity correction for two reasons. First, in our sample, compared to other es-
timators of the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals, inference is more conservative. Second, it is a close
approximation of the jackknife standard errors, a concept that is particularly appropriate in our framework.
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(southwest quadrant): they seem to subsidize investment more although their share of state-
owned firms is below average. The foreign and residual shares (FOInvFA and REInvFA) have
the opposite effect.28
This pattern repeats itself once one looks at a broader indicator of the presence of the state
such as the state-owned gross industrial output value share (SOGIOV ). Interestingly, more mar-
ketized regions (Market) seem to have higher investment wedges (lower investment) even when
controlling for differences in economic development. The presence of the state in the construc-
tion sector gross output value (SOCGOV ) tends to magnify investment subsidies.
Indicators summarizing the economic structure of the regional economies seem to be related
to frictions. The following factors are negative and highly significant: the share of the construc-
tion and tertiary sector relative to GDP (SectorConst and SectorTert), our indicator for sectoral
economic concentration (StructConc) and the share of coal and oil extraction relative to GDP
(CoalOil). All promote investment relative to the neoclassical model. In a similar fashion to
private firms, the importance of the industrial sector relative to GDP (SectorInd) has a positive
coefficient.
Indicators capturing the extent to which regions are integrated into the world economy do
not seem to be systematically related to investment frictions. All have a positive sign. One of
our indicators of financial development (Loans) is highly negatively correlated with the wedges.
One may come to the conclusion that financially more developed regions seem to have higher
investment (more negative investment wedge). However, interpreting this indicator as a proxy
for financial development may be misleading. In our opinion, it primarily captures the presence
of state-owned banks, which rationalizes the negative coefficient.29
In Table 3.7, more explanatory factors are available. Human capital indicators related to
education (TertiaryEduc, HighEduc) or innovation (Patents) seem to foster investment, as is a
higher social security coverage (SOCSEC). Most of these results are driven by Metropolises.
Some demographic characteristics seem to matter for investment wedges: regions with high
sex ratio imbalances (SexRatio) and high share of ethnic minorities (EthnicShare) have more
negative wedges.
Even though the cross-sectional variability is limited, we try to include many variables in
the same regression. In Table 3.4, we pick six factors that we consider may play a key role in
28Collective-owned enterprises seem to exhibit the same patterns as private firms. In the early reform period, de
facto private firms were still registered as collective ones to benefit from various privileges (Brandt and Rawski, 2008,
chapter 1). Consequently, we merge both categories (REInvFA). The collective share of total investment is negligible
anyway.
29The negative coefficient could reflect credit policies implemented by SOBs. In fact, this finding is not surprising:
a substantial share of aggregate deposits and loans in China figures on big state banks’ balance sheets. Even smaller
banks are mostly close to local governments. Banks are thus largely owned by the state and closely work hand in hand
with local authorities and SOEs. Thus, a high loans over GDP ratio could rather be suggestive of a strong government-
led investment policy that biases investment frictions in the region downward rather than broad financial development.
The fact that loans – rather than deposits – are particularly strongly negatively associated with investment wedges gives
weight to that argument.
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investment frictions, one for each broad category of variables. The presence of the state in gross
fixed capital formation (SOInvFA), the importance of loans in financial insitutions (Loans) and
the size of the construction sector (SectorConst) are all strongly negatively related to the wedges
and bias investment upward. These variables are mostly robust to the inclusion of other factors
in the regression. In conclusion, it seems that the presence of state-owned firms and banks is
strongly associated with investment frictions.
3.4.2 Potential explanatory factors of saving wedges
We follow the same exposition strategy as in the preceding section. Table 3.3 summarizes the
effect of the factors on saving wedges. Economic development is associated with the wedges in
a convex way: initially, saving frictions are increasingly negative as regions get more developed
(i.e. they subsidize saving more and more). Then, at around 130% of national GDP, frictions
start to increase and regions decrease implicit saving subsidies.
The independent variables are identical as in the preceding section and are described in ap-
pendix (Section A.1.1). Indicators related to investment ownership are correlated with saving
frictions: the presence of the state (SOInvFA) seems to push up the wedges (lower saving) while
private and collective firms (REInvFA) have the opposite effect. Foreign firms (FOInvFA) are
not robust to the inclusion of development.
We expect broader indicators of the importance of the private economy to be highly correlated
with saving frictions. It seems to be the case: state-owned firms in the industrial (SOGIOV ) and
construction sector (SOCGOV ) make a dent in saving while more marketized regions (Market)
seem to promote saving. The coefficient on private and self-employed employment share (Empl
Private) has no stable sign over specifications. In Figure 3.8, we provide a scatter plot that
illustrates the clear positive relationship between the presence of the state (SOGIOV ) and saving
frictions. On the graphic, the western provinces of Shaanxi and Xinjiang seem to be outliers:
they considerably subsidize saving in spite of having a high share of state-owned firms.30
In the economic structure category, the importance of the industrial sector over GDP (Sector
Ind) is strongly negatively related to saving frictions. This is consistent with the idea that
industry-intensive provinces tend to export physical capital to the rest of the world and other
regions. The tertiary sector (SectorTert) has an opposite effect. Higher housing price growth
(HousingPrice) magnifies savings but is not robust.
All indicators of the integration of the economies with the world have a negative coefficient.
More open regions in terms of international trade (Openness), provinces with higher share of
multinational firms in international exports (MNE) or a bigger share of FDI compared to GDP
(FDI) are all implicitly subsidizing saving. However, only MNE is robust to the inclusion of
30This result is possibly due to poor data. In Section 3.5.4, we find that they may have higher saving wedge than
official data suggest.
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development. We provide a graphical representation of the strong negative association between
the presence of multinational firms (MNE) and saving frictions in Figure 3.9. Again, a few
western provinces stand out as they have lower share of international firms than average but still
negative saving wedge.
Financial development (Deposits and Loans) is positively related to the wedges (i.e. it lowers
saving). Note that interpreting loans as an indicator for the presence of the state would lead to
results consistent with earlier findings.
In Table 3.7, human capital indicators correlate positively with saving wedges but the rela-
tionship is mostly not significant. Interestingly, once one controls for economic development,
social security coverage (SOCSEC) seems to reduce saving while its coefficient has an opposite
sign as standalone. Of the demographic factors, only sex ratio (SexRatio) and urbanization rate
(UrbRate) are significant. If anything, regions with more unbalanced male to female ratio and
more urbanized regions seem to have lower saving relative to the neoclassical model.31
From results in Table 3.4, where we regress saving frictions on key factors summarizing
regional characteristics, we observe that the presence of state-owned firms in the industrial sec-
tor (SOGIOV ), the importance of the industrial sector (SectorInd) and the share of international
firms in exports (MNE) seem to be particularly robust. Their coefficient is smaller than in the pre-
ceding specifications but of the same sign. In this and later regressions, we do not include human
capital indicators, social security and other demographic factors (apart from urbanization).32
Saving frictions are the driver of the internal capital allocation puzzle in China. Making them
time-varying could give us more power to disentangle the importance of the respective factors
discussed so far. We estimate the frictions for three subsamples (1984-1992, 1993-2001 and
2002-2010). Unfortunately, there are only a few variables for which we have reliable results for
all subsamples, which restricts the set of possible regressors. In Table 3.5, we provide a panel
regression with six factors that are deemed representative of regional characteristics in a given
province. We use two alternative variance-covariance matrices.33
As in preceding tables, the share of state-owned firms in the industry (SOGIOV ) is strongly
positively related to frictions. The share of private employment (EmplPrivate) has the opposite
31Wei and Zhang (2009) find a positive effect of sex imbalances on saving at the provincial level. However, there
are many differences with respect to sample (theirs is 1980-2007), estimation (they use panel data and other controls)
and definition of saving (they consider Y −C while our net exports are Y −C−G− I) that make direct comparison
hazardous.
32First, human capital indicators did not seem to be robust to the inclusion of other factors. Second, the literature
provides no clear guidance regarding their potential effect. At last, there are highly endogenous. As for social security,
its introduction and extension was politically-driven and started in targeted urban areas. The self-selection issue is
too obvious. Moreover, we did not find comparable provincial data for earlier periods. While we do not deny that
demographic factors could play an important role at the household level, our investigations led us to think that the
cross-section of macroeconomic regional data is not very helpful in testing them.
33We provide heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust variance-covariance matrix estimates (Arellano) and
clustered estimates on the regional level (Liang and Zeger). The Arellano standard errors are very similar to the
uncorrected standard errors. In our sample, inference sometimes changes considerably by using clustered standard
errors.
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effect: it acts like a saving subsidy.34 The available balance of funds in banks and financial
institutions (the difference between deposits and loans normalized by provincial GDP) is not
significant.35 The size of the industrial sector (SectorInd) is another robust driver of saving
frictions. Openness per se does not seem to have an impact on frictions but FDI does: regions
that receive a higher share of FDI relative to their output (FDI) tend to promote saving more.
Obviously, our results could be spurious (i.e. driven by the fact that there is a clear downward
trend in saving wedges over the three time periods). We run the same specification but introduce
time fixed-effects. The share of industry and FDI are still highly significant while the coefficients
on the private/state sector become insignificant.36
3.4.3 Private and state net exports
If, as suggested by our former analysis, the presence of state-owned and international firms is
essential in explaining the capital allocation puzzle, a decomposition of net exports for different
regions should be informative. Indeed, there is a rich cross-regional variation in the level of
state’s presence and international integration. By using data on the composition of gross fixed
asset investment and the share of state output from Brandt et al. (2012), we separate net exports
into state and non-state component for the 1997-2012 period and normalize them by regional
output.37
In Figure 3.10 (above), we see that more marketized regions with a strong presence of private
and international firms (i.e. the East Coast and the City-Provinces) have a large non-state saving
surplus while other regions have balanced net exports on average. From that picture, we infer
that non-state net exports have either been neutral or positive in most regions and thus partly
responsible for the large capital outflows observed at the national level. In fact, households and
firms in high productivity East Coast regions should have imported capital and hinterland regions
exported capital. Once more, this table tells us the opposite story.
But this is only one side of the capital allocation puzzle coin. From preceding sections,
we know that many hinterland regions have experienced large capital inflows and implicitly tax
34The literature (notably Song et al. (2011)) has emphasized that the major distinction between private and state-
owned firms is that the former are financially repressed whereas the latter have preferential access to bank credit. Our
results are compatible with that hypothesis: the expanding private sector can only finance its growth from retained
earnings. This may explain the negative coefficient.
35Another implication of Song et al. (2011) is that during the transition process, state firms shrink in favor of private
enterprises. As the former’s economic importance dwindles and investment opportunities dry out, regions with faster
growing private sector have an increasing surplus of deposits compared to loans as the largely state-owned financial
sector does not redirect funds to the emerging private sector.
36It is not surprising: the massive decrease in the share of state-owned firms in industry and the growing private
employment share are typical stylized facts of the Chinese economy that have been observed in all regions. With such
a low number of time periods (three), removing the trend inevitably makes these variables less informative.
37We use data on investment in fixed assets by ownership and attribute the state- and collective-owned shares to the
state. The rest is the non-state sector. The nominal (broad) state output share of Brandt et al. (2012) (non-agricultural
sector) is applied to our GDP data assuming the 2000-2007 decline rate to be constant for 2008-2012. State net exports
are constructed as NXS = Y S−G− IS and non-state net exports as NXP = Y P−C− IP. All data are nominal.
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savings, while they have been falling behind in terms of productivity. In Figure 3.10 (below), it
seems obvious that the state sector is the key driving force behind such a regional pattern: large
state net exports deficits largely overturn small positive non-state ones, particularly in the West
and in the South. Interestingly, increasing capital imports by the state sector annihilate rising
large non-state savings in Metropolises. It explains their – initially surprising – neutral net export
position observed in the second chapter.
In conclusion, this simple decomposition provides us with additional evidence that both the
state and the non-state sectors play an essential role in the emergence of the capital allocation
puzzle.
3.5 Data robustness checks
3.5.1 Subsamples
Although the adopted model has to be thought of as a long run one, an estimation of subsamples
may shed light on the variations in capital flows over decades and enable to better track the
emergence of the capital allocation puzzle observed in the preceding sections.
For the period leading up to the Asian Financial Crisis (1984-1997), our flow indicator is far
lower (between -1.3 and 3.1) than for the entire sample (-20.4 to 20.7). Catch-up parameters are
in a similar range.38 While there is little change in the negative relationship between flows and
productivity, the positive link between investment wedges and TFP is more marked and turns out
to be highly significant. The strong negative pattern of saving wedge and productivity is similar.
Things change in the sample embodying the accelerated integration of China into the world
economy (1998-2010). Due to the higher reference GDP level, flows are lower than for the entire
sample (-4.1 to 7.1) but clearly larger than for the initial subsample. The flows-productivity
relationship is not significant anymore. Thus, it seems that the capital allocation puzzle has
disappeared. Remarkably, the change in pattern is due to some inner provinces such as Shaanxi,
Inner Mongolia, Chongqing and Shanxi that have flipped from negative catch-up in the first
subsample to a positive one in the second one while continuing importing physical capital. On the
other side, while mostly still being capital exporters, some eastern regions started to fall behind
relative to national values in terms of productivity (e.g. Zhejiang and Guangdong). Investment
wedges are now unrelated to catch-up parameters. While our regression results for investment
frictions are relatively similar, the strong positive effect of state-owned firms presence on saving
frictions disappears. Indicators of international integration are less informative as well. The
importance of the industrial and tertiary sector, housing prices and natural resources seems to
play a bigger role in explaining saving frictions.
38Cumulated provincial instead of national values are used for the computation of the reference productivity growth
rate. The reason is that due to data aggregation issues, large differences between national and provincial TFP may
arise in subsamples.
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By comparing the geographical distribution of saving wedges between both subsamples,
we observe that high saving subsidies have shifted inland. On the map in Figure 3.11 (1998-
2010 sample) compared to Figure 3.6 (1984-2010 sample), Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Shaanxi
and Chongqing now have among the most negative saving wedge. To a lesser extent, central
provinces exhibit the same pattern. The distribution for the earlier subsample (1984-1997) rather
corresponds to the one of the full sample. Even though major inner regions’ saving wedges
have turned negative, they continue to massively import capital while they catch up in terms of
productivity.
As a result, the capital allocation puzzle and the investment puzzle may be slowly disappear-
ing. Still, the rising inner regions are no exception to the rule in terms of the saving puzzle: they
replaced East Coast provinces in the sense that they subsidize saving and catch up relative to
China. The crucial difference is that, even by doing so, they are the ones that end up importing
physical capital. First 2011/2012 net exports figures confirm that trend. By contrast, the East
Coast experienced capital outflows all along. On the one side, the much advocated rebalancing
towards domestic consumption and inner provinces development may already have started. On
the other side, there are some reasons to remain sceptical about the inland take-off in productiv-
ity.39
3.5.2 A simple error correction mechanism
The quality and properties of Chinese data have been intensively discussed in the literature.
Some issues concerning macroeconomic provincial data are discussed in the second chapter. At
this stage, we want to tackle three major issues that potentially put our results at risk.
First, any factor systematically biasing investment statistics could make the investment puz-
zle disappear. As we have seen in the empirical part, SOEs’ presence in the economy seems to
massively influence the patterns of investment rate. One may argue that large public gross fixed
capital formation is better captured by the statistical system than (smaller) private projects. Fur-
thermore, state-owned firms possibly have incentives to overreport investment (it is a key variable
for monitoring). This would lead to a too low investment in regions where marketization is more
advanced (typically the East Coast) and too high figures in the hinterland compared to reality.
We capture this possibility by adopting the following investment error correction mechanism:
Zi,syntht =
(
1−
[(
X it
mediant
(
X it
) −1)×w])Zi,datat
39It seems worth mentioning that this productivity reversal may happen at high cost. Brandt et al. (2012) find
that western regions particularly suffered from a decrease in realized TFP due to an increasing inefficiency of capital
allocation between the state and non-state sector. In Section 3.4.3, we show that state net exports deficits and low non-
state net exports drive capital inflows in these regions. Moreover, our findings may partly be driven by idiosyncratic
data issues: light data of chapter 2 suggest that GDP growth could have been grossly overestimated (e.g. in Inner
Mongolia). Finally, alternative data from Brandt et al. (2012) in Section 3.5.4 suggest that some may have substantially
lower productivity growth (e.g Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Shaanxi).
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where Z would correspond to I and X to the share of state-owned firms in total investment in fixed
assets. A province (i) with relatively high share of state-owned investment in fixed assets will
have a X/median(X) ratio higher than one. Given an adjustment weight w, synthetic investment
will be lower than in official data.40
Second, relative saving of more developed regions is far higher than in the rest of the country.
Any factor biasing consumption of those areas downward would artificially reinforce the capital
allocation puzzle. It is often argued that the NBS underestimates private consumption across
the board.41 For urban and richer areas where an emerging middle-class has been triggering
near double digit real consumption growth over the last decade, this could particularly bias net
external balance upward. To account for that, we apply the same formula as for investment with
Z being S and X the urbanization rate.
At last, we tackle aggregation issues. Provincial saving and investment figures do not add up
to national values. Over the last decades, investment – and to a lesser extent saving – have been
historically too high on the regional level compared to national data. We take that into account
by multiplying them separately by a common adjustment ratio after the error correction to get a
perfect match between national and cumulated data.
We apply our correction method to aggregate investment and saving before deflating. New
net exports and cumulated relative capital flows are derived from these “synthetic” figures. There-
after, we discuss implications using w = 0.40. We compare the synthetic time series to the raw
data (both adjusted to aggregate to national values). The average investment rate of the new time
series is between 10 percentage points lower (Qinghai) and 4 percentage points higher (Jiangsu).
For saving rate, average adjustments between -8pp (Liaoning) and 11pp (Henan) are recorded.
The effects on external positions (NX = S− I) are large: relative average net exports are between
8pp lower (Liaoning) and 14pp higher (Gansu).42 By way of example, in Figure 3.12, one can
observe net exports for the data and the synthetic series for two regions: Guangdong (East Coast)
and Shaanxi (West). The correction is massive: both provinces end up having the same surplus
in 2010 although being cases in point of a surplus and deficit region.
Interestingly, even such large biases would not flip the relationship found between capital
flows, investment wedges, saving wedges and catch-up parameters. In Figure 3.13, we compare
raw data to the corrected ones and illustrate how the relationship between capital flows and
40For example, in 2010, Shaanxi exceeds the median by 45%. Given a weight of 0.40, the correction factor is of
0.18. Only 82% of investment is considered and this region has a substantial decrease in its investment rate from 0.68
to 0.55. Note that the 1997 values for X had to be used for the entire 1984-1997 period due to data availability issues.
41Key issues are a too low inputed housing consumption, the report of fringe benefits paid by companies as invest-
ment and the lack of representativity of the household survey (Jun and Tian, 2013). How they influence the relative
distribution of saving is debatable: the first and third arguments suggest the more developed East Coast saving to be
lower while the second one would rather decrease saving and investment in inner provinces as SOEs tend to give more
privileges to employees.
42Values for City-Provinces are exceptional: due to their high urbanization rate, they register a decrease of between
19 and 25pp in net exports.
68
productivity catch-up flattens out but still stays negative. Main results for saving wedges are
robust to the discussed modifications but less so for investment wedges.
3.5.3 International capital flows
We focused on external balances at the regional boundary. An important issue is to apprehend
whether our results hold for (exclusively) international capital flows. As showed in the literature
(e.g. Alder et al., 2013), the integration of the Chinese economy into the world supply chain
and the creation of special economic zones was a pivotal development step. One would expect
provinces more active in international trade to have positive growth and TFP impulses. In fact, as
discussed in the literature review, export-led-growth is one of the hypotheses having the potential
of rationalizing the capital allocation puzzle.43
Custom data for international exports and imports in dollars are provided by the China Data
Center (from 1984 to 1991). We complete them with data on trade by place of destination/origin
from the Provincial Statistical Yearbooks (available from 1992 to 2010). They are transformed
into RMB using the implicit exchange rate used in national statistics. We refer to the second
chapter (Section 2.4) for more information on these data.
In Figure 3.14, we see that the capital allocation puzzle is still present. Some provinces are
outlier due to huge capital outflows and relatively moderate catch-up (e.g. Fujian and Zhejiang).
Strikingly, most regions are not heavily involved in international trade and only a few eastern
provinces seem to drive the general pattern.44 The link between frictions and catch-up is similar
as are most of the qualitative regression results.
3.5.4 Alternative data
We explore to which extent our results are robust to alternative (and better) data. In their paper
on factor market distortions inside China, Brandt et al. (2012) carefully revised and assembled
macroeconomic provincial time series.45 We are particularly concerned about large systematic
biases in official employment data, mainly because of the Hukou registration system and prob-
lems of primary and state-sector employment reporting (Brandt et al., 2012). Furthermore, we
relied on official CPI while they constructed sectoral GDP deflators. A central difference is that
they exclude the agricultural sector from their analysis.
43Empirical work at our Chair has showed that evidence for cointegration and Granger causality between GDP,
exports and imports is weak and limited to some coastal provinces (Herzog, 2013). Still, we expect evidence to be
far stronger at the local level (prefectures, counties and townships). The adoption of a broader view than trade, say
the inclusion of associated gross fixed capital formation, technology transfer and other positive externalities (e.g.
increased competitivity of the domestic sector) could make the relationship between growth and exports more potent,
even on the provincial level.
44Without the high value of Hainan (South), Beijing (Metro), Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong and Jiangsu (East
Coast), the negative relationship would disappear.
45We gratefully thank the authors for providing the data.
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Their sample ends in 2007. To fill the gap, we assume the growth rate of their data to be
similar to ours for capital, employment and real GDP. The national time series are obtained
by aggregating regional data. This should deliver sensible results as they already took care of
aggregation properties during the data preparation process. Some provinces are excluded from
their sample.46 The national reference TFP growth rate (8.7%) is slightly higher than in our
baseline version (7.07%). Their final capital to output ratio is lower than ours. Obviously, much
of our capital increase has been absorbed in higher productivity growth in their data.
Their provincial TFP over the period is correlated with ours (0.64) and the general pattern
is comparable although some regions experience a switch in catch-up parameter.47 We relate
the capital flow figures of this study to the new catch-up parameters and find the strong negative
pattern to be robust (Figure 3.15). In fact, compared to the baseline graphic (Figure 3.2), data
points are more equally distributed along the catch-up axis. The positive relationship between
investment wedges and TFP is still positive but not significant anymore, while the pattern for
saving wedges is preserved. Investment wedges from our baseline version are highly correlated
with the alternative ones (0.95) but it is less the case for saving wedges (0.70). In Figure 3.16,
where we compare the baseline to the new figures, one sees that there are some substantial shifts
in saving wedge.48
There are some noteworthy changes at the supraregional level as well. In Table 3.2 (last
column), we provide regional statistics using the new saving wedge (real GDP-weighted). The
Metropolises now subsidize saving more than the East Coast. Central regions and Manchuria’s
frictions are now clearly negative while they were slightly positive before. Importantly, the West
does not seem to subsidize saving anymore. The positive wedge for the South is much bigger.
In spite of these changes, the econometric patterns discussed in the main sections are com-
parable. The effect of the presence of the state/private, international enterprises and economic
structure on the frictions even seems larger.
3.6 Conclusion
3.6.1 Summary
This paper presents a first systematic analysis of external imbalances inside China. We estimate
regional total factor productivity growth over three decades of economic reforms (1984-2010).
By plotting productivity against the final relative change in capital flows approximated by net
46Tibet, Hainan and Hunan have been excluded. Only Hunan is sizeable in terms of GDP. Another difference is
that they merged Chongqing into Sichuan. We compare it to actual Sichuan and exclude Chongqing from the sample.
47The TFP pattern changes considerably for seven provinces. Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin, Shanghai, Anhui and Hubei
switch from negative to near zero or positive catch-up using their data. We found Xinjiang to be slightly positive and
it turns out to be clearly negative according to theirs.
48Among substantial negative shifts in saving wedge, Beijing changes from to 0.54 to -0.61%, Liaoning from 0.04
to -0.75%, Anhui from 1.05 to -0.87% and Hubei from 0.15 to -1.75%. Conversely, Jiangxi turns from -0.69 to 0.62
and Xinjiang from -1.28 to 2.03%.
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exports, we observe that provinces that caught up relative to national productivity had capital
outflows (i.e. positive net exports). Thus, there seems to be a capital allocation puzzle inside
China reminiscent of the findings of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) at the international level.
Starting from that empirical finding, we follow up by identifying the drivers of that pattern.
The methodology developed in Gourinchas and Jeanne is adopted to identify frictions affecting
investment and saving in Chinese regions. A small-open economy model is augmented with
two wedges. The first one (the investment wedge) affects gross return on aggregate capital. It
is identified in matching an empirical with a theoretical decomposition of investment rates. By
relating investment wedges to productivity, we find an investment puzzle: regions that caught up
relative to the rest of China seem to have higher wedge (lower investment rate), while provinces
that fell behind implicitly subsidized investment. This is a first blow to the baseline neoclassical
framework and stands in sharp contrast with international patterns.
The second friction (the saving wedge) is comparable to a tax on capital income of house-
holds. It is identified in matching an empirical with a theoretical decomposition of cumulated
relative capital flows (i.e. net exports). As in Gourinchas and Jeanne at the international level,
we find a saving puzzle: the relationship between productivity catch-up and saving wedges is
negative and very significant. Provinces that caught up are the ones that implicitly subsidized
saving, causing a saving glut that translates into capital outflows. This is a second blow to the
neoclassical model as standard theory predicts that provinces with high productivity should ex-
perience capital inflows (positive saving wedge and lower saving). As opposed to investment
wedges, saving frictions are the main driver of the capital allocation puzzle.
We relate the wedges to a large number of “usual suspects” typically suggested by the lit-
erature. The cross-regional long run variation in frictions suggests some robust explanatory
variables. Characteristics related to the investment structure of the economy robustly account
for a high part of the cross-regional variation in investment wedges: a high share of the state in
investment in fixed assets or in construction gross output value robustly acts as an investment
subsidy (i.e. it lowers investment wedges). The share of state-owned firms in gross industrial
output value magnifies investment as well. In terms of economic structure, a higher share of the
construction sector relative to GDP raises investment rate. A marked presence of the formal,
state-near financial sector – loans in financial institutions – seems to foster investment as well.
Saving wedges are correlated with a large number of variables. There seems to be an ubiq-
uitous positive effect on saving wedge of the state’s involvement in the economy (i.e. it lowers
saving), independently of whether one considers investment in fixed assets or gross industrial
output value. On the other side, a greater importance of foreign- and privately-owned enterprises
increases saving compared to the neoclassical model. Among particularities linked to economic
structure, the share of the industrial sector has a similar effect. Integration into the world supply
chain is another important factor: FDI and the presence of multinational enterprises impact neg-
atively on saving wedges (i.e. it implicitly subsidizes saving). Financial development – deposits
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and loans in financial institutions – seems to make a dent in saving.
The capital allocation puzzle is driven by both the visible hand (the state) and the private
sector. By constructing non-state sector net exports, we show that more marketized regions with
a strong presence of private and international firms (i.e. the East Coast and the City-Provinces)
have a large non-state saving surplus while other regions have balanced non-state net exports in
average. In fact, massive state net exports deficits are largely responsible for large capital imports
(negative saving - investment balances) in the Chinese hinterland.
Being aware of the noisiness of Chinese statistics, we discuss the effects on our general results
of alternative data. In terms of subsamples, the general patterns seem to be more pronounced for
the initial reform period (1984-1997). Due to a surge of productivity growth in some hinterland
regions, the capital allocation puzzle disappears in the more recent period (1998-2010). Then,
we propose a simple error correction mechanism by acting on three dimensions: account for the
fact that public gross fixed capital formation is potentially better captured by the statistical system
than (smaller) private projects, embed the assumption that consumption has been underestimated
(particularly in urban and richer areas) and finally adjust regional data so that they aggregate to
national official figures. Even assuming substantial errors would not invalidate our results. What
is more, our patterns are robust to the use of (exclusively) international physical capital flows (i.e.
trade balances). We use improved regional macroeconomic time series from Brandt et al. (2012)
and find our results to be robust as well, even though productivity and saving wedges strongly
differ for some regions.
3.6.2 Implications for global imbalances
In this section, we put our results in a broader perspective. As discussed in the second chapter,
large surpluses driving global imbalances are generated by a few more developed provinces on
the East Coast specialized in international trade. The majority of hinterland regions have had near
neutral international trade balances since the mid-1990s. The drivers of international Chinese
capital outflows are thus heavily concentrated. However, including interregional physical capital
flows in the analysis – switching to the provincial difference between saving and investment
– revealed a radically different picture: most hinterland provinces have been running large net
exports deficit and have positive saving wedge.
While most of these regions are relatively small taken individually, their cumulated potential
impact is growing. In 2010, the 15 hinterland regions typically having external deficit accounted
for 27% of real cumulated GDP and nearly 38% of population. In terms of economic weight, a
back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that emerging China has already overtaken Germany
and amounts to nearly three quarters of Japan’s GDP in real PPP terms. These regions are on the
brink of moving up in the world. By 2020, even under conservative assumptions, they should be
comparable with top-tier developing countries. For instance, in terms of GDP, Inner Mongolia is
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predicted to approach South Africa, while Xinjiang will correspond to Israel and Anhui to Poland
(HSBC, 2010).
Some of the reforms discussed in chapter one could ease off external imbalances in inner
China. In the first place, as we have showed in this chapter, the visible hand is an important driver
of capital imports. Eventually, the slowdown of state-led investment in infrastructure should
contribute to a less negative net exports position. In addition to that, as opposed to coastal regions,
households and local SOEs would benefit from more market-based energy and raw material
prices. Lastly, inner regions may develop against a backdrop of financial repression easing and
improving social security coverage.
Other factors may play a key role as well but are less dependent on whether the CCP will
endorse its rebalancing agenda. Inevitably, the hinterland is going to integrate into the world
supply chain and may take over a large part of international exports from the East Coast. This
may not necessarily generate large surpluses as the catch-up potential in terms of infrastructure
and urbanization is still substantial. A part of the ailing state investment could be counterbal-
anced by international and private projects. What is more, the return of large waves of migrants
to the hinterland should promote consumption. At last, these regions will experience a later
and slower demographic transition than the East Coast, lowering incentives for large immediate
saving accumulation.
In conclusion, many of the points made before suggest that the rise of inner China has the
potential to alleviate the issue of massive national external surpluses. Its development may not
trigger such a large rise in savings as on the East Coast in the 2000s. As did the celebrated strate-
gic inland retreat of the Communists in the 1930s, capital’s long march west has the potential to
change the underlying characteristics of the Chinese economy over the next decades.
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Figure 3.1: Technology catch-up, 1984-2010
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Table 3.1: Main results, 1984-2010
ID Name Employment TFP Investment Investment Capital flows Saving
growth (%) catch-up over GDP wedge (%) over GDP wedge (%)
BJ Beijing 3.30 -0.26 0.58 -7.95 2.89 0.54
TJ Tianjin 1.26 0.12 0.55 -6.75 -1.62 -2.40
HB Hebei 1.56 0.34 0.39 -2.64 -7.51 -2.40
SXI Shanxi 1.55 -0.12 0.49 -6.20 1.30 -0.63
IM Inner Mong. 1.39 0.34 0.54 -5.61 8.43 -2.51
LN Liaoning 1.11 -0.21 0.36 -3.07 -1.80 0.04
JL Jilin 1.41 -0.08 0.42 -3.64 6.37 -0.41
HG Heilongjiang 1.29 -0.3 0.38 -4.32 -2.47 0.59
SG Shanghai 0.76 -0.17 0.54 -7.95 -3.22 -1.24
JG Jiangsu 1.57 0.51 0.45 -3.93 -9.26 -3.21
ZJ Zhejiang 2.23 0.17 0.43 -3.6 -8.73 -2.00
AH Anhui 1.98 -0.33 0.37 -3.37 0.11 1.05
FJ Fujian 2.66 0.34 0.42 -2.22 -4.89 -2.23
JX Jiangxi 1.62 -0.04 0.40 -3.68 0.66 -0.69
SD Shandong 1.79 0.29 0.45 -4.25 -5.77 -2.44
HE Henan 2.30 0.01 0.43 -3.65 0.25 -0.98
HBI Hubei 1.35 -0.26 0.45 -5.3 -0.06 0.15
HA Hunan 1.57 -0.37 0.32 -0.59 0.49 1.29
GD Guangdong 3.06 0.86 0.36 0.15 -20.35 -3.50
GX Guangxi 1.96 -0.19 0.39 -2.50 5.84 0.24
HN Hainan 2.11 -0.37 0.52 -7.07 2.24 0.99
CQ Chongqing 1.22 0.05 0.41 -4.23 6.72 -0.73
SA Sichuan 1.22 -0.25 0.40 -4.47 1.98 0.41
GZ Guizhou 2.43 -0.45 0.42 -5.05 11.47 2.58
YN Yunnan 2.15 -0.26 0.40 -4.22 8.12 0.97
TB Tibet - - - - - -
SAI Shaanxi 1.47 0.14 0.44 -4.59 5.82 -1.33
GS Gansu 1.76 -0.37 0.43 -5.52 3.99 1.51
QH Qinghai 1.96 -0.44 0.63 -9.10 12.52 2.04
NG Ningxia 2.54 -0.17 0.61 -8.17 20.69 0.47
XJ Xinjiang 1.64 0.06 0.55 -7.97 3.34 -1.28
Catch-up parameter computed relative to national TFP. Investment, GDP and capital flows are adjusted for initial price level using an
expenditure basket by Brandt and Holz (2006). Investment is deflated using consumer price index (CPI) and the price of investment
in fixed assets (PIFA) since 1992. GDP is deflated by CPI. Investment wedges are obtained by matching empirical average investment
rate. Capital flows are the sum of external provincial surplus/deficit (NX = S− I) normalized by initial real output and deflated by the
last period price level as in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013). The deflator of capital flows is CPI and, since 1997, the producer price
index of manufactured goods (PPI). Saving wedges are obtained by matching empirical relative capital flows.
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Table 3.2: Investment and saving wedge for larger regions, 1984-2010
Real GDP Investment wedge (%) Saving wedge (%)
share (2000) unweighted weighted unweighted weighted section 3.5.4
Metropolises 0.07 -7.55 -7.70 -1.03 -0.93 -2.05
East Coast 0.43 -2.75 -2.77 -2.63 -2.73 -1.84
Center 0.19 -3.32 -3.40 0.16 0.06 -0.95
Manchuria 0.10 -3.68 -3.59 0.07 0.13 -0.32
West 0.08 -6.74 -6.11 -0.25 -0.85 -0.01
South 0.12 -4.59 -4.18 0.74 0.49 3.07
Average values over six larger macroeconomic regions. Weighted version with 2000 real GDP. Metropolises: Beijing, Tianjin
and Shanghai. East Coast: Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong. Center: Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Anhui
and Jiangxi. Manchuria: Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang. West: Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai
and Xinjiang. South: Chongqing, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guangxi, Guizhou and Hainan.
Figure 3.2: Capital flows vs productivity catch-up, 1984-2010
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Figure 3.3: Investment wedge vs productivity catch-up, 1984-2010
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Table 3.3: Factor regressions of investment and saving wedge (I)
Investment wedge Saving wedge
Univariate Ec.Dvpt control Univariate Ec. Dvpt control
Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value
Investment Str.
SOInvFA -5.2 0.01 -8.3 0.00 4.7 0.00 3.4 0.03
FOInvFA 0.5 0.55 1.5 0.14 -1.0 0.01 -0.4 0.50
REInvFA 7.3 0.00 7.4 0.00 -3.9 0.04 -3.6 0.03
State vs Private
SOGIOV -1.4 0.09 -2.6 0.01 1.8 0.00 1.4 0.01
EmplPrivate -1.3 0.12 -3.1 0.16 -1.3 0.14 1.7 0.09
Market 2.6 0.13 7.7 0.00 -3.2 0.00 -2.5 0.08
SOCGOV -1.8 0.07 -3.0 0.01 2.4 0.00 1.6 0.05
Economic Str.
SectorPrim 0.8 0.52 0.7 0.79 1.6 0.01 0.1 0.94
SectorInd 3.3 0.08 4.8 0.00 -5.1 0.00 -3.9 0.02
SectorConst -3.5 0.16 -6.3 0.01 2.6 0.03 0.6 0.76
SectorTert -5.7 0.02 -6.5 0.03 1.2 0.35 5.8 0.00
StructConc -0.6 0.00 -0.6 0.00 0.2 0.07 0.4 0.07
HousingPrice -0.1 0.98 0.6 0.80 -2.4 0.03 -1.1 0.41
CoalOil -0.7 0.07 -0.8 0.05 0.1 0.55 -0.1 0.61
International
Openness 0.1 0.90 0.8 0.70 -0.7 0.00 -0.4 0.70
MNE 0.7 0.42 2.3 0.01 -1.6 0.00 -1.4 0.03
FDI 0.1 0.84 0.7 0.63 -0.9 0.03 -0.3 0.64
Financial Dvpt
Deposits -2.2 0.23 -2.4 0.20 0.4 0.47 1.7 0.00
Loans -4.5 0.02 -4.8 0.01 1.2 0.12 2.8 0.00
Cross-sectional OLS regressions with 30 observations. First regression with constant and factor, second with control for level
of economic development (average of real GDP per capita relative to national values). Coefficients in %. Factors normalized
by their cross-sectional mean. P-values based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors HC3 (jackknife approximation).
The dependent variable is the investment/saving wedge estimated for the 1984-2010 sample. The independent variables are
the mean over 1997-2009 of the respective factor. See Section A.1.1 in appendix for a description of the factors.
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Table 3.4: Factor regressions of investment and saving wedge (II)
Investment wedge Saving wedge
Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value
% HC2 HC3 % HC2 HC3
SOInvFA -4.4 0.04 0.07 SOGIOV 0.9 0.07 0.12
Loans -2.2 0.07 0.14 EmplPrivate -0.7 0.40 0.48
HousingPrice -2.0 0.31 0.40 HousingPrice 0.0 0.97 0.97
SectorConst -3.8 0.05 0.11 SectorInd -2.7 0.00 0.00
FDI 0.2 0.77 0.82 MNE -0.9 0.02 0.03
UrbRate -2.5 0.15 0.24 UrbRate 1.3 0.15 0.21
Cross-sectional OLS regressions with 30 observations. Coefficients in %. P-values based on
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors HC2 and HC3 (jackknife approximation). The dependent vari-
able is the investment/saving wedge estimated for the 1984-2010 sample. The independent variables are
the mean over 1997-2009 of the respective factor. See Section A.1.1 in appendix for a description of the
factors.
Table 3.5: Panel factor regression of saving wedge for three subsamples
No time fixed-effects With time fixed-effects
Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value
% AR LZ % AR LZ
SOGIOV 6.3 0.02 0.00 -0.9 0.82 0.43
EmplPrivate -12.3 0.01 0.00 -4.1 0.45 0.01
DepMinLoans 0.9 0.67 0.17 1.6 0.50 0.03
SectorInd -21.1 0.00 0.00 -11.4 0.07 0.00
Openness 1.0 0.63 0.12 0.6 0.80 0.40
FDI -35.2 0.01 0.00 -41.1 0.03 0.00
Pooled OLS estimates with province fixed-effects. Coefficients in %, not comparable with
cross-sectional regressions (i.e. not normalized by cross-sectional mean). P-values based on
Arellano’s heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors (AR) and clustered
by province based on Liang and Zeger (LZ). The dependent variable is saving wedge esti-
mated for three subsamples (1984-1992, 1993-2001 and 2002-2010). Independent variables
are the mean over 1984-1991, 1993-2000 and 2002-2009 of the respective factor. EmplPri-
vate is in year level (1992, 2001 and 2010) because no value is available before 1992. See
Section A.1.1 in appendix for a description of the factors.
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Table 3.6: Detailed results, 1984-2010
Name TFP Capital Investment decomposition Capital flows decomposition
growth (%) eff.units Conv. Catch-up Trend Conv. Catch-up Trend Saving
Beijing 5.9 5.3 0.08 -0.04 0.53 29.0 0.4 -14.2 -12.3
Tianjin 7.6 4.5 0.12 0.01 0.41 26.2 -1.6 4.4 -30.6
Hebei 8.3 2.8 0.06 0.03 0.30 14.1 -1.5 8.1 -28.1
Shanxi 6.5 4.2 0.10 -0.01 0.40 23.3 -0.5 -4.1 -17.4
Inner Mong. 8.3 3.9 0.13 0.04 0.38 27.7 -1.3 12.0 -30.1
Liaoning 6.1 2.9 0.08 -0.02 0.30 17.0 0.0 -5.0 -13.8
Jilin 6.7 3.1 0.11 -0.01 0.32 23.4 -0.2 -2.3 -14.6
Heilongjiang 5.6 3.3 0.07 -0.03 0.34 15.4 0.5 -7.5 -10.9
Shanghai 6.3 5.3 0.12 -0.02 0.45 22.2 -1.1 -5.6 -18.7
Jiangsu 8.8 3.2 0.07 0.05 0.33 16.2 -2.1 13.5 -36.9
Zhejiang 7.7 3.1 0.08 0.02 0.34 22.0 -1.1 5.4 -35.2
Anhui 5.5 3.0 0.07 -0.03 0.33 18.4 0.7 -9.4 -9.6
Fujian 8.3 2.7 0.07 0.03 0.32 22.1 -0.9 11.1 -37.1
Jiangxi 6.9 3.1 0.08 0.00 0.33 17.6 -0.5 -1.0 -15.6
Shandong 8.1 3.3 0.08 0.03 0.35 19.1 -1.6 8.7 -32.0
Henan 7.1 3.1 0.09 0.00 0.34 23.6 -0.5 0.3 -23.2
Hubei 5.8 3.7 0.11 -0.03 0.37 23.9 0.1 -8.3 -15.8
Hunan 5.2 2.3 0.09 -0.03 0.26 20.3 0.5 -9.3 -11.0
Guangdong 9.7 2.1 0.02 0.06 0.28 7.9 -1.6 21.3 -47.9
Guangxi 6.2 2.7 0.10 -0.02 0.31 25.6 0.1 -6.0 -13.9
Hainan 5.2 4.7 0.11 -0.05 0.45 29.5 0.8 -15.6 -12.5
Chongqing 7.3 3.3 0.07 0.00 0.33 15.2 -0.6 1.2 -9.1
Sichuan 5.9 3.4 0.09 -0.02 0.34 19.1 0.3 -6.8 -10.6
Guizhou 4.6 3.6 0.08 -0.05 0.39 23.5 2.0 -16.6 2.5
Yunnan 5.9 3.3 0.07 -0.02 0.35 19.7 0.7 -8.1 -4.2
Tibet - - - - - - - - -
Shaanxi 7.6 3.4 0.08 0.01 0.35 17.9 -0.9 4.0 -15.2
Gansu 5.2 3.8 0.08 -0.04 0.38 20.1 1.3 -12.0 -5.4
Qinghai 4.7 6.3 0.14 -0.07 0.55 36.7 2.0 -22.8 -3.4
Ningxia 6.3 5.5 0.11 -0.02 0.52 33.1 0.4 -8.6 -4.2
Xinjiang 7.3 5.3 0.07 0.01 0.48 15.7 -1.7 2.1 -12.8
Steady-state capital in efficiency unit matches average investment rate and depends on investment wedge.
Investment decomposition: Conv: initial investment needed to reach the steady-state capital stock. Catch-up: investment required by falling
behind or catching up compared to reference TFP. Trend: amount of investment needed to compensate for capital depreciation.
Capital flows decomposition: Conv: amount of capital necessary to reach the steady-state capital stock. Catch-up: external borrowing needed
to finance domestic investment. Trend: cumulated debt inflows required to hold the relative debt ratio constant. Saving: intertemporal con-
sumption decision of households.
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Table 3.7: Factor regressions of investment and saving wedge (III)
Investment wedge Saving wedge
Univariate Ec. Dvpt control Univariate Ec. Dvpt control
Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value
Human Capital
TertiaryEduc -1.1 0.01 -1.9 0.01 -0.4 0.67 1.7 0.01
HighEduc -1.2 0.11 -1.8 0.13 -0.7 0.52 1.6 0.19
Patents -0.2 0.61 -0.1 0.94 -0.4 0.22 0.9 0.20
Social Security
SOCSEC -1.3 0.06 -3.0 0.02 -1.1 0.09 1.6 0.08
Demographics
OldDepRatio 3.1 0.37 5.2 0.13 -1.8 0.32 0.9 0.66
SexRatio -1.4 0.14 -1.6 0.07 1.5 0.04 1.0 0.14
UrbRate -1.6 0.19 -4.5 0.10 -1.6 0.12 4.3 0.01
EthnicShare -0.7 0.05 -0.9 0.01 0.5 0.15 0.3 0.38
Cross-sectional OLS regressions with 30 observations. First regression with constant and factor, second with control for level
of economic development (average of real GDP per capita relative to national values). Coefficients in %. Factors normalized
by their cross-sectional mean. P-values based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors HC3 (jackknife approximation).
The dependent variable is the investment/saving wedge estimated for the 1984-2010 sample. The independent variables are
the mean over 1997-2009 of the respective factor. See Section A.1.1 in appendix for a description of the factors.
Figure 3.4: Saving wedge vs productivity catch-up, 1984-2010
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Figure 3.5: Investment wedges (τk), 1984-2010 (in %)
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Figure 3.6: Saving wedges (τs), 1984-2010 (in %)
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Figure 3.7: Investment wedge vs SOInvFA
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Figure 3.8: Saving wedge vs SOGIOV
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Figure 3.9: Saving wedge vs MNE
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Figure 3.10: Non-state vs state net exports over total GDP for larger regions, 1997-2012
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Figure 3.11: Saving wedges, 1998-2010 (in %)
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Figure 3.12: Net exports over GDP: aggregation and error correction
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Figure 3.13: Productivity catch-up vs original (dashed) and error-corrected (red) capital flows
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Figure 3.14: International trade flows vs productivity catch-up, 1984-2010
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Figure 3.15: Capital flows vs productivity catch-up (alternative data from Brandt et al. (2012))
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Figure 3.16: Saving wedge: baseline vs alternative data (Brandt et al. (2012))
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Figure 3.17: Sensitivity of wedges to alternative reference TFP (g∗)
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Figure 3.18: Sensitivity of wedges to alternative coefficient of relative risk aversion (γ)
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Figure 3.19: Initial external position over 1984 GDP (debt +, assets -)
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Figure 3.20: Sensitivity of saving wedge to weights on initial external position ([0−1])
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Figure 3.21: Implied real wage wedge relative to China: model vs data (- means high wage vs
China)
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Chapter 4
A Provincial View of Global
Imbalances: Regional Capital Flows in
China1
1This chapter is joint work with Prof. Dr. Mathias Hoffmann. It is currently under submission at the International
Monetary Fund Economic Review.
90
4.1 Introduction
The empirical fact that international capital tends to flow uphill – from big emerging economies
such as China to highly developed countries such as the US – has been an issue of intensive aca-
demic and policy debate over the last decade. This pattern is a theoretical challenge to neoclas-
sical growth models and therefore has rightfully been dubbed a puzzle (Gourinchas and Jeanne,
2013). It is also often seen as the main symptom of a perceived imbalance in international capital
flows that could distort exchange rates, interest rates and asset prices at a global level (Bernanke,
2007). Considerable research effort has therefore been given to explaining these patterns theo-
retically (Caballero et al., 2008; Mendoza et al., 2009; Song et al., 2011; Aguiar and Amador,
2011).2 However, so far, we have relatively little evidence about the patterns of intranational cap-
ital flows in the country that – with its persistent surpluses over the last decade – best exemplifies
this capital allocation puzzle: China.
We attempt to fill that gap in this paper. We study empirically the dynamics and determinants
of net exports at the level of Chinese provinces. Understanding this “cross-section” of China’s
net exports provides a useful disaggregated perspective on global imbalances and their origins.
Specifically, we model province-level net exports using a stylized intertemporal model of capital
flows in which we allow for a simple form of financial frictions in the form of a “savings wedge”
in the mould of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013). Our framework builds on Hoffmann (2013)
and nests two broad channels of external adjustment in interprovincial capital flows: the first is
variation in intertemporal prices, which can further be disaggregated into variation in national
real interest rate, the excess return on international assets over the domestic interest rate, and
real exchange rate (i.e. the relative price of tradable and non-tradable goods). The second is
intertemporal variation in quantities – cash flows of output, investment and government spending.
As we show, our simple model can account for up to 85 percent of the net exports variation in a
panel of 30 provinces over the 1985-2010 period. Variation in cash flow explains on average 70
percent of external adjustment and intertemporal prices, on average, account for the remaining
15 percent.
However, these numbers mask considerable cross-provincial heterogeneity in the importance
of adjustment channels. First, as documented in the third chapter, China’s provinces are charac-
terized by an internal capital allocation puzzle, with some of the most quickly growing provinces
displaying the most persistent surpluses. Second, our decomposition of provincial net exports
puts us into a position to correlate province-level patterns of external adjustment with a host of
regional characteristics: i) the relative role of private and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the
provincial economy and their differential access to finance, ii) measures of openness to inter-
national FDI and trade, iii) the sectoral composition of local economies and iv) demographic
factors. All of these characteristics have been identified in the empirical and theoretical lit-
2For more, we refer to the third chapter (Section 3.1.1) where we provide a review of the main theories and
findings.
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eratures as potential drivers of China’s external surplus. However, a taxonomy that allows to
assess the relative importance of these factors is lacking to date. By looking at the cross-section
of China’s province-level net exports, we can provide such a taxonomy by identifying through
which channels these characteristics impact interprovincial and international capital flows.
Our results suggest that the relative role of private and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has a
particularly strong impact on the patterns of external adjustment at the province-level: variation
in domestic (as opposed to international) interest rate and expected variation in future invest-
ment (i.e. net output) are much more important drivers of capital flows in provinces with high
share of private enterprises in the economy. Conversely, in provinces with a strong presence of
SOEs, we see that variation in international interest rate and relative price of non-tradables is
more important. This pattern is consistent with a view of the Chinese economy (Song et al.,
2011) in which private enterprises and households are subject to considerable financial repres-
sion, whereas state-owned enterprises have preferential access to international finance through
the state-owned banking system. As a result, saving decisions by private households and firms
should be driven by variation in the domestic (financially repressed) interest rate and firm sav-
ings should predict future private investment because such investment has to be financed from
internal funds. This is what our empirical findings suggest. We also find a significant impact on
capital flows from internal price adjustment (i.e. in the relative price of non-tradables such as a
housing) in less developed regions. This seems consistent with the view that housing may serve
as a savings vehicle where other investible assets are hard to come by.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 introduces our theoretical and empirical
framework. Then, Section 4.3 discusses the data. In a next step, we present our main results
in Section 4.4 and briefly discuss some alternative specifications in Section 4.5. At last, Section
4.6 concludes.
4.2 The framework
4.2.1 Model
Our analysis follows the tradition of the intertemporal approach to the current account (Sachs
et al., 1981; Bergin and Sheffrin, 2000; Kano, 2008; Hoffmann, 2013). However, to our knowl-
edge, we are the first to extend and apply the empirical framework used in these studies to in-
tranational data and, in particular, to data from Chinese regions. Specifically, our setup extends
Hoffmann (2013) to allow us to study a cross-section of regional economies. It is based on rather
minimal identifying assumptions since it builds on the log-linearized version of an intertemporal
budget constraint, similar to Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) and Gourinchas and Rey (2007).
Our starting point is the law of motion of a province’s claims on the rest of the world (includ-
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ing other provinces and other countries), here expressed in tradable goods as
Bkt = (1+ r
T,k
t )B
k
t−1+Y
k
t − Ikt −Gkt −Ckt
where Bkt is the stock of out-of-region assets and Y
k
t , I
k
t , G
k
t and C
k
t denote the province-level (k)
values of real output, investment, government consumption and private consumption respectively.
The term rT,kt denotes the interest rate (expressed in terms of tradable goods) that the province
obtains on its (end-of-last-period) holdings of out-of-province assets, Bkt−1. We can then define
the provincial net exports balance as
NXkt = ∆B
k
t − rT,kt Bkt−1 = NOkt −Ckt
where we use the notation NOkt = Y
k
t − Ikt −Gkt to denote net output (i.e. the cash flow available
for consumption to the province’s residents).
China has a closed capital account. As has been widely documented, most of its foreign assets
are in the the hands of the public sector or of state owned enterprises, while private or politically
non-connected firms and households are subject to a considerable degree of financial repression
(see Aguiar and Amador, 2011; Song et al., 2011). Another justification for introducing a savings
friction is that, in the long run framework of the third chapter, they have been identified as the key
driver of provincial external balances (as opposed to investment wedges). Following Gourinchas
and Jeanne (2013), we capture these frictions in a reduced form as a wedge between domestic and
world real interest rates. Specifically, we model the de facto real interest rate faced by residents
of province k as
rT,kt = (1−δ k)(iNt −Et(pit+1))+δ k(iWt −∆st+1−Et(pit+1))
where iNt and i
W
t are the Chinese and the world (US) nominal interest rate respectively and ∆st+1
the percentage change in the nominal effective Renminbi exchange rate. Finally, pit+1 denotes
Chinese tradables inflation. The coefficient δ k captures differences across provinces in the degree
of financial integration with world capital markets. We rewrite the preceding equation as
rT,kt = r
N
t +δ
kτt
where rNt = i
N
t −Et(pit+1) is the national (domestic) real interest rate and τt = iWt −∆st+1− iNt is
the excess return of investing into the foreign bond while borrowing in Chinese currency. Here,
δ kτt can be interpreted as a measure of the province-level savings wedge.3 This decomposition
3To see the formal similarity with a savings wedge in the Gourinchas-Jeanne setup, write (1+rT,kt ) = (1+ iWt )(1−
τkt )/(1+pikt ), where τkt is a province-specific wedge and iWt is the nominal world rate of interest. In our setup, we
assume τkt = δ kτt (i.e. the province-level wedge is the product of a province-level degree of financial integration and
a China-wide wedge vis-à-vis the rest of the world). Taking logs then gives the representation above. The assumption
implicit in this formulation is that time variation in savings wedges is common across provinces, whereas the relative
degree of access of provinces to the global capital market is unchanged over time. Since province-level interest rates
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of the regional real interest rate has an intuitive interpretation. The first term (rNt ) corresponds to
saving incentives arising from the domestic real interest rate. The second term reflects variation
in the excess returns on the international bond (τt). Note that the impact of τt is allowed to vary
across provinces according to the loading parameter δ k ∈ [0 : 1]. A weight δ k of one means that
the province has full access to international markets, so that rT,kt = iWt −∆st+1−Et(pit+1), the real
return on the foreign bond. A weight of zero indicates that the region is financially repressed, so
that households and firms are forced to invest into national assets at rate rT,kt = rNt . For example,
we would expect that more urbanized provinces with more international trade or regions with
a stronger presence of state-owned enterprises – which have preferential access to international
finance – would have a relatively higher level of δ k (lower financial repression). By contrast,
less open and financially developed provinces may be characterized by a lower value of δ k (more
financial repression). We will corroborate this conjecture in our empirical analysis.
Imposing the usual transversality constraint, the above law of motion can be solved forward,
to yield the non-linear intertemporal budget constraint:
Bkt−1 =
∞
∑
l=0
Et
{
RT,kt+k
[
Ckt+l−NOkt+l
]}
where RT,kt+l =
[
∏li=0(1+ r
T,k
t+i)
]−1
. We build on Kano (2008) and log-linearize this expression to
obtain a formula for the net exports / net output ratio:4
N˜X
NOt
k
= c
∞
∑
l=1
κ lEt
{
∆c˜kt+l− r˜T,kt+l
}
+
∞
∑
l=1
κ lEt
{
r˜T,kt+l−∆n˜okt+l
}
(4.1)
We provide a detailed derivation of a version with savings wedge in appendix (Section B.2.2).
Here, ∆no and ∆c are the growth rates of net output and consumption expenditure respec-
tively and the tilde denotes deviations from the unconditional mean. The parameters b and
c are the long-term means of B/NO and C/NO. The discount parameter takes the form κ =
exp
[
E(∆nokt )−E(rT,kt )
]
. In the derivation, we have assumed that E(∆nokt ) = E(∆ckt ). Note that
the approximation above follows directly from the intertemporal budget constraint and that we
have, so far, not imposed any restrictions on technology or preferences.
In what follows, we restrict this setup using some theory. Specifically, we posit that each
province’s representative agent has lifetime CRRA utility over a consumption bundle composed
are not directly observable, this approach allows us to calibrate τt directly from observables while estimating δ k as a
parameter of the model.
4Kano (2008) obtained an expression for the CA/NO ratio. As no income flows data among regions are available,
we use the approximation N˜XNOt
k
= C˜ANOt
k
−br˜T,kt , where b is the steady-state value of foreign assets.
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of a tradable and non-tradable good:
∞
∑
t=0
β tE0
X
(
CN,kt ,C
T,k
t
)1−γ
1− γ

where
Xkt = X
(
CT,kt ,C
N,k
t
)
=CT,kαt ×CN,k 1−αt
A detailed derivation of the model is available in appendix (Section B.2.1.1). In this setting,
it is well known that the intertemporal consumption allocation can be solved for independently
from the intratemporal allocation between tradable and non-tradable goods. Specifically, we can
define the price index of aggregate consumption by recognizing that, for any such index P∗kt , it
must be true that P∗kt Xkt = C
T,k
t +PkC
N,k
t = Ckt for all P
k
t . Then replacing C
k
t with P
k∗
t X
k
t in the
budget constraint, one obtains the Euler equation
Et
(
β
P∗kt
P∗kt+1
(
Xkt
Xkt+1
)γ (
1+ rT,kt+1
))
= 1
which can be rewritten in terms of aggregate consumption expenditure as
Et
β( Ckt
Ckt+1
)γ(
P∗kt
P∗kt+1
)1−γ (
1+ rT,kt+1
)= 1 (4.2)
The aggregate price index for consumption is given by P∗t+1/P
∗
t = (Pt+1/Pt)
1−α . Hence, (4.2)
links aggregate consumption expenditure growth to the consumption-based real interest rate,
which is the national real interest rate corrected for the savings wedge and real exchange rate
changes (defined as the change in the relative price of the non-traded good relative to the tradable
good). Assuming that consumption growth, the real exchange rate, and the real interest rate are
jointly log-normal, Bergin and Sheffrin (2000) show that this condition can be log-linearized to
obtain
Et(∆ckt+1) =
1
γ
Et
(
rkt+1
)
+ constant (4.3)
where rkt is the consumption-based real interest rate of province k,
rkt+1 = r
T,k
t+1+(1−α)(γ−1)∆pkt+1
and where ∆pkt+1 reflects the change in relative non-tradable prices. We provide an interpretation
of this equation at the end of Section B.2.1.1.
We now substitute for consumption growth and the real interest rate term on the right-hand
side of the log-linearized budget constraint.5 Plugging in for rkt+1/γ = E(∆c
k
t+1), and using the
5This follows Bergin and Sheffrin (2000) and Bouakez and Kano (2009). However, these models do not feature a
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decomposition rT,kt = rNt +δ kτt from above, we obtain the following expression for net exports
N˜Xt
NOt
k
=−
∞
∑
l=1
κ lEt∆n˜okt+l +φ
∞
∑
l=1
κ lEt ∆˜q
k
t+l +[1−φ ]
∞
∑
l=1
κ lEt r˜Nt+l +δ k
[
[1−φ ]
∞
∑
l=1
κ lEt τ˜t+l
]
(4.4)
where we have introduced additional notation so that φ = c
(
1− 1γ
)
and ∆qt+1 = (1−α)∆pt+1
is the change in the provincial real exchange rate (i.e. the inflation differential in the relative
price of non-tradables and tradables). A detailed derivation of this result is provided in Section
B.2.3.1.
This equation suggests four channels of net exports adjustment.6 The first term reflects the
intertemporal consumption smoothing channel that is emphasized by basic versions of the neo-
classical model (see e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoff, chapter 2). If output is below (above) trend, so that
the sum of its expected changes is positive (negative), the country should run a deficit (surplus)
ceteris paribus. It is the intuition underlying this channel that has contributed to the conventional
perception of China’s persistent surpluses as an empirical puzzle: according to this intuition, an
emerging economy with high future expected GDP growth rates should run a deficit.7
The second to fourth terms all capture how expected variation in prices and interest rates im-
pacts on capital flows. These channels can therefore potentially help explain departures from the
simplest neoclassical benchmark model of net exports behavior. The second term is the effect on
intertemporal substitution of expected changes in the local price of non-tradables (i.e. intratem-
poral substitution). If the price of the provincial consumption bundle relative to tradable goods is
expected to rise in the future, there is an incentive to save more. In analogy to Hoffmann (2013),
we refer to this channel as “internal tilting” since it is driven by relative variation in expected
prices of only regionally consumed (non-tradable) to both internationally and domestically con-
sumed (tradable) goods. For example, we would expect that anticipated rises in the local price of
housing, schooling or medical care could be important determinants of saving decisions.
The third and fourth terms capture how variation in the (China-wide) real rate of interest and
in the impact of the excess return on the foreign bond respectively affect province-level capital
flows. If province-level interest rates are temporarily high (because national interest rates or the
savings wedge are high), so that the sum of future interest-rate deviations from the long-term
mean interest rate is positive, consumers will want to defer consumption and save more. We call
the first term the domestic interest rate channel since national – as opposed to global – interest
rate variation should matter only in repressed financial markets. We refer to the second term
savings wedge.
6Thereafter, we assume 0 < φ < 1, which is fulfilled for values of risk aversion (γ) higher than one and most
empirical values of the consumption ratio (c).
7However, as we discuss in detail below, even in quickly growing economies this channel can also be consistent
with surpluses. If financial frictions require firms to finance investment from retained earnings , these saving surpluses
will predict increases in investment that can at least temporarily exceed output growth.
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as the world interest rate channel. Clearly, both channels become stronger as the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution (1/γ) – and (1−φ) – increases.
4.2.2 Empirical implementation
A detailed explanation of the following steps is provided in appendix (Section B.2.3.1). Equation
(4.4) is the focus of our empirical analysis of province-level net exports. For each region in our
sample, we proxy the expectations on the right hand side of (4.4) using a vector autoregressive
model (VAR):
Xkt =
p
∑
l=1
Al(k)Xkt−l + ε
k
t
where Xkt =
[
∆nokt ∆qkt rNt τt (NX/NO)
k
t
]′
is the vector of endogenous variables, the Al(k)
are 5×5 coefficient matrices of the p-th order VAR and εkt is the vector of reduced-form resid-
uals. Stacking Zkt =
[
Xkt , X
k
t−1, ... ,X
k
t−p+1
]′
, one can write the VAR companion form as
VAR(1) so that
Zkt = A{k}Z
k
t−1+U
k
t (4.5)
where A{k} is the companion matrix of the VAR estimated on province k data and
Ukt =
[
εkt , 0, ... ,0
]′
the associated vector of residuals. Then, once the VAR-parameters
have been estimated, the expectation terms are easily backed out as
∞
∑
l=1
κ lEtXkt+l = e
′
xκA{k}
[
I−κA{k}
]−1 Zkt
where Xt stands, in turn, for ∆nokt , ∆qkt , rNt , τt , NXNO
k
t and ex is the unit vector associated with the
position of x in the vector Zkt (i.e. the first unit vector for ∆no, the second for ∆qt etc.). Plugging
this representation of the expectation terms into (4.4) above, one gets the NX/NO ratio predicted
by the model for each province:
N̂X
NO
k
t
=
[
−e′∆no+φe′∆q+(1−φ)(e′r +δ ke′τ)
]
κA{k}
[
I−κA{k}
]−1 Zkt (4.6)
where again φ = c
(
1− 1γ
)
and where we denote the predicted value of NX/NO from the model
with a hat.
For each province and for any known set of parameter values 1/γ , κ , c and δ , the predicted
net exports can now be compared to the actual net exports. This can be done either through
an informal comparison of the predicted net exports with the data (in terms of correlation and
variance) or formally, based on a Wald test.8 Note that in the above setup, we let the VAR-
8Rewriting equation (4.6) for a given companion matrix A as e′nx =[
−e′∆no +φe′∆q +(1−φ)(e′r +δ ke′τ )
]
κA [I−κA]−1 and denoting the right-hand side of this restriction with
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parameters vary at the provincial level, allowing for potentially very different dynamics in outputs
and prices across regions.
One decision we have to take at this junction is to what extent we want to allow the param-
eters of the theoretical model like c (the long-term consumption ratio) and in particular 1/γ (the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution) to differ across regions. In principle, c can be recovered
from the data. Prima facie, it would seem natural to restrict the preference parameter γ to be the
same across regions. However, we would expect that the technologies available for intertemporal
substitution – and, thus, measured elasticities – vary widely across provinces, e.g. with the level
of development. Whether we would also expect this to be the case with respect to the extent
to which provinces have access to international markets is an open question. On the one hand,
more open or developed provinces may benefit from a more developed financial system and may
have access to finance from international banks or firms. On the other hand, state-owned firms
may have a privileged access to international markets. We therefore estimate 1/γ , κ and δ us-
ing a GMM-procedure for each province separately. We discuss the details of this estimation in
Section 4.4.1.
4.2.3 Channels of province-level external adjustment
Once the parameters κ , c, γ and δ have been determined, we can use (4.6) to decompose the
variance of each province’s net exports as follows. Write the component that is unexplained
by the model as resk = NXk/NOk− N̂X/NOk, take the variance on both sides and plug in for
N̂X/NO
k
from (4.6). Then, dividing by var(NXk/NOk), one gets
1 = β k∆no+β
k
∆q+β
k
r +β
k
τ +β
k
res (4.7)
Ψ(A), the Wald-statistics [e′nx−Ψ(A)] ∂Ψ(A)∂A var(A)−1
∂Ψ(A)
∂A
′
[e′nx−Ψ(A)]′ is asymptotically distributed as a χ2 with
m degrees of freedom where m is the dimension of the companion matrix A.
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where
β k∆no =
cov
(
−e′∆noκA{k}
[
I−κA{k}
]−1 Zkt ,NXk/NOk)
var(NXk/NOk)
β k∆q =
cov
(
φe′∆qκA{k}
[
I−κA{k}
]−1 Zkt ,NXk/NOk)
var(NXk/NOk)
β kr =
cov
(
(1−φ)e′rκA{k}
[
I−κA{k}
]−1 Zkt ,NXk/NOk)
var(NXk/NOk)
β kτ =
cov
(
δ k(1−φ)e′τκA{k}
[
I−κA{k}
]−1 Zkt ,NXk/NOk)
var(NXk/NOk)
β kres =
cov(resk,NXk/NOk)
var(NXk/NOk)
where again φ = c
(
1− 1γ
)
. Here, β k∆no is the contribution of net output variation (consump-
tion smoothing or net output channel), β k∆q is the contribution of expected changes in relative
price of non-tradables (internal price channel), β kr is the contribution of (expected) variation in
the national real rate of interest (domestic channel) and β kτ the variation arising from changes in
excess returns (international channel). Note that τ is always used in the VAR predictions but is
not necessarily present in (4.6) because we allow for a weight (δ ) of zero in the grid-search. The
coefficient β kres is the fraction of the variance of province k’s net exports that remains unexplained
by the model.
For notational compactness, we collect the various β kx s into the vector
β k =
[
β k∆no β
k
∆q β
k
r β kτ β kres
]′
and we call β k the pattern of external adjustment of province k. In what follows, we also allow
for the possibility that the elements of β k vary over time.9
At the level of each province, the elements of β k could easily be estimated from time series
OLS regressions of the expected present values of ∆˜nok, ∆˜qk, r˜N and τ˜ on NXk/NOk respec-
tively. However, our main interest in this paper is also to analyze to what extent province-level
characteristics (such as financial and economic development, industrial structure, demography,
etc...) affect the patterns of external adjustment and, potentially, also to allow for time-variation
in these variables. We therefore posit that the external adjustment in province k through a given
channel is an affine-linear function of a vector zkt of province-level characteristics so that
β kx (t) = βx+ γ ′xzkt (4.8)
9Note that these β kx s are not to be confused with the discount parameter of the utility function (β ).
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where x denotes the respective channel. The coefficient βx measures the average (across-provinces)
importance of channel x and the vector γx describes the sensitivity of the respective external ad-
justment channel to variation in characteristics (z) across provinces. This assumption on β kx (t)
allows us to analyze the cross-provincial variation in external adjustment patterns using a panel
set-up. Specifically, we estimate β kx (t) from the following relationship
xkt = α+ τt +µ
k +β kx (t)×
[
NX
NO
]k
t
+ψ ′× zkt +νkt (4.9)
where xkt stands in turn for the VAR-implied expectations of the corresponding channel. On the
right hand side of (4.9), α is a constant and τt and µk are time- and province fixed-effects. The
vector zkt stacks characteristics as before. For each channel, equation (4.9) can be estimated as a
panel regression once we plug in from (4.8) above:
xkt = α+ τt +µ
k +βx×
[
NX
NO
]k
t
+ γx′× zkt ×
[
NX
NO
]k
t
+ψ ′× zkt +νkt (4.10)
The coefficient on
[NX
NO
]k
t then measures the average importance of the channel x across
provinces (βx), whereas the coefficients on the interaction terms of the regional net exports with
the province-level characteristics (γx) capture the sensitivity of the respective channel to variation
in characteristics over provinces and time.
4.3 Data
4.3.1 General remarks
When not mentioned otherwise, data used in this chapter are from the National Statistical Year-
books of the People’s Republic of China and from the Provincial Statistical Yearbooks of the 22
provinces, 5 autonomous regions and 4 municipalities of Mainland China.10 The China Data
Center (CDC) of the University of Michigan provides electronic access to the yearbooks and
made main statistics conveniently available.11 For most provinces, our online access only covers
regional statistical yearbooks in the 1990s and 2000s. Thus, it happens that the data are some-
times incomplete. We will primarily rely on data directly retrieved from recent online yearbooks
and complete possible gaps with CDC sheets. This allows us to take account of revisions as much
as possible.
The quality of provincial and aggregate Chinese National Accounts data is an important issue
10The autonomous regions are Tibet, Xinjiang, Guangxi, Inner Mongolia and Ningxia. The cities of Beijing,
Tianjin, Shanghai as well as the region of Chongqing are municipalities. Thereafter, the term province will be used as
general qualifier.
11http://chinadataonline.org/. The CDC reports values as soon as they are published in the corresponding
yearbook. Although data have sometimes been subject to official revisions in later years, the CDC did not systemati-
cally adapt past values.
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that we explore in the second chapter of the thesis, where we focus on some stylized facts and
discuss the quality and aggregation properties of the data. This analysis revealed large discrep-
ancies between aggregate statistics and the sum of provincial statistics. For example, the sum
of province-level GDPs was about 11 percent higher than the officially published national value
in 2010. The bulk of this large error stems from an excess of regional over national investment,
which has been widening since the mid-1990s. Conversely, the discrepancy between cumulated
provincial saving and national saving shows no clear trend over time. Still, the sum of province-
level saving overestimated national values by around 7 percent of China’s GDP in 2010. All
things considered, it suggests that, since the mid-2000s, the sum of province-level net exports
will generally be lower than the corresponding official aggregate statistics. Other authors have
argued that China’s current account surplus is overstated for a variety of reasons (see Zhang,
2008). Whether regional data are more affected than national ones is an open question (e.g.
the 2004 Economic Census validated provincial GDP data and invalidated national ones (Holz,
2008)).
While there is some uncertainty concerning the levels of aggregate and regional statistics,
our exploratory analysis also showed that the sum of province-level GDP, investment and saving
data is generally highly correlated with movements in aggregate statistics.12 Since our empirical
analysis focuses on a log-linearized model that emphasizes the movements in these variables
over time rather than their specific levels, we are reasonably confident that our province-level
data capture important aspects of external adjustment among China’s provinces. In the appendix
(Section B.1), we provide a description of the data and indicators used in our analysis. Apart from
Tibet – for which data are incomplete – we are able to estimate the model for all 30 provinces.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Fitting the model to province-level net exports
We estimate the province-level VAR with one or two lags.13 This allows us to back up the VAR-
implied expectations on the right hand side of the present-value relation (4.4). For each province,
we then estimate the parameters of the model – 1/γ , κ and δ – based on a three-dimensional
grid-search procedure that minimizes the squared deviation between the right hand side of (4.4)
and the respective province’s observed net export / net output ratio. In the grid-search procedure,
we let the coefficient of relative risk aversion (γ) vary between 0.2 and 5, the discount parameter
(κ) between 0.900 and 0.995 and the world market integration parameter (δ ) between 0 and 1.
Table 4.1 summarizes the estimated parameter values, the general fit of the model in terms
of correlation and the relative variance of predicted to actual net exports. In order to better
12Over 1985-2010, the correlation of the first difference of national net exports with cumulated net exports is 0.80.
It rises to 0.87 for 2000-2010, the period in which global imbalances arose.
13Additional lags generally do not improve the fit.
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appreciate the economic importance of provinces, we provide their relative share of cumulated
2000 real GDP and their rank. The ten largest provinces – accounting for more than 60% of
output – are in bold type. A geographical representation of provinces’ economic size classified
by quartile and normalized by the largest region is available in Figure 4.2. We refer to Table
4.4 for more details about the specification (sample length, number of lags, net output deflator,
consumption ratio and φ parameter).14 For most provinces, our simple model provides a good
fit: the mean correlation between actual and predicted net exports is 0.96 while the lowest value
is 0.77. The model also matches the standard deviation of actual province-level net exports quite
closely: the average relative standard deviation is 1.06.
While large cross-provincial variations exist, on average, we find a plausible value of γ of
2.59 (i.e. an average elasticity of substitution of 0.39). This coefficient is comparable with
values conventionally used in the literature and somewhat lower than estimates of Hoffmann
(2013) for China as a whole (0.71 for 1982-2010 with updated IFS data). For the discount factor,
we find a value of 0.95 on average. In general terms, the GDP-weighted means are close to
the non-weighted parameter values. Consequently, results of small – and potentially “noisier” –
provinces do not affect the parameters and the fit massively. Note in particular that the model
seems to perform especially well when applied to relatively large and more developed provinces.
Figure 4.1 provides a graphical representation of the predicted and real net exports of the three
largest provinces (Shandong, Guangdong and Jiangsu) and seven other provinces representative
of the geographical and structural diversity of China.
4.4.2 Channels of adjustment
We turn to the decomposition of the variance of province-level net exports into four channels as
in equation (4.7). For each province, the results of this decomposition are given in Table 4.2.
By way of example, Figure 4.3 provides a plot of actual and model-implied net exports along
with a breakdown into the four channels for four provinces: Liaoning, Shanghai, Guangdong and
Yunnan.
With a little more than three quarters on average, expected variation in regional cash flow –
net output (NO) – accounts for the bulk of variation in province-level capital flows, with variation
in intertemporal prices – internal price (IP), domestic (DR) and international interest rate (IR) –
accounting for the rest. However, these numbers mask considerable variation across provinces.
We provide a map of the variance decomposition of net output in Figure 4.4, where provinces
are classified by quartile. Variation in cash flow available for consumption seems to be important
14The model is estimated on the 1985-2010 period with the exception of five regions that have a reduced sample.
Guangxi, Yunnan (South) and Shaanxi (West) experienced huge decline in net exports toward the end of the sample.
Shanxi and Ningxia (West) had very high volatility in their relative net exports in the initial reform years. The con-
sumption ratio is estimated over the sample length using the same deflator as for output and government consumption.
Some smaller, less developed provinces happen to have a value higher than one but the GDP-weighted value is 0.92.
Apart from a few exceptions, the φ parameter is lower than one. Thus, even if large variations in parameters exist, the
GDP-weighted mean of all parameters is in an economically plausible value range.
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in some coastal regions as well as central China. By contrast, in Figure 4.5, the dynamics of
the relative price of non-tradables seem to play a bigger role in less developed regions (i.e. the
South and part of the Center and Manchuria) while its contribution is negative for most eastern
provinces.
In the City-Provinces such as Shanghai and Beijing, variation in world interest rate is an
important driver of variations in net exports. This is clearly in line with the notion that these
major cities are more open to foreign trade and capital, which we would expect to facilitate
access to finance from abroad. Conversely, in the East Coast provinces, with their many private
SMEs that do not have access to formal finance, financial repression – expected variation in
domestic real interest rate – is a key driver of capital flows. A geographical representation of the
interest rate channel (both domestic and international) is available in Figure 4.6.
4.4.3 Regional external adjustment: panel analysis
In the preceding section, the contribution of the different factors has been estimated for each re-
gion separately. In order to gain an overview of the general patterns of regional external balance,
we now turn to estimating the patterns of external adjustment in a panel framework as discussed
in Section 4.2.3. We start with a general characterization of external adjustment in the average
province. Equation (4.10) is estimated without any province-level characteristics (i.e. without
the zkt ), which gives us the specification
xkt = α+ τt +µ
k +βx×
(
NX
NO
)k
t
+νkt
where the x stands for one of the VAR-implied expectations of the four channels from equation
(4.4). Results of this exercise (i.e. the βxs) are given in the first panel of Table 4.3, where
bold type indicates significancy at the 10% confidence level. The panel-based estimates reveal
again that the bulk of capital flows among Chinese provinces is driven by expected variation in
quantities: net output fluctuations explain around 70 percent of the variation in NX/NO for the
average province. Variation in the expected relative price of non-tradables and expected domestic
and international interest rates each drive around 5 percent. Though these numbers seem small
at first sight, they are all significant.
The second row of the table shows the result of a panel estimate in which we weigh the
channels and net exports by the provincial real GDP share.15 A geographical representation
of the relative weights is available in Figure 4.2. While variation in net output remains the main
driver of NX/NO (the point estimate now increases to 0.82), we now also find a much bigger role
for the domestic interest rate channel than in the unweighted panel (11 percent of the variation in
NX/NO vs 5 percent). At first sight, this suggests that financial repression may be an important
driver of saving dynamics in the more developed and larger provinces with their many private
15We use 2000 real GDP as in Table 4.1 normalized by the largest province (Shandong=1).
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firms, most of which do not have access to formal finance. It seems that the significancy of
the relative price of non-tradables and the international interest rate channels is driven to a large
extent by smaller regions as it turns out to disappear in this configuration. The residual share is
at its lowest (3 percent).
The third row presents results from an alternative weighting scheme that is based on the
variance of the unexplained part of province-level net exports. In this weighting procedure,
regions that are better explained by our model get a higher weight.16 Estimates are qualitatively
similar to the non-weighted and GDP-weighted versions, with all channels – with the exception
of the domestic interest rate (DR) – being significant.
In the second and third panels of Table 4.3, we estimate the external adjustment patterns
for geographic subgroups of provinces using GDP-weighting.17 For provinces constituted of a
major metropolitan areas (such as Beijing and Shanghai), we again find a big role for variation
in international interest rate. To a lesser extent, the same seems true of southern provinces and
Manchuria, two regions where the presence of large state-owned firms could have facilitated
access to international financial markets. Conversely, in the East Coast and central regions, the
domestic interest rate channel is found to be relatively important, consistent with the view that
these provinces seem to have much less access to international finance.18
Interestingly, variations in domestic prices in non-tradables have a strong negative influence
in eastern regions while the coefficient is small and positive in two neighboring geographic areas
(the Center and Manchuria). Apart from idiosyncratic data issues, a potential explanation for the
lack of significancy in the channels of western China is its heterogeneity and the high number of
provinces (7). What is more, the model performs less well for those regions. In the last row of
the second panel (NoMetro&EC), we gather inner provinces (regions not being part of the more
developed East Coast and not being Metropolises) in the same group. The difference between
East Coast regions and inner regions does not seem to arise from the net output channel (0.86
vs 0.83) but rather from the relative importance of the internal price channel (-0.18 vs 0.05) and,
again, the domestic channel (0.28 vs 0.07). The unexplained part is higher in hinterland provinces
(0.04 vs 0.00).
The third panel of Table 4.3 also provides an indication that the pattern of adjustment is
strongly affected by the degree to which a provincial economy can be characterized as either
market-based or centrally planned. To this end, we use an index of marketization initially devel-
16This weighting procedure uses the absolute residual share of the variance decomposition ([max(abs(RES))−
abs(RESk)]2). As for real GDP, we normalize by the highest weight (i.e. Hainan=1 has the best fit).
17The definition of regional clusters is as in preceding chapters. Metropolises: Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai. East
Coast: Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong. Manchuria: Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang.
Center: Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Anhui and Jiangxi. West: Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai
and Xinjiang. South: Chongqing, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guangxi, Guizhou and Hainan.
18The fact that Manchuria has a large domestic and international channel is not necessarily a contradiction. While
this cluster historically had large state-owned firms, particularly in the heavy industry and energy-related sector, FDI,
foreign and private firms started to thrive in the later reform period, particularly in Liaoning.
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oped by Fan et al. (2001) and split provinces into two equal subgroups of high and low marke-
tization.19 Again, net output fluctuations remain the predominant force of external adjustment
in both groups. But there is a marked distinction in the way in which prices and interest rates
influence capital flows in the two categories of provinces: in the high-marketization group of
provinces, variation in domestic and world interest rate respectively explains 15 and 13 percent
of the variation in province-level net exports. In the low-marketization group, variation in world
interest rate does not matter at all, while financial repression – variation in domestic interest rate
– explains a much smaller share. Finally, in the low-marketization group of provinces, there is
also a small but significant role for expected non-tradable price changes in explaining NX/NO
while this figure is slightly negative and not significant for more advanced regions.
4.4.4 External adjustment and characteristics (standalone)
Our ultimate goal is to assess the relative empirical merit of different theoretical explanations
that have been put forward for China’s current account surplus. To this end, we now characterize
the heterogeneity in external adjustment patterns across provinces more sharply by correlating
them with province-level characteristics. We categorize these characteristics into four groups,
each of which corresponds roughly to a broad set of theoretical explanations that have been put
forward for China’s big saving surplus: i) indicators of the relative role of state-owned and private
enterprises in the local economy and financial development, ii) indicators of integration into the
world economy, iii) indicators of sectoral composition and iv) demographic indicators.
To quantify the impact of these characteristics on province-level external adjustment, we use
the panel setup with interaction terms (4.10).20 Specifically, we estimate:
xkt = α+ τt +µ
k +βx×
(
NX
NO
)k
t
+ γx′× zkt ×
(
NX
NO
)k
t
+ψ ′× zkt + εkt
where zkt is our vector of regional characteristics. To gain an impression of the link between
external adjustment and particular provincial factors, we start by considering zkt one by one (one
individual variable at a time). To at least partly alleviate the omitted variable issue, we systemati-
cally control for the mean level of development of a region (Dvpt), measured here as the average
of real GDP per capita relative to national values over the sample period. As in the second and
third panels of Table 4.3, channels and net exports are weighted by provincial real GDP share.21
Table 4.5 (left panel) gathers the results that we obtain for indicators related to the impor-
tance of the state/private sector in the regional economies. By looking at the interaction term of
19Rank based on the mean of the index over 1997-2005. Factors: government and market, ownership structure,
goods market development, factor market development and legal framework.
20For a similar specification applied to international shock transmission during the interwar gold standard, see
Hoffmann and Woitek (2011).
21There are two reasons why we favor this weighting scheme. First, small provinces have typically noisier data and
very large variations in net exports. Second, essentially, we want to shed light on the drivers of global imbalances.
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economic development and relative net exports in the following regressions, we generally find a
bigger role for global variation in international interest rate in more developed provinces, and a
more mitigated role for the internal terms of trade. This pattern is consistent with the view that
housing prices are a less important margin of adjustment in more developed parts of the country,
where de facto access to world financial markets is slightly better.
The results from Table 4.5 also clearly suggest that a higher share of SOEs (as measured
by the share of state-owned firms in gross industrial output value, SOGIOV ) in the provincial
economy leads to a smaller contribution of the net output channel to external adjustment as well
as a larger internal price and world channel. Alternative indicators of the presence of the state
in the economy would lead to similar patterns.22 Complementary evidence is borne out once
we condition on a general indicator of the extent to which a province can be characterized as a
market economy: higher levels of marketization (Market) coincide with a significantly bigger
role of the domestic (financially repressed) interest rate and a smaller role of the internal price
channel.
The literature – notably Song et al. (2011) – has emphasized that the major distinction be-
tween private and state-owned firms is that the former are financially repressed whereas the latter
have preferential access to bank credit and therefore – indirectly – to international financial mar-
kets. Our results provide strong cross-provincial evidence that supports this view. In particular,
if the expanding private sector can only finance its growth from retained earnings, we will see
that province-level surpluses predict increases in investment and, ceteris paribus, declines in net
output. This is perfectly in line with our finding that the role of net output as a channel of exter-
nal adjustment increases with the importance of the private sector. In the same mould, we would
expect saving and investment decisions by financially repressed private households and firms to
be more dependent on future domestic interest rates than on international ones, whereas the op-
posite should be true for state-owned enterprises with (implicit) access to international financial
markets. This is exactly the pattern that we find in the data.
A last factor that we focus on is the balance of funds available in banks and financial in-
stitutions (the difference between deposits and loans normalized by provincial GDP). Another
implication of Song et al. (2011) is that during the transition process, state firms shrink in fa-
vor of private enterprises. As the former’s economic importance dwindles and their investment
opportunities dry out, regions with faster growing private sector have an increasing surplus of
deposits compared to loans as the largely state-owned financial sector does not redirect funds to
the emerging private sector. At first sight, our results are compatible with that explanation as they
suggest that larger deposit surpluses ((Deposits−Loans)/GDP) make the domestic interest rate
22As the bulk of bank loans mainly goes to state-owned enterprises, we could use loans in financial institutions over
GDP as an alternative indicator for the presence of the state in the economy. The sum of deposits and loans relative to
GDP is usually interpreted as a rough index of financial development. This indicator would behave qualitatively in a
similar way as loans, suggesting that financially more developed provinces have lower net output channel and higher
international interest rate channel.
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channel more important for explaining net exports adjustment.
In the second part of Table 4.5 (right panel), we discuss some demographic factors. Urban-
ization (Urbanization) is related to a decrease in the importance of the net output channel and an
increase in the contribution of other channels to net exports adjustment, particularly international
interest rate. Thus, it seems that a higher level of urbanization – and the associated increase in
economic complexity – of a region gives rise to alternative smoothing possibilities compared to
the classical textbook adjustment. Unbalanced sex ratios (SexRatio) have been proposed as one
of the main driver of Chinese imbalances (Du and Wei, 2010). In fact, it seems that internal price
of non-tradables relative to tradables play a more significant role in regions with higher male to
female ratio.23 We observe a similar pattern for our human capital indicator: student enrollment
in higher education (HighEduc) seems to drive up the importance of that channel.
In the first part of Table 4.6 (left panel), we discuss factors related to the integration of
provinces into the world economy. As we would expect, openness (Openness) generally in-
creases the role of world financial markets and therefore of the world interest rate for external
adjustment. It also lowers the role of internal price adjustment of non-tradables, again consistent
with the view that housing price adjustments are less important where alternative investible assets
are available – which is likely to be the case in more open provinces. However, we generally also
see a bigger role for the domestic (financially repressed) interest rate in more open provinces.
This could be the case because these regions are also the ones where private enterprises tend
to grow most quickly. Furthermore, it could be that our identification strategy does not always
sharply separate domestic from international interest rate dynamics.
As discussed in the literature (e.g. Alder et al., 2013), special economic zones (SEZs) have
played a pivotal role in China’s development over the last decades. In our sample, FDI (FDI)
seems to be significantly associated with an increasing contribution to international interest rates
variability and a decreasing contribution to net output variability. Thus, regions where firms in-
creasingly get access to foreign financing seem to experience a decrease in the classical channel
of adjustment: private enterpreneurs are less dependent on their own savings to finance invest-
ment projects and supply working capital but increasingly have access to international markets
via foreign firms.24 Conclusions are very similar by using the relative importance of foreign
investment in fixed asset (FOInvFA) as an alternative proxy.
In the second part of Table 4.6 (right panel), we focus on key indicators of economic struc-
ture. In our sample period (1986-2010), for most regions, the massive transformation of the
Chinese economy is known to have primarily been driven by the structural change from a largely
agricultural and resource-based economy to an industrial one. Private and foreign firms rapidly
expanded at the cost of state-owned firms, particularly in the manufacturing sector. A larger
23Note that one would need reliable regional yearly time-variation in this indicator in order to truly test this theory
in our framework.
24Note that FDI is not robust to the inclusion of development. They are highly correlated.
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share of the industrial sector relative to GDP (Industry) seems to be associated with a significant
increase in the contribution of the net output channel and a decrease in other channels. It could
indirectly corroborate earlier findings (i.e. if a rising share in industry was associated with a
decreasing state sector).25
The share of the construction sector in the economy (Construction) is strongly correlated
with the internal price channel, which seems to make sense (i.e. this channel plays a bigger
adjustment role in regions with increasing importance of housing/infrastructure in output). At
last, the domestic interest rate seems to play an important role in regions with an increasing
patent density (Patents), even when controlling for large differences in economic development.
If innovation stems from financially repressed private firms, this could be compatible with the
preceding findings. The – initially surprising – negative coefficient on net output is driven by a
few well-integrated provinces (e.g. Beijing and Shanghai) that already started the transition from
an industrial to a service economy towards the end of the sample.26
4.4.5 External adjustment and characteristics (multivariate)
In Table 4.7, we provide a multivariate regression with six main explanatory factors. Our goal
is to shed light on the drivers of more recent variations in regional external balances. For that
reason, we focus on the second half of the sample (1997-2010). Historically speaking, it captures
the acceleration of the integration of coastal regions into the world economy and the general
spread of marketization into the Chinese hinterland. An added benefit of limiting our sample
period in this way is that all province-level characteristics with the exception of the demographic
one (SexRatio) are available on an annual basis. This allows us to treat them as time-varying in
our interaction regressions and increases the data variation that we can use for identification. As
a broad and representative vector of provincial characteristics is used, we do not control for the
level of economic development anymore. Factors are cross-sectionally demeaned.
The patterns of sex imbalances (SexRatio) are unchanged. The relative importance of the state
in gross industrial output value (SOGIOV ) is not significant anymore. Instead, the share of private
employment (EmplPrivate) seems to play a key role in net exports adjustment, particularly for
the net output channel (positive level-effect) and the international interest rate channel (positive
interaction term). Interestingly, surpluses in the financial sector ((Deposits−Loans)/GDP) are
strongly correlated with an increase in the importance of the interest rate channel, particularly
with the domestic one. At this point, it seems that the accumulation of large surpluses of deposits
over loans is potentially linked to the emergence of private firms that largely rely on self-financing
and, ultimately, on domestic interest rate as suggested by Song et al. (2011).
25With some exceptions (e.g. Beijing or Shanghai), it seems true that high share in industry has been concomitant
with a low share of state employment. However, it is not the case for relative changes over time.
26As already shown in Table 4.3, Metropolises tend to have a small net output channel.
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As before, FDI (FDI) seems to increase the share of the international channel in net exports
adjustment. Importantly, it has an even stronger opposite effect on the domestic channel. Regions
with larger FDI share have better access to international markets and become less sensitive to
domestic interest rate (i.e. are less financially repressed). The relative size of the industrial sector
per se (Industry) does not seem to impact on net exports adjustment anymore. Still, it has a
positive level effect on the internal price channel and the international channel as a standalone
while it lowers the net output channel.
In conclusion, while it seems that price channels are robust and still informative, variations
in quantities are more difficult to disentangle in such a multivariate framework. This is not
surprising given the fact that net output itself is a linear combination of three variables that
potentially react very differently to our explanatory factors.
4.4.6 Implications for China’s aggregate surplus
In this section, we examine the implications of our province-level analysis for China’s aggregate
surplus. Figure 4.7 plots the sum of province-level net exports over our sample period against the
sum of fitted values from our province-level models.27 The two lines comove almost perfectly.
In particular, the China-wide aggregate of our fitted province level net exports clearly replicates
the run-up in China’s net exports from the late 1990s until 2007/08 and the subsequent sharp
decline. This suggests that our model has substantial power for understanding the province-level
sources of global imbalances before 2007/08 and of their subsequent – partial – correction.
To shed light on this issue, we add up the regional model-based decompositions from each
province to obtain China-wide aggregates of our four channels (Figure 4.8). As was the case for
most provinces, the bulk of variations in aggregate net exports and also most of the run-up over
our sample period are driven by intertemporal variation in national cash flow (net output). This
channel also accounts for most of the correction of China’s surplus. The negative 2009 shock
stems from a large number of regions, independently of their characteristics. It is corroborated
by official current account statistics at the national level.
Variation in the world interest rate plays only a relatively minor role overall, consistent with
the view that China’s economy as a whole is relatively closed so that variation in global inter-
est rate plays only a limited role for the saving decisions of private households and firms and,
eventually, for aggregate external surpluses. This is consistent with the view that, over most of
the first decade of the 2000s, China’s external balance was to a large extent reflected in official
reserve accumulation, which, in turn, was driven by the need to counteract appreciation pressure
on the Renminbi.
While the role of expected variation in the domestic interest rate – our measure of financial
repression – appears limited overall, it makes a persistent and positive contribution to China’s
27The raw line corresponds to the data for all regions over 1985-2010.
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surplus. In fact, from the mid-1990s to 2000, it was the main driver of national net export dy-
namics. It started to rise again in the second half of the 2000s against the (possible) backdrop of
an increasing discrimination in private firms’ access to finance. More than half of the 2008 neg-
ative shock in that channel stemmed from three large and highly marketized provinces (Jiangsu,
Shandong and Guangdong).
Variations in the internal terms of trade had a stabilizing effect on net exports in the period
after the turn of the millenium, which was characterized by high and increasing surpluses. This
suggests that internal price pressure on housing, medical expenses and schooling had a major
dampening effect on China’s burgeoning external surplus during this period. Non-tradable infla-
tion therefore contributed substantially to the required internal revaluation of the Renminbi that
could not occur externally in a system of largely fixed nominal exchange rates.
4.5 Robustness checks
4.5.1 Alternative specification
We construct an alternative panel with important adjustments in the net output deflators discussed
in Section B.1.2 and in the number of lags (1 or 2). We choose an alternative specification. Of
the 30 provinces, 26 have a change in specification (10 in the number of lags, 12 in the deflator
and 4 in both). We were not able to find an alternative for 4 provinces.28
Mean deep parameters are roughly similar to the baseline case. The general fit is only
marginally worse and the model still does a remarkable job in explaining regional net exports. In
the panel setting, the net output channel rises in importance while most price channels become
smaller and lose significancy. With real GDP-weighting, two price categories are still significant:
the internal price channel is more negative (-0.13 vs -0.02) and the domestic one nearly doubles in
size (0.21 vs 0.11). The main regional results discussed in Section 4.4.3 are maintained. The East
Coast and the Center have an even larger financial repression channel. Net output adjustments
are now clearly more important in more marketized provinces than in less marketized ones.
It seems that the increase in the size of the net output and domestic interest rate channels
comes at the cost of less significancy and a lower coefficient in our factor regressions. The
presence of the state in the economy (e.g. SOGIOV ) now seems to significantly negatively impact
on the financial repression channel instead of net output, which is still compatible with our story.
Interestingly, in a shorter sample (1997-2010), the coefficient on the share of private employment
interacted with net exports has a positive and significant sign for the net output channel. On top
of that, it is robust to the inclusion of other factors.29 It corroborates earlier findings.
28By using alternative deflators, Jilin experiences a huge shock in net exports. Jiangxi has highly asymmetric
channels. Shandong and Gansu have a miserable fit. These provinces are neither related geographically nor are they
similar economically speaking. Thus, they should not invalidate our test.
29Private employment is only time-varying for 1997-2010. That is why we did not use it in the full sample part.
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Most importantly, our conclusions concerning the impact of the respective channels on global
imbalances are similar: the aggregate net output and domestic interest rate channels have similar
dynamics. The world interest rate does not contribute to aggregate imbalances anymore. The
internal price channel is still negative over the period with the exception of 2009/2010.
4.5.2 Region-specific interest rate
As explained in Section B.1.4, we used national RPI (retail price index) inflation as a proxy for
inflation in tradable good in our proxy for domestic interest rate and used regional RPI in the
internal price index of Section B.1.6. Considering differences in inflation across provinces (i.e.
make the domestic interest rate region-specific) could influence our patterns substantially. In
this section, we consider provincial instead of national RPI inflation in the domestic interest rate
channel.
Changes in parameters and general fit are minor. In the panel regressions, the financial re-
pression channel is slightly smaller but still strongly significant. Other channels are not greatly
affected. In the standalone factor regressions (with development as control), patterns are similar.
If at all, coefficients on the presence of the state are even higher (e.g. SOGIOV , Market and
(Deposits−Loans)/GDP). Aggregate patterns are similar.
4.5.3 CES case
In the baseline model, the intratemporal elasticity of substitution was unity. An increase in the
relative price of the tradable good of 1% thus implied a corresponding decrease in its relative
consumption. A priori, as for intertemporal elasticities, large discrepancies in the level of devel-
opment across regions could imply large differences in substitution technology. In that respect, a
natural extension would be to allow for a flexible intratemporal elasticity as well. First, it could
influence the size of the relative price channel in some provinces. Second, it is a theoretical
extension of our model that may be useful for future applications.
As a theoretical contribution, we provide three methodologies to implement flexible elasticity
in our framework. In Section B.2.1.4, we linearize around a constant steady-state drawing on
an alternative derivation of Bergin and Sheffrin in Section B.2.1.3.30 It is the version that we
estimate in this section. As an alternative, we propose a linearization around a steady-state growth
path assuming different functional growth forms for relative prices (Section B.2.1.5 and B.2.1.6).
Instead of φ ∑∞l=1κ lEt ∆˜q
k
t+l , the new internal price channel is
φ
∞
∑
l=1
κ l
Q¯1−θ
(1−α)+αQ¯1−θ Et ∆˜q
k
t+l
30We are grateful to Alexander Rathke for suggesting us that approach.
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where Qt = PN/PT and θ is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution. We provide the new
form of our empirical implementation in Section B.2.3.2. For Q¯ = 1, one obtains the baseline
expression. The implementation is as follows: the variable Q¯1−θ is integrated in the grid-search
that becomes four-dimensional. Its value is restricted between 0.2 and 5, which allows for a rich
variation among regions in both deep parameters.31
The GDP-weighted average value of Q¯1−θ across provinces is of 1.55, larger than the value
of 1 implicitly assumed in the baseline version. There are only minor changes in general fit
and internal price channel size among regions. With regard to the factor regressions, coefficient
of variables related to the importance of the state/private sector and sectoral composition are
larger and still significant. However, it seems that the excess return channel is less informative:
it is not strongly associated with variables of international integration anymore. Still, the same
patterns arise in the 1997-2010 regression (multivariate). On the aggregate level, the contribution
of internal prices to stabilizing Chinese net exports is higher (more negative value) while world
interest rates are less volatile (i.e. they contribute less to the recent increase). Importantly, the
contribution of both the net exports and financial repression channels is similar.
4.6 Conclusion
We have proposed a simple, theory-based framework to analyze capital flows among Chinese
provinces. Our framework nests two broad channels of external adjustment in interprovincial
capital flows. The first is variation in intertemporal prices, which we further disaggregate into
variation in the domestic real interest rate, the excess return on international assets over the
domestic rate, and variability in real exchange rate (i.e. the relative price of tradable and non-
tradable goods). The second is intertemporal variation in quantities (cash flows of output, invest-
ment and government spending). As we show, our simple model can account for 85 percent of
the variation in a panel of 30 province-level net exports over the 1985-2010 period.
More importantly, modelling province-level net exports allows us to identify how the patterns
of external adjustment depend on province-level characteristics. We have focused on four groups
of characteristics that the literature has emphasized as potentially important in explaining China’s
persistent surpluses since the mid-1990s: i) the relative importance of private and state-owned
enterprises (SOE) and the differential access of these types of firms to finance, ii) a province’s
degree of integration into the world economy in terms of openness to FDI or trade, iii) sectoral
composition and iv) demographics.
We find that there are major differences in the patterns of adjustment across provinces. In
particular, the relative importance of SOEs and private enterprises in the local economy has a
major bearing on the pattern of external adjustment. Intertemporal variation in net output – GDP
less investment and government spending — is particularly important as a driver of capital flows
31For θ = 0.5 or θ = 2 this would allow for values of Q¯ between 0.2 and 5.
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in provinces with a strong presence of private firms, as is the domestic interest rate. This pattern
is consistent with theories that see financial repression as a major source of China’s persistent sur-
pluses: under financial repression, private firms do not have access to bank finance and therefore
have to finance investment from retained earnings. As a result, surpluses are better at predicting
decreases in net output (via increases in investment) in provinces with a large share of private
firms. The absence of access to international finance also means that the domestic (financially
repressed) interest rate is the relevant driver of saving decisions of households and private firms.
Furthermore, we show that a higher integration into the world economy – international open-
ness and FDI – is strongly related to a rising importance of international interest rate and to a
decrease in intertemporal variation in quantities (net output). Foreign participation thus possibly
alleviates financing constraints of the private sector. We also find that variation in non-tradable
prices (e.g. housing) is an important driver of net export variation in less developed regions,
suggesting that housing is particularly important as a savings vehicle when there is a lack of
investible assets.
Our framework allows us to reconstruct Chinese net exports from the inside. We find that
most of the 2000s run-up and the successive adjustment is driven by intertemporal variation in
net output. During this period, the domestic interest rate channel (financial repression) makes a
persistent and positive contribution to China’s surplus. Variation in the world interest rate plays
only a relatively minor (but increasing) role overall while internal price pressure on non-tradable
goods has a major dampening effect on China’s burgeoning external surplus.
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Figure 4.1: NX/NO: data (solid) versus predicted (dashed), 1986-2010
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Figure 4.2: Real GDP weights (2000, largest province=1)
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Table 4.1: Specification, grid-search results and basic fit measures
γ κ δ ρ(xˆ,x) σ(xˆ)/σ(x) rGDP rank
Beijing 0.80 0.995 0.95 0.98 0.95 2.3% 15
Tianjin 5.00 0.995 0.90 0.99 0.88 1.5% 24
Hebei 4.80 0.960 0.00 0.96 1.00 6.0% 6
Shanxi 2.80 0.900 1.00 0.93 1.04 1.6% 23
Inner Mong. 0.70 0.900 0.00 0.98 1.06 1.7% 22
Liaoning 1.60 0.940 0.30 0.99 1.03 4.9% 7
Jilin 2.50 0.985 0.45 0.99 0.97 2.0% 18
Heilongjiang 1.50 0.935 0.00 0.99 0.96 3.4% 14
Shanghai 1.90 0.995 1.00 0.99 0.96 3.5% 12
Jiangsu 1.10 0.900 0.00 0.99 1.15 8.6% 3
Zhejiang 1.70 0.925 0.00 0.97 0.98 6.2% 4
Anhui 5.00 0.900 0.00 0.87 2.74 3.4% 13
Fujian 5.00 0.900 0.95 0.99 1.18 3.8% 10
Jiangxi 3.20 0.955 0.00 0.97 1.01 2.2% 17
Shandong 2.60 0.925 0.15 0.97 1.03 9.1% 1
Henan 3.40 0.905 0.35 1.00 0.99 6.1% 5
Hubei 5.00 0.940 0.00 0.94 1.03 4.1% 9
Hunan 5.00 0.900 0.00 0.94 1.88 3.5% 11
Guangdong 2.30 0.900 1.00 0.94 1.03 8.8% 2
Guangxi 1.10 0.995 0.00 0.98 0.99 2.2% 16
Hainan 1.10 0.985 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.4% 28
Chongqing 1.50 0.995 1.00 0.99 0.89 2.0% 19
Sichuan 3.30 0.900 0.10 1.00 0.99 4.6% 8
Guizhou 2.40 0.995 0.00 1.00 0.98 1.0% 27
Yunnan 3.30 0.945 1.00 0.87 0.92 1.9% 20
Tibet
Shaanxi 0.60 0.995 0.00 0.77 0.72 1.8% 21
Gansu 0.80 0.995 0.00 0.86 0.97 1.1% 26
Qinghai 5.00 0.995 1.00 0.99 0.74 0.3% 30
Ningxia 2.00 0.995 1.00 0.98 0.87 0.3% 29
Xinjiang 0.70 0.995 0.00 0.93 0.92 1.4% 25
Median 2.35 0.95 0.05 0.98 0.99 2.2%
Mean 2.59 0.95 0.37 0.96 1.06 3.3%
Mean (rGDP) 2.69 0.93 0.32 0.96 1.10
Results obtained from a three dimensional grid-search for γ , κ and δ by minimizing the squared
distance between the real and estimated NX/NO. Tibet is excluded because of data issues. The ten
largest provinces in terms of 2000 real GDP are in bold type and represent around 62% of cumulated
output. The last row is the (2000) real GDP-weighted mean.
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Table 4.2: Channels of external adjustment: variance decomposition
NO IP DR IR RES
Beijing 0.51 0.00 0.17 0.25 0.06
Tianjin 0.78 0.16 -0.10 0.03 0.13
Hebei 0.96 -0.26 0.25 0.00 0.05
Shanxi 1.23 0.01 -0.03 -0.24 0.03
Inner Mong. 1.22 -0.05 -0.13 0.00 -0.04
Liaoning 0.50 0.14 0.14 0.24 -0.02
Jilin 1.07 0.11 -0.22 0.00 0.04
Heilongjiang 0.71 -0.01 0.26 0.00 0.04
Shanghai 0.94 -0.18 -0.15 0.33 0.06
Jiangsu 0.55 0.02 0.57 0.00 -0.13
Zhejiang 0.37 0.10 0.48 0.00 0.05
Anhui 2.05 0.30 0.03 0.00 -1.38
Fujian 1.05 -0.03 0.19 -0.05 -0.17
Jiangxi 0.59 -0.13 0.52 0.00 0.02
Shandong 1.88 -0.66 -0.01 -0.21 -0.01
Henan 0.93 0.03 0.06 -0.03 0.01
Hubei 0.95 0.21 -0.20 0.00 0.03
Hunan 1.79 -0.24 0.22 0.00 -0.77
Guangdong 0.70 -0.16 0.32 0.10 0.03
Guangxi 0.08 0.01 0.88 0.00 0.03
Hainan 0.74 -0.01 0.28 0.00 0.00
Chongqing 0.62 0.03 0.07 0.15 0.13
Sichuan 0.76 0.55 -0.35 0.03 0.01
Guizhou 1.13 0.08 -0.23 0.00 0.02
Yunnan 0.12 0.50 -0.24 0.41 0.20
Tibet
Shaanxi 0.18 0.01 0.36 0.00 0.45
Gansu -0.34 0.03 1.15 0.00 0.16
Qinghai 0.58 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.27
Ningxia 0.79 0.10 -0.01 -0.04 0.15
Xinjiang 0.42 0.01 0.43 0.00 0.14
Median 0.74 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.03
Mean 0.77 0.03 0.15 0.03 -0.01
Mean (rGDP) 0.89 -0.03 0.18 0.02 -0.05
The table presents estimates of the variance decomposition coefficients.
NO: net output, IP: internal price, DR: domestic rate, IR: international
rate. RES: unexplained part. The last row is the (2000) real GDP-
weighted mean.
118
Table 4.3: Panel analysis of external adjustment
NO IP DR IR RES
Weighting
Same 0.70
(11.17)
0.06
(3.12)
0.05
(1.69)
0.05
(1.73
0.14
(3.24)
Real GDP 0.82
(11.50)
−0.02
(−0.55)
0.11
(3.28)
0.05
(1.26
0.03
(2.14)
Residual 0.75
(10.78)
0.05
(2.71)
0.05
(1.31)
0.06
(1.77)
0.10
(2.92)
NO IP DR IR RES
Regions
Metro 0.62
(5.93)
−0.01
(−0.20)
0.05
(0.62)
0.24
(9.43)
0.10
(40.83)
East Coast 0.86
(4.35)
−0.18
(−3.09)
0.28
(5.08)
0.05
(0.77)
0.00
(−0.10)
Manchuria 0.64
(11.13)
0.07
(1.91)
0.15
(2.40)
0.12
(2.08)
0.02
(1.90)
Center 0.92
(117.51)
0.04
(6.20)
0.06
(9.61)
−0.03
(−25.34)
0.02
(2.30)
West 0.71
(2.85)
0.00
(−0.08)
0.12
(0.88)
−0.01
(−0.77)
0.18
(1.55)
South 0.58
(5.27)
0.10
(1.15)
0.05
(0.70)
0.14
(3.46)
0.13
(2.36)
No Metro & EC 0.83
(10.97)
0.05
(2.67)
0.07
(3.53)
0.01
(0.33)
0.04
(1.79)
NO IP DR IR RES
Dvpt Level
Market High 0.75
(8.19)
−0.06
(−1.18)
0.15
(3.17)
0.13
(3.42)
0.03
(1.55)
Market Low 0.88
(14.84)
0.04
(2.72)
0.06
(3.00)
−0.01
(−0.70)
0.14
(1.46)
Panel estimates (βx) of the respective channels from the regression xkt =α+τt +
µk+βx×
( NX
NO
)k
t +ε
k
t , where x
k
t stands for the VAR-implied expectations of the
channels. T-statistics clustered by regions based on Liang and Zeger (1986)
in parentheses. Bold type indicates significancy at the 10% confidence level.
The first weighting procedure (Real GDP) uses 2000 real GDP computed using
provincial CPI. The second weighting procedure (Residual) uses the absolute
residual share of the variance decomposition [max(abs(RES))− abs(RESk)]2.
Both are normalized by the highest regional value. In the second and third
panels, relative net exports and channels are GDP-weighted.
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Table 4.4: Specification, data and grid-search results
Sample Lag NO Defl c φ
Beijing 85-10 1 RPI 1.38 -0.34
Tianjin 85-10 2 RPI PIFA 0.77 0.61
Hebei 85-10 1 GDP PIFA 0.79 0.63
Shanxi 87-10 1 RPI PIFA 0.88 0.56
Inner Mong. 85-10 1 RPI PIFA 1.04 -0.45
Liaoning 85-10 1 GDP PIFA 0.78 0.29
Jilin 85-10 1 RPI PIFA 0.91 0.55
Heilongjiang 85-10 1 GDP PIFA 0.87 0.29
Shanghai 85-10 2 RPI PIFA 0.76 0.36
Jiangsu 85-10 1 RPI PIFA 0.68 0.06
Zhejiang 85-10 1 GDP 0.85 0.35
Anhui 85-10 1 RPI 1.00 0.80
Fujian 85-10 1 GDP 0.98 0.79
Jiangxi 85-10 1 GDP PIFA 1.00 0.69
Shandong 85-10 1 GDP PIFA 0.80 0.50
Henan 85-10 1 GDP PIFA 1.02 0.72
Hubei 85-10 1 RPI 0.99 0.79
Hunan 85-10 2 GDP PIFA 0.94 0.75
Guangdong 85-10 1 GDP 0.86 0.49
Guangxi 85-08 1 RPI PIFA 1.02 0.09
Hainan 85-10 1 RPI 1.19 0.11
Chongqing 85-10 1 GDP PIFA 1.20 0.40
Sichuan 85-10 1 GDP PIFA 1.06 0.74
Guizhou 85-10 1 RPI PIFA 1.21 0.70
Yunnan 85-09 2 GDP PIFA 1.04 0.72
Tibet
Shaanxi 85-09 2 GDP PIFA 1.11 -0.74
Gansu 85-10 2 GDP PIFA 1.13 -0.28
Qinghai 85-10 1 RPI PIFA 1.67 1.34
Ningxia 89-10 2 RPI PIFA 1.40 0.70
Xinjiang 85-10 1 RPI PIFA 1.07 -0.46
Median 1.00 0.52
Mean 1.01 0.39
Mean (rGDP) 0.92 0.43
Specification and choice of net output deflator as in main text. Consumption
ratio (c) estimated from the data. Implied φ = c× (1− 1γ ) from grid-search (γ).
Tibet is excluded because of data issues.
120
Ta
bl
e
4.
5:
C
ha
nn
el
s
of
ex
te
rn
al
ad
ju
st
m
en
ta
nd
pr
ov
in
ce
-l
ev
el
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
(I
),
19
86
-2
01
0
N
et
In
te
rn
al
In
te
re
st
R
at
e
N
et
In
te
rn
al
In
te
re
st
R
at
e
ST
AT
E
O
ut
pu
t
P
ri
ce
D
om
es
tic
In
te
rn
.
To
ta
l
D
E
M
O
G
R
A
PH
IC
S
O
ut
pu
t
P
ri
ce
D
om
es
tic
In
te
rn
.
To
ta
l
N
X
/N
O
0.
98
(8
.0
5)
0.
04
(0
.7
4)
0.
10
(1
.3
6)
−0
.1
4
(−
3.
67
)
−0
.0
4
(−
0.
49
)
N
X
/N
O
0.
83
(2
0.
63
)
−0
.0
1
(−
0.
34
)
0.
11
(4
.0
8)
0.
04
(2
.7
4)
0.
15
(4
.7
1)
SO
G
IO
V
−0
.0
2
(−
0.
82
)
0.
00
(−
0.
05
)
0.
01
(0
.4
2)
0.
01
(1
.3
2)
0.
02
(1
.1
1)
U
rb
an
iz
at
io
n
0.
03
(0
.9
1)
0.
00
(0
.0
9)
0.
05
(1
.7
0)
−0
.0
2
(−
1.
65
)
0.
02
(0
.7
1)
D
vp
t×
N
X
/N
O
−0
.0
9
(−
0.
78
)
−0
.0
8
(−
1.
72
)
0.
01
(0
.1
8)
0.
16
(6
.2
6)
0.
17
(2
.4
0)
D
vp
t×
N
X
/N
O
0.
38
(1
.4
5)
−0
.1
4
(−
0.
82
)
−0
.0
8
(−
0.
38
)
0.
01
(0
.1
5)
−0
.0
6
(−
0.
35
)
SO
G
IO
V
×
N
X
/
N
O
−0
.2
9
(−
2.
31
)
0.
17
(2
.0
5)
−0
.0
2
(−
0.
29
)
0.
09
(2
.1
0)
0.
08
(0
.9
7)
U
rb
an
iz
at
io
n
×
N
X
/N
O
−1
.5
4
(−
2.
16
)
0.
25
(0
.5
1)
0.
26
(0
.5
2)
0.
50
(2
.6
7)
0.
76
(1
.5
1)
N
X
/N
O
1.
02
(6
.6
0)
0.
17
(3
.7
1)
−0
.1
1
(−
1.
20
)
−0
.1
6
(−
3.
19
)
−0
.2
7
(−
2.
56
)
N
X
/N
O
6.
30
(1
.6
2)
−4
.3
2
(−
2.
48
)
2.
61
(1
.4
4)
−2
.0
2
(−
1.
49
)
0.
60
(0
.2
3)
D
vp
t×
N
X
/N
O
−0
.1
2
(−
0.
93
)
0.
01
(0
.2
8)
−0
.0
9
(−
1.
14
)
0.
17
(5
.6
3)
0.
08
(0
.9
3)
D
vp
t×
N
X
/N
O
−0
.1
5
(−
1.
66
)
−0
.0
4
(−
1.
55
)
0.
01
(0
.0
8)
0.
18
(6
.8
4)
0.
19
(2
.6
6)
M
ar
ke
t×
N
X
/N
O
−0
.0
1
(−
0.
34
)
−0
.0
4
(−
3.
87
)
0.
06
(3
.0
9)
0.
01
(0
.6
5)
0.
06
(2
.7
4)
Se
xR
at
io
×
N
X
/N
O
−5
.0
0
(−
1.
37
)
4.
10
(2
.5
1)
−2
.3
7
(−
1.
40
)
1.
77
(1
.3
8)
−0
.6
0
(−
0.
25
)
N
X
/N
O
1.
01
(9
.7
1)
0.
04
(0
.8
5)
0.
08
(1
.3
2)
−0
.1
5
(−
3.
81
)
−0
.0
7
(−
0.
94
)
N
X
/N
O
0.
96
(9
.2
2)
0.
05
(1
.3
9)
0.
09
(1
.1
4)
−0
.1
4
(−
3.
51
)
0.
05
(−
0.
51
)
D
ep
os
it
s−
Lo
an
s
G
D
P
−0
.0
3
(−
2.
41
)
0.
01
(1
.6
5)
0.
00
(0
.7
2)
0.
01
(2
.0
9)
0.
02
(2
.2
6)
D
vp
t×
N
X
/N
O
0.
08
(0
.4
4)
−0
.2
3
(−
3.
72
)
0.
06
(0
.3
6)
0.
16
(3
.3
3)
0.
23
(1
.2
1)
D
vp
t×
N
X
/N
O
−0
.1
2
(−
1.
72
)
−0
.0
5
(−
1.
48
)
−0
.0
1
(−
0.
10
)
0.
18
(5
.6
4)
0.
17
(3
.1
4)
H
ig
hE
du
c×
N
X
/N
O
−2
.0
7
(−
1.
53
)
1.
70
(3
.4
8)
−0
.5
1
(−
0.
44
)
0.
16
(0
.4
5)
−0
.3
4
(−
0.
25
)
D
ep
os
it
s−
Lo
an
s
G
D
P
×
N
X
/N
O
−0
.1
5
(−
1.
61
)
−0
.0
2
(−
0.
30
)
0.
10
(2
.3
9)
0.
02
(0
.7
8)
0.
13
(2
.2
2)
T
he
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
th
e
re
su
lts
of
pa
ne
lr
eg
re
ss
io
ns
of
th
e
fo
rm
xk t
=
α
+
τ t
+
µ
k
+
β x
×
( NX NO)
k t
+
γ′ x
×
( NX NO)
k t
×
zk t
+
ψ
′ ×
zk t
+
εk t
,w
he
re
xk t
st
an
ds
in
tu
rn
fo
r
th
e
VA
R
-i
m
pl
ie
d
ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
of
th
e
re
sp
ec
tiv
e
ch
an
ne
l.
T
he
ve
ct
or
zk t
st
an
ds
fo
rt
he
di
ff
er
en
tp
ot
en
tia
le
xp
la
na
to
ry
va
ri
ab
le
s.
T-
st
at
is
tic
s
cl
us
te
re
d
by
re
gi
on
s
ba
se
d
on
L
ia
ng
an
d
Z
eg
er
(1
98
6)
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
B
ol
d
ty
pe
in
di
ca
te
s
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
y
at
th
e
10
%
co
nfi
de
nc
e
le
ve
l.
T
he
la
st
co
lu
m
n
(T
ot
al
)r
es
ul
ts
fr
om
m
er
gi
ng
th
e
do
m
es
tic
w
ith
th
e
in
te
rn
at
io
na
li
nt
er
es
tr
at
e
ch
an
ne
l.
D
vp
t:
m
ea
n
re
al
G
D
P
pe
r
ca
pi
ta
re
la
tiv
e
to
na
tio
na
lv
al
ue
s
ov
er
19
86
-2
01
0.
SO
G
IO
V
:
sh
ar
e
of
st
at
e-
ow
ne
d
gr
os
s
in
du
st
ri
al
ou
tp
ut
va
lu
e.
(D
ep
os
it
−
Lo
an
s)
/G
D
P
:
de
po
si
ts
m
in
us
lo
an
s
in
ba
nk
s
an
d
fin
an
ci
al
in
st
itu
tio
ns
no
rm
al
iz
ed
by
G
D
P.
M
ar
ke
t:
m
ar
ke
tiz
at
io
n
in
de
x
de
ve
lo
pe
d
by
Fa
n
et
al
.(
20
01
),
19
97
-2
00
5
av
er
ag
e.
U
rb
an
iz
at
io
n:
po
pu
la
tio
n
sh
ar
e
liv
in
g
in
ur
ba
n
ar
ea
(c
ro
ss
-s
ec
tio
na
lly
de
m
ea
ne
d)
.
Se
xR
at
io
:m
al
e
to
fe
m
al
e
ra
tio
(2
00
0
C
en
su
s)
.H
ig
hE
du
c:
st
ud
en
te
nr
ol
lm
en
ti
n
in
st
itu
tio
ns
of
hi
gh
er
ed
uc
at
io
n
re
la
tiv
e
to
po
pu
la
tio
n,
19
97
-2
01
0
av
er
ag
e.
121
Ta
bl
e
4.
6:
C
ha
nn
el
s
of
ex
te
rn
al
ad
ju
st
m
en
ta
nd
pr
ov
in
ce
-l
ev
el
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
(I
I)
,1
98
6-
20
10
N
et
In
te
rn
al
In
te
re
st
R
at
e
N
et
In
te
rn
al
In
te
re
st
R
at
e
IN
T
E
R
N
AT
IO
N
A
L
O
ut
pu
t
P
ri
ce
D
om
es
tic
In
te
rn
.
To
ta
l
ST
R
U
C
T
U
R
E
O
ut
pu
t
P
ri
ce
D
om
es
tic
In
te
rn
.
To
ta
l
N
X
/N
O
0.
97
(7
.9
0)
0.
03
(0
.6
7)
0.
10
(1
.6
7)
−0
.1
4
(−
3.
69
)
−0
.0
3
(−
0.
47
)
N
X
/N
O
0.
27
(1
.2
3)
0.
35
(2
.5
3)
0.
18
(1
.1
2)
0.
06
(0
.5
2)
0.
24
(1
.8
2)
O
pe
nn
es
s
0.
02
(2
.4
4)
0.
01
(1
.5
0)
−0
.0
1
(−
1.
96
)
0.
00
(−
0.
82
)
−0
.0
1
(−
2.
10
)
In
du
st
ry
−0
.0
3
(−
0.
61
)
−0
.0
2
(−
0.
78
)
0.
03
(1
.3
5)
0.
00
(0
.0
8)
0.
04
(1
.0
9)
D
vp
t×
N
X
/N
O
−0
.1
1
(−
0.
94
)
−0
.0
2
(−
0.
44
)
−0
.0
3
(−
0.
43
)
0.
17
(6
.1
2)
0.
14
(1
.9
0)
D
vp
t×
N
X
/N
O
−0
.1
5
(−
2.
33
)
−0
.0
5
(−
1.
51
)
0.
01
(0
.2
0)
0.
18
(8
.3
9)
0.
20
(3
.3
8)
O
pe
nn
es
s×
N
X
/N
O
−0
.0
7
(−
1.
25
)
−0
.0
8
(−
3.
99
)
0.
11
(2
.1
5)
0.
03
(1
.7
3)
0.
13
(2
.2
8)
In
du
st
ry
×
N
X
/N
O
1.
55
(3
.7
0)
−0
.6
7
(−
2.
10
)
−0
.2
0
(−
0.
78
)
−0
.4
3
(−
2.
19
)
−0
.6
3
(−
2.
96
)
N
X
/N
O
0.
87
(1
1.
74
)
−0
.0
1
(−
0.
26
)
0.
10
(3
.1
9)
0.
02
(0
.3
7)
0.
11
(1
.7
4)
N
X
/N
O
1.
14
(7
.1
4)
−0
.0
6
(−
1.
04
)
0.
11
(0
.9
0)
−0
.1
7
(−
4.
28
)
−0
.0
6
(−
0.
38
)
F
D
I
0.
06
(0
.8
4)
0.
00
(0
.0
1)
0.
01
(0
.3
7)
−0
.0
5
(−
1.
02
)
−0
.0
4
(−
0.
93
)
C
on
st
ru
ct
io
n
0.
23
(1
.1
3)
0.
00
(0
.0
0)
−0
.0
4
(−
0.
33
)
−0
.1
4
(−
1.
64
)
−0
.1
8
(−
1.
19
)
F
D
I×
N
X
/N
O
−1
.3
4
(1
.7
3)
−0
.3
4
(−
0.
80
)
0.
38
(0
.5
7)
1.
30
(3
.3
7)
1.
68
(2
.7
1)
D
vp
t×
N
X
/N
O
−0
.1
2
(−
1.
52
)
−0
.0
6
(−
1.
63
)
0.
01
(0
.1
3)
0.
17
(6
.6
7)
0.
18
(2
.8
8)
C
on
st
ru
ct
io
n
×
N
X
/N
O
−2
.9
9
(−
1.
21
)
1.
84
(2
.1
6)
−0
.2
5
(−
0.
13
)
0.
44
(0
.6
6)
0.
19
(0
.0
8)
N
X
/N
O
0.
98
(8
.3
1)
0.
04
(0
.7
2)
0.
10
(1
.7
6)
−0
.1
4
(−
3.
87
)
−0
.0
4
(−
0.
63
)
N
X
/N
O
0.
71
(3
.7
5)
0.
05
(0
.4
1)
0.
26
(2
.4
6)
−0
.0
8
(−
1.
13
)
0.
19
(1
.4
1)
D
vp
t×
N
X
/N
O
−0
.0
7
(−
0.
51
)
−0
.0
1
(−
0.
15
)
−0
.1
0
(−
1.
33
)
0.
15
(5
.0
6)
0.
05
(0
.7
0)
D
vp
t×
N
X
/N
O
0.
33
(1
.0
4)
−0
.0
7
(−
0.
35
)
−0
.2
8
(−
1.
77
)
0.
07
(0
.6
7)
−0
.2
1
(−
1.
02
)
F
O
In
vF
A
×
N
X
/N
O
−0
.9
3
(−
1.
49
)
−0
.5
0
(−
1.
13
)
1.
29
(3
.5
4)
0.
40
(2
.5
2)
1.
69
(4
.2
8)
Pa
te
nt
s×
N
X
/
N
O
−1
.0
9
(−
1.
70
)
0.
03
(0
.0
8)
0.
67
(2
.1
9)
0.
26
(1
.2
4)
0.
93
(2
.2
6)
T
he
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
th
e
re
su
lts
of
pa
ne
lr
eg
re
ss
io
ns
of
th
e
fo
rm
xk t
=
α
+
τ t
+
µ
k
+
β x
×
( NX NO)
k t
+
γ′ x
×
( NX NO)
k t
×
zk t
+
ψ
′ ×
zk t
+
εk t
,w
he
re
xk t
st
an
ds
in
tu
rn
fo
r
th
e
VA
R
-i
m
pl
ie
d
ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
of
th
e
re
sp
ec
tiv
e
ch
an
ne
l.
T
he
ve
ct
or
zk t
st
an
ds
fo
rt
he
di
ff
er
en
tp
ot
en
tia
le
xp
la
na
to
ry
va
ri
ab
le
s.
T-
st
at
is
tic
s
cl
us
te
re
d
by
re
gi
on
s
ba
se
d
on
L
ia
ng
an
d
Z
eg
er
(1
98
6)
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
B
ol
d
ty
pe
in
di
ca
te
s
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
y
at
th
e
10
%
co
nfi
de
nc
e
le
ve
l.
T
he
la
st
co
lu
m
n
(T
ot
al
)r
es
ul
ts
fr
om
m
er
gi
ng
th
e
do
m
es
tic
w
ith
th
e
in
te
rn
at
io
na
li
nt
er
es
tr
at
e
ch
an
ne
l.
D
vp
t:
m
ea
n
re
al
G
D
P
pe
rc
ap
ita
re
la
tiv
e
to
na
tio
na
lv
al
ue
s
ov
er
19
86
-2
01
0.
O
pe
nn
es
s:
in
te
rn
at
io
na
le
xp
or
ts
an
d
im
po
rt
s
ov
er
G
D
P.
F
D
I:
us
ed
FD
Io
ve
rG
D
P.
F
O
In
vF
A
:f
or
ei
gn
-o
w
ne
d
sh
ar
e
in
in
ve
st
m
en
t
in
fix
ed
as
se
ts
(i
nc
lu
di
ng
H
on
g-
K
on
g
an
d
M
ac
au
).
In
du
st
ry
:i
nd
us
tr
y
se
ct
or
sh
ar
e
of
G
D
P.
C
on
st
ru
ct
io
n:
co
ns
tr
uc
tio
n
se
ct
or
sh
ar
e
of
G
D
P.
Pa
te
nt
s:
gr
an
te
d
pa
te
nt
s
ov
er
po
pu
la
tio
n,
19
97
-2
01
0
av
er
ag
e.
122
Table 4.7: Channels of external adjustment and province-level characteristics (III), 1997-2010
Net Internal Interest Rate
Output Price Domestic Intern. Total
NX/NO 0.73
(13.62)
0.06
(1.85)
0.06
(1.24)
0.09
(3.73)
0.16
(2.99)
SexRatio×NX/NO −5.90
(−1.03)
5.96
(1.94)
−2.99
(−0.90)
2.06
(2.05)
−0.92
(−0.26)
SOGIOV −0.01
(−0.34)
0.01
(0.63)
−0.01
(−0.63)
0.01
(1.38)
0.00
(0.11)
SOGIOV ×NX/NO −0.59
(−1.00)
0.23
(1.20)
−0.04
(−0.13)
0.19
(1.17)
0.15
(0.38)
EmplPrivate 0.08
(1.94)
−0.03
(−1.90)
−0.04
(−1.69)
−0.01
(−0.37)
−0.04
(−1.66)
EmplPrivate×NX/NO −0.30
(−0.44)
0.36
(1.34)
−0.32
(−0.62)
0.36
(1.97)
0.04
(0.07)
Deposits−Loans
GDP −0.03
(−1.97)
0.01
(1.49)
0.00
(0.42)
0.01
(1.84)
0.01
(1.15)
Deposits−Loans
GDP ×NX/NO −0.47
(−3.07)
−0.02
(−0.35)
0.31
(3.01)
0.09
(2.42)
0.40
(3.73)
FDI 0.16
(1.24)
−0.09
(−1.63
−0.04
(−0.43)
−0.06
(−1.87)
−0.10
(−1.01)
FDI×NX/NO 0.16
(0.10)
0.68
(0.89)
−2.07
(−1.82)
1.06
(1.70)
−1.01
(−0.78)
Industry −0.17
(−2.75)
0.07
(1.88)
0.03
(0.54)
0.05
(1.86)
0.09
(1.75)
Industry×NX/NO 0.44
(0.42)
0.05
(0.10)
0.08
(0.09)
−0.48
(−1.49)
−0.40
(−0.41)
The table reports the results of panel regressions of the form xkt = α + τt + µk + βx×
( NX
NO
)k
t + γ
′
x×( NX
NO
)k
t × zkt +ψ ′× zkt + εkt , where xkt stands in turn for the VAR-implied expectations of the respective
channel. The vector zkt stands for the different potential explanatory variables. T-statistics clustered
by regions based on Liang and Zeger (1986) in parentheses. Bold type indicates significancy at the
10% confidence level. The last column (Total) results from merging the domestic with the international
interest rate channel. Factors are cross-sectionally demeaned.
SexRatio: male to female ratio (2000 Census). SOGIOV : share of state-owned gross industrial output
value. EmplPrivate: share of private and self-employed relative to total employment. (Deposits−
Loans)/GDP: deposits minus loans in banks and financial institutions normalized by GDP. FDI: used
FDI over GDP. Industry: industry sector share of GDP.
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Figure 4.4: Net output channel β , 1986-2010
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Figure 4.5: Internal price channel β , 1986-2010
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Figure 4.6: Interest rate channel β (world and domestic), 1986-2010
 
 
0.42
−0.060.25
−0.27
−0.13 0.38
−0.22
0.26
0.19
0.57
0.48
0.03
0.15
0.52
−0.22
0.03
−0.2
0.22
0.430.88
0.28
0.22−0.32
−0.23
0.18
NaN
0.36
1.15
0.03
−0.05
0.43
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Figure 4.7: Cumulated nominal net exports (100 million RMB), 1986-2010
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Figure 4.8: Nominal aggregate channels of net exports (100 million RMB, demeaned), 1986-
2010
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A.1.1 Factors
Investment structure:
SOInvFA state-owned share of investment in fixed assets (by status of registration/ownership).
FOInvFA: foreign-owned share of investment in fixed assets (HK, TW and MO included).
REInvFA: residual share of investment in fixed assets (contains collectively-owned, private and self-employed).
State vs Private:
SOGIOV: state-owned share in gross industrial output value.
EmplPrivate: private and self-employed employment share.
Market: mean of marketization index (1997-2005 average). Scale 0-10. Factors: government and market, ownership
structure, goods market dvpt, factor market dvpt and legal framework. See Fan et al. (2001).
SOCGOV: state-owned share in construction gross output value.
Economic structure:
SectorPrim: share of primary sector in GDP (production approach).
SectorInd: share of industrial sector in GDP (production approach)
SectorConst: share of construction sector in GDP (production approach).
SectorTert: share of tertiary sector in GDP (production approach).
StructConc: Index of structural economic concentration using primary, industrial, construction and tertiary sector.
HousingPrice: growth of housing prices 1999-2010 (selling price of commercialized buildings, includes business and
residential use, in RMB/sq.m).
CoalOil: coal and crude oil production value over GDP (using world prices for 1984-1988 and national price indices
for non-ferrous metal and raw material/fuel for 1989-2010).
International:
Openness: international exports + imports over GDP (by place of destination and origin).
MNE: share of multinational enterprises in provincial international exports, mean of 1996 and 2008, from Girardin
and Owen (2011).
FDI: share of used FDI over GDP.
Financial Dvpt:
Deposits: deposits in banks and financial institutions over GDP.
Loans: loans in banks and financial institutions over GDP.
Human Capital:
TertiaryEduc: enrollment in tertiary school over population.
HighEduc: enrollment in higher education over population.
Patents: patents granted per 10 000 habitants.
Social Security:
SOCSEC: index of social security coverage. Mean of pension insurance (average of urban contributors over urban
employment 2005-2010 and rural contributors over rural employment 2005-2009, mixed using urbanization rate),
unemployment insurance 2000-2010 (average of contributors over employment) and medical insurance 2000-2010
(average of contributors over population).
Demographics:
OldDepRatio: people 65 and more over population, mean of 2000 and 2010 Censuses.
SexRatio: nb of men for 1 woman, mean of 2000 and 2010 Censuses.
UrbRate: urbanization rate (Shen, 2006 and statistical yearbooks).
EthnicShare: share of non-Han relative to population. 2000 Census.
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A.1.2 Data
A.1.2.1 Capital stock
National and regional capital stocks are estimated using the perpetual inventory method. Busi-
ness cycles are removed from the initial value by taking the mean of f (real gross fixed capital
formation, GFCF) adjusted for its growth rate.1 In accordance with the model’s notation, 1984 is
t = 0 and 2010 is t = T = 26.
The initial gross fixed capital formation (F0) is
F0 =
1
T +1
T
∑
t=0
ft
(( fTf0 )
1
T )t
To transform data into real terms, we use Brandt and Holz (2006)’s consumption basket expen-
diture for the initial price level, the regional consumer price index (CPI) for 1984-1991 and the
regional price index of investment in fixed assets (PIFA) for 1992-2010 (i.e. as soon as avail-
able).2
The initial capital stock (K0) is
K0 =
F0
δ + k
where δ is the yearly depreciation rate of capital and k is the growth rate of capital. As in
Gourinchas and Jeanne, a value of δ = 0.06 is assumed. The choice of a region-specific k is
more controversial. Usually, a mean of past growth rates is used. Unfortunately, this method
is impossible to apply to all regions due to the lack of data on GFCF and CPI for the pre-1984
period.3 As an alternative, we use the mean value for the 1984-2010 period.4 By using the initial
capital stock and real gross fixed capital formation, we obtain provincial and national time series
for capital stock. We discuss the effects of capital adjustment costs in Section A.1.4.1.
In 1984, the initial capital stock to real output ratio is on average 1.2 with values between
0.6 and 2.1. At the end of the sample (2010), values for relative capital stock range between 1.6
and 3.8 with a mean of 2.4. Average provincial relative capital stock more than doubled between
1984 and 2010. The 2010 value for China (2.3) is in line with estimates found in the literature
and on the private research market (HSBC, 2012, Dragonomics). Nevertheless, our estimation
strategy has some shortcomings.5
1We are thankful to Prof. Dr. Woitek for suggesting that approach.
2We thus take into account differences in inflation as well as initial differences in price level. The reference is the
price level for Chinese national value in 1984 Renminbi.
3Jiangxi, Guangdong, Hainan, Chongqing, Sichuan, Tibet and Ningxia have missing GFCF values before eco-
nomic reforms. As for CPI, more than half of provinces have missing values.
4In the literature, the growth of output of past periods is sometimes used as a proxy for capital growth. Here again,
the poor output data for some provinces before 1984 refrain us from giving it a try. Using post 1984 output growth
would lead to a roughly similar k compared to using GFCF growth. For China, real output growth over the sample
period has been of 10% while real gross fixed capital formation growth has been of 12%.
5Intuitively, relatively rich provinces should have a higher 1984 K/Y ratio than less developped ones. In our case,
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A.1.2.2 Technology catch-up
The time path of total factor productivity (A) is estimated using a labor share (1−α) of 0.70.6
Real output (expenditure approach) is in 100 million Renminbi for Y .7 We use Brandt and Holz
(2006) consumption expenditure basket price data and official CPI to convert nominal into real
output.8 The exactness of GDP figures in China is highly controversial. For a general discussion
of aggregation properties and quality, we refer to the second chapter of the thesis. The model
assumes that labor supply is exogenous and equal to population. For L, Gourinchas and Jeanne
used working-age population. We refrain from using regional active population because of data
issues and take employed persons in million as a proxy for L.
As population, Chinese employment measurement is an issue of its own: bad aggregation
properties as well as biases arising from migration and erroneous sectoral reporting in the agri-
cultural and state sector are common. Keeping that in mind, we assemble our own employment
dataset using provincial and national statistical yearbooks. In Section 3.5.4, we address that issue
by using data from Brandt et al. (2012). The fact that we are primarily interested in capturing
long run trends and the smoothing of the TFP series should minimize potential biases. In order
to get rid of transitory fluctuations, we use the Hodrick-Prescott filter.9 The annual growth rate
of TFP is then obtained using filtered data (i.e. g∗ =
(
AtrendT /A
trend
0
)1/T ). In contrast to Gourin-
chas and Jeanne, we adopt a new definition of g∗ as being the growth of the Chinese productivity
frontier instead of the world.10
The last value of the catch-up parameter is defined as the steady-state one (piT = pi ), which is
this is generally true (e.g. Shanghai 1.4 vs Guangxi 0.7). There are some important exceptions: although being below
average in terms of wealth, western regions like Xinjiang (2.1), Qinghai (1.5) and Ningxia (1.6) start with relatively
high initial value. The reason is that many less developed western provinces started with low output and experienced
huge capital formation flows (i.e. high F0) relative to their economic size.
6Our labor share is similar to Gourinchas and Jeanne but may be slightly too high compared to the aggregate value
of 0.60 suggested by Brandt and Zhu (2010). Our results would not be seriously affected by such a change. Assuming
the same factor elasticities for all regions is not controversial: Brandt et al. (2012) found them to be very similar.
7The use of GDP data computed following the production approach would not influence results much. On the
national level, differences between expenditure and production GDP approach figures have been of a little less than
2% of expenditure output over the reform period on average. No systematic discrepancies on the provincial level have
been observed. The regions of Shanxi, Zhejiang, Anhui, Hubei, Hainan and Chongqing have average errors of more
than 1% of output.
8GDP deflators are not directly available at the provincial level and would have to be inferred from the real growth
of the agriculture, manufacturing and service sector (see Brandt and Zhu, 2010). We use their productivity figures in
Section 3.5.4 as a robustness check.
9Gourinchas and Jeanne used a value of 1600 that filters out more than 70% of cycles lower than 32 years. Al-
though it certainly fits within the long run focus of the model, we stick to the usual macroeconomic value of 100.
The reason is specific to the huge transformation of the Chinese economy: the steep rise in TFP experienced in most
provinces causes the filter to start with a value far below initial data points. As a consequence, TFP growth would be
unrealistically high. Furthermore, we are not convinced of using such a heavy filter on our short time series. In the
end, it primarily affects the absolute value of the catch-up parameters rather than their distribution across provinces.
10To be conceptually correct, one should compute the catch-up values not relative to national figures but to a mix
of world and local TFP growth as provincial net exports contain international as well as interprovincial flows. In fact,
compared to the rest of the world, all regions have extremely large catch-up values. We find it more convenient to
refer to national values to look at cross-sectional patterns. We motivate our approach in Section A.1.3.1 and show that
taking alternative values of g∗ does not invalidate our main conclusions.
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used for the estimation of the wedges. Our empirical value for China is g∗ = 7.07%. Compared
to values obtained in recent studies, our estimate appears to be an upper bound. It seems to make
sense to the extent that we do not control for other potential factors inside TFP (e.g. human
capital).11
A.1.2.3 Capital flows
In the baseline version of the estimation procedure, we refrain from using estimates of the initial
debt position.12 Still, we discuss the effects of considering a synthetic initial debt in Section
A.1.3.3. For that reason, we keep the methodology as general as possible and already include
initial debt in the discussion.
In Gourinchas and Jeanne, the change in external position over the sample (∆D) was approx-
imated by using a measure of initial net external debt as well as the sum of negative current
accounts and net overseas development assistance.13 We could in principle approximate the ini-
tial external positions by using (negative) net exports from 1952 to 1983 and deflate them using
the cumulated CPI inflation of China over the period:14
Dn0 =−
1983
∑
t=1952
NXt
CPInat1983
Define Q as the regional deflator. Thereafter, we follow Gourinchas and Jeanne and start with the
external accumulation equation and some definitions:
DnT = D
n
0−
T−1
∑
t=0
CAnt
DnT
QT
= DrT
Dn0
Q0
= Dr0
which gives
11Note that, unlike in the literature on growth accounting where TFP is defined as Solow residual, in this framework
TFP is labor-increasing and can thus can de facto be interpreted as a mix of human capital and TFP. Without accounting
for human capital, Brandt and Zhu (2010) found an average Solow residual growth of 3.05% over 1988-1998 and
4.58% for 1998-2007.
12First, transfers between the central government and regions are conceptually not comparable to movements in
international assets as they could be unlimited and free of interests. Second, data availability issues do not allow us to
include income flows and transfers in the net exports measure.
13For initial debt, they used the difference between the opposite of net international investment position (NIIP) and
cumulated errors and omissions.
14Many regions lack CPI data before 1984. As for net exports, we had no choice but to infer the entire 1952-1983
time series from 1978-1983 for Jiangxi, Guangdong, Sichuan and Ningxia. Note that as initial periods were quite
flat in terms of net exports, we chose to consider only half the obtained amount. The value for Hainan is set to zero
corresponding to the first available values between 1984 and 1986. A gap for Chongqing in 1957 is ignored.
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DrT QT = D
n
0−
T−1
∑
t=0
CAnt
DrT = D
n
0/QT −
T−1
∑
t=0
CAnt /QT
DrT −Dr0 = Dn0(
1
QT
− 1
Q0
)−
T−1
∑
t=0
CAnt
QT
We use net exports instead of current account as, to our knowledge, no income flows statistic
at the regional level is available over the sample period. Ideally, the deflator Q should capture
the evolution of the price of traded goods. Gourinchas and Jeanne used the price of investment
goods as a proxy due to data restriction. Our deflator for cumulated net exports and debt (PTG)
is a combination of regional CPI (1984 to 1996) and of the regional producer price index of
manufactured goods (PPI) (1997-2010) as a proxy for the price of tradable goods. Thus, our final
expression for relative capital flows from 0 to T −1 is
∆Dr
Y0
=
Dn0
Y0
(
1
PT GT
− 1
PT G0
)
− ∑
T−1
t=0 NX
n
t /PT GT
Y0
It is normalized by initial real GDP based on regional CPI (Y0 = Y n0 /CPI0). The initial debt or
asset position enters our flow indicator with the following reasoning: in steady-state, provinces
with initial debt position Dn0 – negative cumulated net exports in the past – will experience capital
outflows depending on the pace of price level growth as they hold their debt ratio constant.
Regions with initial assets will experience capital inflows.
A.1.3 Sensitivity analysis
A.1.3.1 Reference productivity growth rate
The reference rate of productivity growth (g∗) is an important parameter of the model as it deter-
mines the benchmark against which provinces catch-up or fall behind in TFP terms. It directly
influences the reference interest rate.15 While the authors of the initial paper chose US TFP
growth (1.7%), we used our estimated value for China (7.07%). Obviously, this high national
rate only plainly makes sense when the focus lies on intranational capital flows. The purely in-
ternational and mixed flows should be discussed using a productivity reference rate rather similar
in value to world TFP growth rate. In the past sections, we refrained from it.16
15In the baseline model, the assumption that R∗ = g∗γ/β is used.
16Four arguments can be made to justify that choice. 1.The interpretation of results is more intuitive using zero-
centered saving wedges. 2.All regions without exception massively caught up relative to the world technology frontier.
As a consequence, we would end up with abnormally high pi . For a given set of “extreme” parameters, the model
has difficulties to match precisely the data and to identify the frictions. 3.As discussed in the second chapter of the
thesis, much of the dynamics and discrepancies in external balances inside China seems to arise from interregional
capital flows rather than purely international ones. 4.We are primarily interested in determining and looking into
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A lower benchmark productivity value raises the level of catch-up parameters. For example,
by using an hypothetical reference rate of 3%, the value range would expand from [−0.45 0.86]
to [−0.51 4.11]. In Figure 3.17, we provide a graphical representation of the provincial frictions
for different reference rates. We observe only minor variations in the rank of regional frictions.
The general patterns are identical and the wedges using a 3% TFP would be highly correlated
with their counterpart using national TFP estimates.17 The saving wedge - TFP relationship
becomes increasingly negative and remains significant as the reference rate grows. Qualitatively,
econometric results are comparable.
A.1.3.2 Coefficient of relative risk aversion
Up to this point, the entire procedure has been run with log utility (i.e. unit intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution). Alternative risk aversion coefficients (γ) influence investment wedges in a
near linear way: the entire distribution shifts down following a parameter increase (Figure 3.18
on the left). Changes in relative risk aversion affect saving wedges (Figure 3.18 on the right). The
range and the cross-sectional variability in saving wedges increases with higher coefficient. The
relationship with TFP becomes more and more negative. Minor changes in ranking are observed
but the correlation with the baseline case remains high.18
A.1.3.3 Initial external position
Although the general capital flows concept has already been presented in Section A.1.2.3, we
have refrained from assuming an initial debt or asset position in the wedges’ computation yet.
In this section, we include them in the analysis. The initial debt level enters the model via the
capital flows estimation and the debt in efficiency units in the trend channel (∆Dt/Y0) of the
relative capital flows decomposition used to estimate saving wedge.
The initial position is estimated using half of cumulated negative net exports from 1952 to
1983 divided by the national CPI index. In Figure 3.19, we observe that initial external positions
are large. The Metropolises – Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjing – and to a lesser extent Manchurian
regions had accumulated large assets over the pre-reform period and, as a consequence, experi-
enced capital inflows from their net external position in the following periods. West and South
China recorded large initial debt (i.e. subsequent capital outflows) while most of the Center was
roughly neutral.
Even though the initial debt part reveals itself to be negatively correlated with the net exports
part of our flow indicator, the latter primarily drives the pattern of the capital flows estimation.
Our final flows measure is still nearly perfectly correlated with the one of the baseline case.
cross-regional patterns of wedges rather than their absolute value.
17For investment wedges, the correlation is of 0.94 and the rank correlation 0.92, while corresponding values for
saving wedges amount to 0.97 and 0.96.
18For γ = 2, the correlation of saving wedges is of 0.97 and the rank correlation of 0.96.
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The minor changes in the relative ranking of the flows do not translate into substantial changes
in saving wedges.19 Still, there are some major differences for Metropolises and West China.
Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai accumulated large external assets of more than 200% of GDP
before economic reforms. Implicit capital inflows over the next decades are automatically making
their saving wedge more positive. The situation is reversed for some less developed western
regions (e.g. Xinjiang) where high initial debt – and subsequent capital outflows – lowers the net
inflows and the saving wedge.
These changes do not invalidate the capital allocation puzzle. In Figure 3.20, where we let
the weight on initial external position vary between 0 and 1, the negative correlation of saving
wedge with productivity is maintained but the substantially affected regions that we mentioned
end up on the flip side of the regression line without affecting much its slope and significancy.
All in all, taking net external position into account only influences the saving friction of a few
provinces and does not affect our conclusions.
A.1.4 Model extensions
A.1.4.1 Capital adjustment costs
In preceding sections, following Gourinchas and Jeanne, we abstracted from capital adjustment
costs. They argued that their results were robust to that extension. In our case, they could
potentially affect less developed regions that accumulated huge relative GFCF relative to their
economic size. Thus, the introduction of capital adjustment costs is particularly interesting as its
effect on the distribution of investment wedges could lead to a change in the investment puzzle’s
pattern. We introduce two adjustment costs. The first one influences the initial jump in capital to
reach the steady-state level. The second one takes effect in the dynamics of capital over time:
It = Kt+1− (1−δ )Kt +κ2(Kt+1−Kt)θ
The parameters κ1 and κ2 enable us to test the effects of various costs of adjusting capital stock
(see Section A.2.4 ):
i =
1
T
k˜∗− k˜0
k˜α0
+
1
T
k˜∗− k˜0
k˜α0
κ1+g∗
pi
T
nk˜∗(1−α)+(g∗n+δ −1)k˜∗(1−α)
+
1
T
T−1
∑
t=0
κ2
(At+1Nt+1k˜∗−AtNt k˜∗)θ
AtNt k˜∗α
The implementation of the initial jump cost driven by κ1 presents no major difficulty. For a
value of κ1 = 0.5, capital adjustment needed to reach steady-state capital value makes up 3 per-
centage points of investment rate on average. While it is quite large for a typical high investment
19The correlation and rank correlation between saving wedges of the baseline model and this version are 0.96.
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region (e.g. Ningxia, 5.0pp), it is negligible for initially more developed provinces (Shandong,
2.4pp).
The second adjustment implies that economies have to use a supplementary part of their
investment flow to maintain capital in efficiency unit of labor at steady-state level. In terms of
the grid-search, it means that provinces with high average investment rate are attributed a lower
k˜∗and a higher relative adjustment cost channel. The κ2 channel influences three steps of the
model estimation and its implementation raises several issues.20
The adjustment costs are substantial. Economically large and/or fast investment growing re-
gions are particularly affected. Capital stock is lower and the technology reference productivity
growth rate rises. In spite of the adjustment in the value of κ2, national values end up being more
affected by adjustment costs. Consequently, most provinces end up with lower catch-up param-
eter compared to the baseline case. In the estimation of the investment wedge components, we
have two new channels. Over all provinces and given our specification, the κ1 channel accounts
for between 0.8 and 5.5pp of average investment. The κ2 channel is roughly similar in terms
of relative size (between 0.3 and 6.4pp). As expected, western regions with high investment
(e.g. Inner Mongolia, Ningxia and Shaanxi) and Metropolises (e.g. Beijing) have relatively high
adjustment costs relative to their investment level. We register only minor changes in the distri-
bution of frictions. Interestingly, as adjustment costs increase, the positive relationship between
investment wedges and catch-up gets stronger (higher slope coefficient and lower p-value).
This somewhat counterintuitive result is due the following trade-off: on one side, our method-
ology attributes relatively high adjustment costs to regions with high investment rate and high
GFCF growth while on the other side, larger provinces register higher relative adjustment costs
due to the similarity of the κ2s across provinces. Typically, high investment regions in the West
are smaller. Thus, both effects run in opposite direction. One would have to let κ2 vary with
economic size (i.e. higher for smaller regions) in order to be able to put the positive investment
wedge - productivity relationship at risk. Patterns of the factor regressions are similar.
A.1.4.2 Exogenous interest rate
In the baseline version, R∗ = g∗γ/β is assumed. It implicitly means the rest of the world is
composed of steady-state economies that have no saving wedge and preferences similar to the
domestic small economy. This assumption is by no way innocuous. It is used in the second step
of our detailed derivation of their model (see Section A.2.2). It enables to obtain a closed-form
201.The choice of the θ parameter is not innocuous as quadratic or cubic terms may lead to convergence problems.
We choose θ = 2.5. 2.κ2 enters the computation of the national capital stock time series and thus influences the
reference productivity growth rate. We typically need low κ2 values (e.g. 0.0000002) as we deal with large macroe-
conomic figures. The capital stock time series is approximated using a grid-search procedure. It implies substantial
capital adjustment costs of 9% of GDP on average and lowers the final Chinese K/Y ratio to 1.9 compared with 2.3
in the baseline case. As capital stock is lower, average TFP growth rises from 7.07 to 7.32%. 3.For the computation
of regional technology catch-up parameters, we adapt κ2 to 0.000002 in order to get comparable adjustment costs.
4.The estimation of the wedges is based on normalized values. That is why we modify κ2 once again (0.05).
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solution that is more easily estimated (i.e. a stable long-run distribution). We crunch through an
alternative version refraining from any restriction on the functional form of world interest rates.
The convergence and investment channels are identical. The new trend and saving components
are:
∆Dt
Y0
=
k˜0(ng∗)T − d˜0
y˜0
+Ωψ(τs) [nφ(τs)]T
d˜0− k˜0
y˜0
and
∆Ds
Y0
=
w˜+ z˜k
y˜0
nT
[
g∗T (1+pi)
R∗−ng∗ −Ω
ψ(τs)φ(τs)T
R∗
∞
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
(1+pit)
]
where
Ω=
(R∗−n(βR∗) 1γ )(βR∗) Tγ
R∗−ng∗
One cannot use ψ to get rid of the infinite sum term anymore. Clearly, the saving channel will
only converge if R∗ > ng∗. For our dataset, it implies that aggregate interest rates have to be at
least higher than 10%. Even for sufficient rates, any estimation of the infinite sum is only precise
for a long time period.
We use different interest rates to shed light on whether the main findings are robust to exoge-
nous interest rates. The flexible R∗ has no impact on TFP. The distribution of investment wedges
remains identical. Saving wedges are positively related to interest rates. Although the location of
some provinces in the catch-up vs saving wedge representation is highly sensitive to the interest
rate, the negative significant relationship is maintained. The correlations of saving wedges with
explanatory factors is not particularly robust and often, significancy is lost. This is not surprising
given the lower precision of the identification.
A.1.4.3 Implicit wage frictions
There are large differences in productivity (and wages) among regions that triggered large pop-
ulation migration flows. In that respect, discussing the potential effects of the introduction of a
labor wedge in the model seems natural.21
As long as we exclude feedback effects of households on the aggregate labor supply, invest-
ment wedges would not be influenced by such a friction. The wage friction could directly be
implemented in the representative agent’s budget constraint (i.e. in a similar fashion as the sav-
ing wedge). However, as total revenues from frictions are rebated to households, transfers end up
21In their paper on factor market misallocation, Brandt et al. (2012) established that frictions in labor allocation,
as opposed to capital frictions, are the driver of cross-regional distortions in TFP. They find them to be constant over
time in spite of the large migration flows experienced from low to high productivity provinces. Interestingly, capital
frictions explained misallocation inside regions (i.e. between the state and the non-state sector) and have been on the
rise since the mid-1990s.
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being only driven by investment frictions. As briefly discussed in Section A.2.6, one would need
to introduce an explicit labor-leisure choice in the maximization problem in order to change our
results.22 Even if exogenous differences in wages were imposed by, for example, not rebating
revenues from wages frictions, the effect would be similar in spirit to a variation in investment
frictions (i.e. a level effect on the saving channel via transfers) and thus insufficient to turn the
capital allocation puzzle upside down.
All the same, we still at least partly address that issue by computing the real wages implied by
the model and compare them with regional wage income data. We compute the model-induced
regional and national steady-state real wages as:
w = (1−α)k∗α︸ ︷︷ ︸
w˜
AT
and capture the difference between provincial and national values with a labor wedge:
w∗ = (1− τw)w
Our proxy for real wage is urban income from wages and salaries deflated by CPI (2010).
In Figure 3.21, we compare the implicit wedge between regional and national values (−τw =
−(1− w∗w )) of the model with the data. First, the relationship is clearly positive and the corre-
lation is high (0.61): regions with lower predicted wages relative to China (positive −τw) tend
to have lower wages in the data as well. Second, while 22 out of 31 regions are in the “right”
quadrant, there seems to be differences between the model’s implications and the data for a few
provinces. For instance, Beijng and Shanghai (northwest quadrant) seem to have higher wages
than predicted by the model. Some western regions (e.g. Xinjiang, Shaanxi and Inner Mongolia
in the southeast quadrant) turn out to have the opposite pattern.23
22We refrain from it for three reasons. First, this would be a major theoretical extension. Second, there is uncer-
taintly concerning data availability over the entire sample. Third, the labor-leisure trade-off on the intensive margin
is possibly less relevant for developing countries like China. In our opinion, the extensive margin (i.e. labor force
participation) is definitely more of an issue.
23Brandt and Zhu (2010) found a large state sector wage premium in the non-agricultural sector. In our case, it does
not seem to be the case that regions where the state is typically more present enjoy higher real wages. This effect may
manifest itself rather within regional economies.
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A.2 Mathematical appendix24
A.2.1 Decomposition of average investment over GDP (investment wedge identifi-
cation)
Dynamics of capital stock:
It = Kt+1− (1−δ )Kt
Divide by GDP in period t:
it =
Kt+1− (1−δ )Kt
Yt
Find an alternative expression for Yt assuming that labor supply is equal to the entire population (Lt = Nt):
Yt = Kαt (AtLt)
1−α
= Kαt (AtNt)
1−α
=
(
Kt
AtNt
)α
AtNt
= k˜αt AtNt
For t ≥ 1we have a constant steady-state capital in efficiency units. Thus:
Yt = AtNt k˜∗α
Kt+1 = At+1Nt+1k˜∗
Kt = AtNt k˜∗
Using gt+1 =
At+1
At
and the assumption that population grows at a constant rate (nt+1 = n =
Nt+1
Nt
), we can
rewrite it as
it =
At+1Nt+1k˜∗− (1−δ )AtNt k˜∗
AtNt k˜∗α
=
At+1Nt+1k˜∗
AtNt k˜∗α
− (1−δ ) k˜
∗
k˜∗α
= gt+1nk˜∗(1−α)− (1−δ )k˜∗(1−α)
= k˜∗(1−α) [gt+1n−1+δ ]
In t = 0, there is a term reflecting the initial jump from k˜0 to k˜∗. First note that
K∗0 = A0N0k˜
∗
K0 = A0N0k˜0
Y0 = A0N0k˜α0
One gets the following jump term:
24The baseline derivations are own detailed explanations of the standard setting in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013).
Capital adjustment costs, exogenous interest rate and wage friction are extensions.
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K∗0 −K0
Y0
=
A0N0k˜∗−A0N0k˜0
A0N0k˜α0
=
k˜∗− k˜0
k˜α0
Add the jump term to the initial expression for it to get i0:
i0 = k˜∗(1−α)(g1n+δ −1)+ k˜
∗− k˜0
k˜α0
Time frame: start at t = 0 until t = T , which is the last observation (steady-state). Thus, the last data is
ignored. In our sample (1984−2010), we have 126 ∑t=25t=0 it although we have a total of 27 periods.
The average investment rate between t and T −1 is
i =
1
T
T−1
∑
t=0
it
=
1
T
k˜∗− k˜0
k˜α0
+
1
T
T−1
∑
t=0
(gt+1n+δ −1)k˜∗(1−α)
The first part is the initial jump term in i0 whereas the second one gathers the standard elements from 0 to
T − 1. Define average productivity growth rate as 1T ∑T−1t=0 gt+1 = g¯. Rewrite the second term of the last
expression and expand with g∗nk˜∗(1−α) (note that the sum from 0 to T −1 divided by T has no effect on
constants):
(g¯n+δ −1)k˜∗(1−α) − g∗nk˜∗(1−α)+g∗nk˜∗(1−α)
(g¯n−g∗n)(k˜∗(1−α)) + (δ −1+g∗n)k˜∗(1−α)
(g¯−g∗)nk˜∗(1−α) + (g∗n+δ −1)k˜∗(1−α)
We want to express gt+1 relative to the catchup parameters pit and pit+1. First note that:
At ≤ A∗t = A∗0g∗t
pit =
At
A0g∗t
−1
pit+1 =
At+1
A0g∗t+1
−1
Start with the definition of technology growth rate and use At and At+1from former equations:
gt+1 =
At+1
At
=
1+pit+1
1+pit
A0g∗t+1
A0g∗t
=
1+pit+1
1+pit
g∗
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where one can approximate 1+pit+11+pit with 1+pit+1−pit .
Rewrite g¯:
g¯ =
1
T
T−1
∑
t=0
gt+1
=
1
T
T−1
∑
t=0
1+pit+1
1+pit
g∗
≈ 1
T
T−1
∑
t=0
(1+pit+1−pit)g∗
Focus on the concrete form of the summation, taking into account that pi0 = 0 and piT = pi (i.e. steady-state
at T = 26, in the 27th period):
1
T
[(1+pi1−pi0 )+ (1+pi2−pi1)+(1+pi3−pi2)+ . . .+(1+piT −piT−1)]
1
T
[1+1+1+ ...+pi]
26
26
+
pi
26
1+
pi
T
Thus we have that g¯ = (1+ piT )g
∗, which we use in i:
i =
1
T
k˜∗− k˜0
k˜α0
+
1
T
T−1
∑
t=0
(gt+1n+δ −1)k˜∗(1−α)
=
1
T
k˜∗− k˜0
k˜α0
+(g¯−g∗)nk˜∗(1−α)+(g∗n+δ −1)k˜∗(1−α)
=
1
T
k˜∗− k˜0
k˜α0
+
[
g∗(1+
pi
T
)−g∗
]
nk˜∗(1−α)+(g∗n+δ −1)k˜∗(1−α)
=
1
T
k˜∗− k˜0
k˜α0︸ ︷︷ ︸
convergence
+g∗
pi
T
nk˜∗(1−α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
catch−up
+(g∗n+δ −1)k˜∗(1−α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
depreciation
Convergence component: initial investment at t = 0 required to put capital at its steady-state level.
Catch-up component: additional investment required by the productivity catch-up.
Depreciation component: investment required to offset capital depreciation taking into account productiv-
ity and population/labor force growth.
A.2.2 Closed-form expression for relative cumulated capital flows (saving wedge
identification)
Step 1: debt ratio
Note that4D = DT −D0, d˜T = DTAT NT and y˜0 =
Y0
A0N0
. We can rewrite relative change in debt as
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4D
Y0
=
DT −D0
Y0
=
d˜T AT NT − d˜0A0N0
A0N0y˜0
=
d˜T AT NT/A0N0− d˜0
y˜0
Notice that
At
A0g∗t
= 1+pit
piT = pi
AT
A0
= g∗T (1+pi)
Nt+1
Nt
= nt+1 = n
NT
N0
= nT
Use expression for AT/A0 and NT/N0:
4D
Y0
=
d˜T g∗T (1+pi)nT − d˜0
y˜0
d˜T (g∗n)T (1+pi)− d˜0
y˜0
(A.1)
At t = 0, there is a jump in external debt to d˜+0 = d˜0+ k˜
∗− k˜0 to finance the initial increase in capital from
k˜0 to k˜∗. Normalization by initial output level occurs before capital jump.
Now we look for d˜T using the BC of the representative HH:
Ntwt +Ntzt =Ct +Kt+1− (1− τs)R∗Kt +(1− τs)R∗Dt −Dt+1
HH resources: work income, transfers, net returns from capital, higher debt and interests on assets.
HH expenditures: consumption, investment in capital for next period, debt repayment and interests on
debt.
The marginal influence of the saving wedge is ∂ .∂τs =R
∗(Kt−Dt). Thus, if Kt >Dt we have a positive effect
of an increase in τs on the expenditures (less ressources). If Kt < Dt , HH have more resources at disposal.
There are two opposite effects given higher τs: HH get less returns on capital but pay less on debt. Which
effects dominates depends on the size of Kt and Dt . The former situation is considered as the standard case.
Divide BC by Nt and use ct = CTNT and Nt =
Nt+1
n :
wt + zt =
Ct
Nt
+
Kt+1−Dt+1
Nt
+(1− τs)R
∗(Dt −Kt)
Nt
= ct +n(kt+1−dt+1)+R∗(dt − kt)− τsR∗(dt − kt)
In a next step, the terms involving the saving wedge are consolidated.
The total revenue from the wedges in per capita unit is
zt = τkRtkt + τsR∗(kt −dt)
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In the BC, focus on the terms involving τs and use zt :
zt + τsR∗(dt − kt)
τkRtkt + τsR∗(kt −dt) + τsR∗(dt − kt)
τkRtkt
Thus, the size of transfers is influenced by investment frictions.
Using Rt = R
∗
1−τk , we get zkt , the lump-sum transfers financed by capital wedge:
zkt =
τk
1− τk R
∗kt
The BC is:
zkt +wt = ct +n(kt+1−dt+1)+R∗(dt − kt)
Divide the BC by At and use At =
At+1
gt+1
:
zkt
At
+
wt
At
=
ct
At
+n(
kt+1
At
− dt+1
At
)+R∗(
dt − kt
At
)
z˜kt + w˜t = c˜t +ngt+1(k˜t+1− d˜t+1)+R∗(d˜t − k˜t)
In steady-state, k˜t+1 = k˜t = k˜∗ and z˜k = τk1−τk R
∗k˜∗.
The normalized BC is
z˜k + w˜ = c˜t +ngt+1(k˜∗− d˜t+1)+R∗(d˜t − k˜∗)
where w˜ = (1−α)k˜∗α (competitive factor markets). At time T , the economy is in steady-state and the
saving wedge disappears. Using gt+1 = g∗, d˜t = d˜T and c˜t = cT , we get the SS debt:
z˜k + w˜ = c˜T +ng∗(k˜∗− d˜T )+R∗(d˜T − k˜∗)
= c˜T − k˜∗(R∗−ng∗)+ d˜T (R∗−ng∗)
d˜T =
z˜k + w˜− c˜T
R∗−ng∗ + k˜
∗ (A.2)
Step 2: consumption
Start with the Euler equation and use R∗ = g
∗γ
β to get rid of β with β =
g∗γ
R∗ :
c−γt = βR∗(1− τs)c−γt+1
c−γT−1 =
g∗γ
R∗
R∗(1− τs)c−γT
c−γT =
c−γT−1
g∗γ(1− τs)
cT =
cT−1
g∗−1(1− τs)−
1
γ
cT = cT−1g∗(1− τs)
1
γ
This result is used to get cT relative to c0 with φ(τs) = (1− τs)
1
γ :
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cT = c0
[
g∗(1− τs)
1
γ
]
T
= c0 [g∗φ(τs)]T
Using AT = (1+pi)A0g∗T , consumption in efficiency unit of labor can be expressed as
c˜T =
c0 [g∗φ(τs)]T
(1+pi)A0g∗T
=
c˜0φ(τs)T
1+pi
(A.3)
The next step is to get the intertemporal BC. Rewrite the per capita BC of households:
t = 0 : zk0+w0 = c0+n(k1−d1)+R∗(d0− k0)
t = 1 : zk1+w1 = c1+n(k2−d2)+R∗(d1− k1)
t = 2 : zk2+w2 = c2+n(k3−d3)+R∗(d2− k2)
From t = 1, get
k1−d1 = c1+n(k2−d2)− zk1−w1R∗
and plug it in t = 0
zk0+w0 = c0+n
c1
R∗
+
n2(k2−d2)
R∗
− nzk1
R∗
− nw1
R∗
+R∗(d0− k0)
Rearrange:
zk0+
nzk1
R∗
+w0+
nw1
R∗
= c0+
nc1
R∗
+R∗(d0− k0)+ n
2(k2−d2)
R∗
From t = 2 get
k2−d2 = c2+n(k3−d3)− zk2−w2R∗
and plug it in the result from before:
zk0+
nzk1
R∗
+
n2zk2
R∗2
+w0+
nw1
R∗
+
n2w2
R∗2
= c0+
nc1
R∗
+
n2c2
R∗2
+R∗(d0− k0)+ n
3
R∗2
(k3−d3)
By repeating the process until ∞, the k−d term on the right disappears if R∗ > n and we are left with the
intertemporal BC:
∞
∑
0
( n
R∗
)t
(zkt +wt) =
∞
∑
0
( n
R∗
)t
ct +R∗(d0− k0) (A.4)
From before, we know that consumption per capita grows at rate g∗φ(τs) until T and at g∗afterwards
(τs = 0 and φ = 1):
ct = A0φmin(t,T )g∗t c˜0
Rewrite the consumption part of the intertemporal BC:
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∞∑
t=0
( n
R∗
)t
ct =
∞
∑
t=0
( n
R∗
)t
A0φmin(t,T )g∗t c˜0
= A0c˜0
T
∑
t=0
( n
R∗
)t
φ tg∗t +A0c˜0φT
∞
∑
t=T+1
( n
R∗
)t
g∗t
= A0c˜0
[
T
∑
t=0
(
φng∗
R∗
)t
+φT
∞
∑
t=T+1
(
ng∗
R∗
)t]
=
A0c˜0
(1− ng∗R∗ )ψ(τs)
(A.5)
All elements influenced by τs are gathered in ψ(τs):
ψ(τs) =
(
1− ng
∗
R∗
)−1[ T
∑
t=0
(
φng∗
R∗
)t
+φT
∞
∑
t=T+1
(
ng∗
R∗
)t]−1
(A.6)
The following part aims at getting an expression for ψ(τs):
n−1
∑
t=0
xt =
1− xn
1− x
∞
∑
t=0
xt =
1
1− x
∞
∑
t=1
xt =
∞
∑
t=0
xt −1 = x
1− x
Use them in ψ(τs): (
1− ng
∗
R∗
)−11− ( φng∗R∗ )T+1
1− φng∗R∗
+φT
1
1− ng∗R∗
−φT 1−
ng∗
R∗
T+1
1− ng∗R∗

(
1− ng
∗
R∗
)−11− ( φng∗R∗ )T+1
1− φng∗R∗
+φT
ng∗
R∗
T+1
1− ng∗R∗
−1
R∗
R∗−ng∗
1− ( φng∗R∗ )T+1
R∗−φng∗
R∗
+φT
ng∗
R∗
T+1
R∗−ng∗
R∗
−1
R∗
R∗−ng∗
R∗ 1− ( φng∗R∗ )T+1
R∗−φng∗ +R
∗φT
ng∗
R∗
T+1
R∗−ng∗
−1
1
R∗−ng∗
 (1− ( φng∗R∗ )T+1)(R∗−ng∗)+φT ng∗R∗ T+1(R∗−φng∗)
(R∗−φng∗)(R∗−ng∗)
−1
Focus on the numerator. First gather terms containing ng∗ (without any R∗):
−ng∗+
[
φng∗
R∗
]T+1
ng∗−φT
[
ng∗
R∗
]T+1
φng∗ =−ng∗
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then, concentrate on R∗ terms:
R∗− φng
∗
R∗
T+1
R∗+φT
ng∗
R∗
T+1
R∗
R∗−R∗
[
φng∗
R∗
]T φng∗
R∗
+R∗
[
φng∗
R∗
]T ng∗
R∗
R∗−
[
φng∗
R∗
]T
φng∗+
[
φng
R∗
]T
ng∗
R∗+
[
φng∗
R∗
]T
ng∗(1−φ)
We get
1
R∗−ng∗
R∗−ng∗+
[
φng∗
R∗
]T
ng∗(1−φ)
(R∗−φng∗)(R∗−ng∗)

−1
ψ(τs) =
R∗−φng∗
R∗−ng∗+
[
ng∗φ(τs)
R∗
]T
ng∗(1−φ(τs))
(A.7)
The consumption in period 0 in efficiency units can now be computed.
Note that:
(1+piT )A0g∗T = AT
(1+pit)A0g∗t = At
w˜ =
wt
At
=
wt
A0(1+pit)g∗t
z˜k =
zkt
At
=
zkt
A0(1+pit)g∗t
wt + zkt = (w˜+ z˜k)A0(1+pit)g∗t (A.8)
Plug (A.5) and (A.8) in the intertemporal version of the budget constraint (A.4):
∞
∑
0
( n
R∗
)t
ct =
∞
∑
0
( n
R∗
)t
(zkt +wt)+R∗(k0−d0)
A0c˜0
(1− ng∗R∗ )ψ(τs)
=
∞
∑
t=0
( n
R∗
)t
(w˜+ z˜k)A0(1+pit)g∗t +R∗(k0−d0)
c˜0 =
R∗−ng∗
R∗
ψ(τs)
1
A0
(w˜+ z˜k)A0
∞
∑
t=0
( n
R∗
)t
(1+pit)g∗t
+
R∗−ng∗
R∗
ψ(τs)
1
A0
R∗(k0−d0)
=
R∗−ng∗
R∗
ψ(τs)(w˜+ z˜k)
∞
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
(1+pit)
+(R∗−ng∗)ψ(τs)k0−d0A0
= . . .+(R∗−ng∗)ψ(τs)(k˜0− d˜0)
c˜0 = (R∗−ng∗)ψ(τs)
[
w˜+ z˜k
R∗
∞
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
(1+pit)+ k˜0− d˜0
]
(A.9)
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The saving wedge τs enters consumption choice through the marginal propensity to consume (R∗ −
ng∗)ψ(τs) out of wealth [. . .]. If τs is higher, then φ(τs) = (1− τs)
1
γ is lower, ψ(pis) is higher and the
marginal propensity to consume out of wealth rises.
From (A.5) we get an expression for c˜t
c˜t =
ct
At
=
1
(1+pit)A0g∗t
A0c˜0
(1− ng∗R∗ )ψ(τs)
1
∑∞t=0
( n
R∗
)t
=
1
(1+pit)g∗t
c˜0
(1− ng∗R∗ )ψ(τs)
1
∑∞t=0
( n
R∗
)t
and by using c˜0, for c˜T as well:
c˜T =
cT
AT
=
c˜0φ(τs)T
1+piT
(A.10)
Step 3: closed-form expression for the relative flows
Use the expression for d˜T (A.2) in the initial
4D
Y0
(A.1):
4D
Y0
=
d˜T (g∗n)T (1+pi)− d˜0
y˜0
=
(
z˜k + w˜− c˜T
R∗−ng∗ + k˜
∗
)(
(g∗n)T (1+pi)
y˜0
)
− d˜0
y˜0
=
k˜∗(g∗n)T (1+pi)
y˜0
+
w˜+ z˜k
R∗−ng∗
(g∗n)T (1+pi)
y˜0
− c˜T
R∗−ng∗
(g∗n)T (1+pi)
y˜0
− d˜0
y˜0
Focus on the last term containing c˜T (A.10) and c˜0 (A.9) :
− c˜0φ(τs)
T
1+pi
1
(R∗−ng∗)
(g∗n)T (1+pi)
y˜0
−(R∗−ng∗)ψ(τs)
[
w˜+ z˜k
R∗
∞
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
(1+pit)+(k˜0− d˜0)
]
φ(τs)T
1+pi
1
(R∗−ng∗)
(g∗n)T (1+pi)
y˜0
−ψ(τs)φ(τs)
T
y˜0
(g∗n)T
[
w˜+ z˜k
R∗
∞
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
(1+pit)+(k˜0− d˜0)
]
The entire expression is
4D
Y0
=
k˜∗(g∗n)T (1+pi)
y˜0
+
w˜+ z˜k
R∗−ng∗
(g∗n)T (1+pi)
y˜0
−ψ(τs)φ(τs)
T
y˜0
(g∗n)T
[
w˜+ z˜k
R∗
∞
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
(1+pit)+ k˜0− d˜0
]
− d˜0
y˜0
The initial part of the equation gathering k˜∗ is the first term:
k˜∗
y˜0
(ng∗)T (1+pi) (I)
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Focusing on parts containing k˜0, one gets the second term:
−ψ(τs)φ(τs)
T
y˜0
(g∗n)T k˜0
− k˜0
y˜0
ψ(τs)[ng∗φ(τs)]T (II)
For the third one, take the terms containing d˜0:
ψ(τs)φ(τs)T
y˜0
(g∗n)T d˜0− d˜0y˜0
d˜0
y˜0
(
ψ(τs)[ng∗φ(τs)]T −1
)
(III)
Collecting the left-over terms of the initial expression, we have
w˜+ z˜k
R∗−ng∗
(g∗n)T (1+pi)
y˜0
− ψ(τs)φ(τs)
T (g∗n)T
y˜0
w˜+ z˜k
R∗
∞
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
(1+pit)
w˜+ z˜k
y˜0
(g∗n)T
[
1
R∗−ng∗ (1+pi)−
ψ(τs)φ(τs)T
R∗
∞
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
(1+pit)
]
w˜+ z˜k
y˜0
(g∗n)T
[
1
R∗−ng∗ (1+pi)−
ψ(τs)φ(τs)T
R∗
∞
∑
t=T
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
(1+pi)− ψ(τs)φ(τs)
T
R∗
T−1
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
(1+pit)
]
(A.11)
where the assumption that, from T on, pit = pi has been used.
From now on, one needs to proceed sequentially. Put the third term aside for the moment:
− w˜+ z˜k
y˜0
(g∗n)T
ψ(τs)φ(τs)T
R∗
T−1
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
(1+pit) (A.12)
Focus on the first and second part:
w˜+ z˜k
y˜0
(g∗n)T
[
1
R∗−ng∗ (1+pi)−
ψ(τs)φ(τs)T
R∗
∞
∑
t=T
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
(1+pi)
]
w˜+ z˜k
y˜0
(g∗n)T
[
(1+pi)
1
R∗
∞
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
− (1+pi)ψ(τs)φ(τs)
T
R∗
∞
∑
t=T
(
ng∗
R∗
)t]
w˜+ z˜k
y˜0
(g∗n)T
(1+pi)
R∗
[
∞
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
−ψ(τs)φ(τs)T
∞
∑
t=T
(
ng∗
R∗
)t]
(A.13)
Before, we had defined
ψ(τs) =
(
1− ng
∗
R∗
)−1[ T
∑
t=0
(
φng∗
R∗
)t
+φ(τs)T
∞
∑
t=T+1
(
ng∗
R∗
)t]−1
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Use this definition to get an expression for ∑∞t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
=
(
1− ng∗R∗
)−1
:
∞
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
= ψ(τs)
[
T
∑
t=0
(
φng∗
R∗
)t
+φ(τs)T
∞
∑
t=T+1
(
ng∗
R∗
)t]
Plug it in (A.13) and focus on the interior of the bracket of the following expression:
w˜+ z˜k
y˜0
(g∗n)T
(1+pi)
R∗
[
ψ(τs)
T
∑
t=0
(
φng∗
R∗
)t
+ψ(τs)φ(τs)T
∞
∑
t=T+1
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
−ψ(τs)φ(τs)T
∞
∑
t=T
(
ng∗
R∗
)t]
Note that we can rewrite the sum terms. For the first one, ∑Tt=0 = ∑
T−1
t=0 +∑
T
t=T . For the second one,
∑∞t=T+1 = ∑
∞
t=T −∑Tt=T .
ψ(τs)
T−1
∑
t=0
(
φng∗
R∗
)t
+ψ(τs)
T
∑
t=T
(
φng∗
R∗
)t
+ψ(τs)φ(τs)T
∞
∑
t=T
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
−ψ(τs)φT
T
∑
t=T
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
−ψ(τs)φ(τs)T
∞
∑
t=T
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
All parts but the first one disappear. By using the external part we left behind at the beginning we get
w˜+ z˜k
y˜0
(g∗n)T
(1+pi)
R∗
[
ψ(τs)
T−1
∑
t=0
(
φng∗
R∗
)t]
This is an expression for the first and second parts of (A.11). Use it with the terms we put aside (A.12) to
get the fourth part:
w˜+ z˜k
y˜0
(g∗n)T
(1+pi)
R∗
[
ψ(τs)
T−1
∑
t=0
(
φng∗
R∗
)t]
− w˜+ z˜k
y˜0
(g∗n)T
ψ(τs)φ(τs)T
R∗
T−1
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
(1+pit)
w˜+ z˜k
y˜0
ψ(τs)
R∗
[ng∗φ(τs)]T
T−1
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t [
φ(τs)t−T (1+pi)− (1+pit)
]
(IV)
The equation of the flows decomposition is composed of the four expressions we have just computed (I),
(II), (III) and (IV):
4D
Y0
=
k˜∗
y˜0
(ng∗)T (1+pi)− k˜0
y˜0
ψ(τs)[ng∗φ(τs)]T +
d˜0
y˜0
(
ψ(τs)[ng∗φ(τs)]T −1
)
+
w˜+ z˜k
y˜0
ψ(τs)
R∗
[ng∗φ(τs)]T
T−1
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t [
φ(τs)t−T (1+pi)− (1+pit)
]
(A.14)
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) show that under certain conditions:
4D
Y0
= D
(
d˜0
+
, k˜0−
,pi
+
,τk−
,τs
+
)
Cumulated relative capital inflows increase with d˜0 if ψ(τs)[ng∗φ(τs)]T > 1, which is the case if τs is
small enough. They clearly decrease with higher k˜0. An increase in pi causes the first term to be higher.
For the fourth one, concentrate on the bracket. First, pit = f (t)pi with f (t) = min( tT ,1) ≤ 1. Second,
φ(τs)t−T = (1− τs)
1
γ (t−T ) > 1. Thus, an increase in pi leads to more inflows. Countries with a relatively
higher τk have lower k˜∗and thus always less inflows given part (IV) is positive. At last, a relatively higher
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τs implies higher inflows if k˜0 ≥ d˜0.
Step 4: channel decomposition
Focus on the first three terms of (A.14) and distribute:
k˜∗
y˜0
(ng∗)T +
k˜∗
y˜0
(ng∗)Tpi− k˜0
y˜0
ψ(τs) [ng∗φ(τs)]T +
d˜0
y˜0
(
ψ(τs)[ng∗φ(τs)]T −1
)
Expand with k˜0y˜0 (ng
∗)T :
k˜∗− k˜0
y˜0
(ng∗)T︸ ︷︷ ︸
convergence
+
k˜∗
y˜0
(ng∗)Tpi︸ ︷︷ ︸
investment
+
k˜0
y˜0
(ng∗)T − k˜0
y˜0
ψ(τs) [ng∗φ(τs)]T +
d˜0
y˜0
(
ψ(τs)[ng∗φ(τs)]T −1
)
Focus on the left-over terms:
k˜0
y˜0
(ng∗)T − k˜0
y˜0
ψ(τs) [ng∗φ(τs)]T +
d˜0
y˜0
ψ(τs)[ng∗φ(τs)]T − d˜0y˜0
k˜0(ng∗)T − d˜0
y˜0
+ψ(τs) [ng∗φ(τs)]T
d˜0− k˜0
y˜0︸ ︷︷ ︸
trend
The saving channel is the fourth part of (A.14):
w˜+ z˜k
y˜0
ψ(τs)
R∗
[ng∗φ(τs)]T
T−1
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t [
φ(τs)t−T (1+pi)− (1+pit)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
saving
A.2.3 Relative flows with no saving wedge
With τs = 0, we have
φ(τs) = (1− τs)
1
γ = 1
ψ(τs) =
R∗−ng∗
R∗−ng∗+
(
ng∗
R∗
)T
ng∗(1−1)
= 1
The convergence and investment channels are identical:
k˜∗− k˜0
y˜0
(ng∗)T
k˜∗
y˜0
(ng∗)Tpi
The trend channel becomes
k˜0(ng∗)T − d˜0
y˜0
+(ng∗)T
d˜0− k˜0
y˜0
d˜0(ng∗)T
y˜0
− k˜0
y˜0
(ng∗)T +
k˜0
y˜0
(ng∗)T − d˜0
y˜0
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d˜0
y˜0
[
(ng∗)T −1]
The saving channel is:
w˜+ z˜k
y˜0
1
R∗
(ng∗)T
T−1
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
[(1+pi)− (1+pit)]
Remember that pit = f (t)pi:
w˜+ z˜k
y˜0
1
R∗
(ng∗)T
T−1
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)
pi [1− f (t)]
Note that in a model without investment frictions as well, all the channels would be similar with the
exception of the saving channel (z˜k would disappear).
A.2.4 Extension 1: capital adjustment costs
A capital adjustment cost is introduced in the equation for the dynamics of capital stock:
It = Kt+1− (1−δ )Kt +κ2(Kt+1−Kt)θ
Divide by GDP in period t
it =
Kt+1− (1−δ )Kt
Yt
+κ2
(Kt+1−Kt)θ
Yt
We can rewrite it as
it = k˜∗(1−α) [gt+1n−1+δ ]+κ2 (At+1Nt+1k˜
∗−AtNt k˜∗)θ
AtNt k˜∗α
The second capital adjustment cost enters in the initial jump in capital stock:
K∗0 −K0
Y0
=
(1+κ1)(k˜∗− k˜0)
k˜α0
Add the jump term to the expression from before to get a new i0
i0 = k˜∗(1−α)(g1n+δ −1)+κ2 (At+1Nt+1k˜
∗−AtNt k˜∗)θ
AtNt k˜∗α
+
(1+κ1)(k˜∗− k˜0)
k˜α0
The average investment rate between t and T −1 is
i =
1
T
T−1
∑
t=0
it
=
1
T
(1+κ1)(k˜∗− k˜0)
k˜α0
+
1
T
T−1
∑
t=0
(gt+1n+δ −1)k˜∗(1−α)+ 1T
T−1
∑
t=0
κ2
(At+1Nt+1k˜∗−AtNt k˜∗)θ
AtNt k˜∗α
Two new channels appear: the second term is the initial capital adjustment cost and the fifth term represents
standard capital adjustment costs.
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i =
1
T
k˜∗− k˜0
k˜α0
+
1
T
k˜∗− k˜0
k˜α0
κ1+g∗
pi
T
nk˜∗(1−α)+(g∗n+δ −1)k˜∗(1−α)
+
1
T
T−1
∑
t=0
κ2
(At+1Nt+1k˜∗−AtNt k˜∗)θ
AtNt k˜∗α
A.2.5 Extension 2: exogenous interest rate
The debt ratio is not influenced, à savoir:
d˜T =
z˜k + w˜− c˜T
R∗−ng∗ + k˜
∗ (A.15)
Start with the Euler equation but do not use R∗ = g
∗γ
β :
c−γt = βR∗(1− τs)c−γt+1
c−γT =
c−γT−1
βR∗(1− τs)
cT =
cT−1
[βR∗(1− τs)]−
1
γ
cT = cT−1[βR∗(1− τs)]
1
γ
This result is used to get cT relative to c0 with φ(τs) = (1− τs)
1
γ :
cT = c0
[
(βR∗)
1
γ (1− τs)
1
γ
]
T
= c0
[
(βR∗)
1
γ φ(τs)
]T
Using AT = (1+pi)A0g∗T , consumption in efficiency unit can be expressed as
c˜T =
c0
[
(βR∗)
1
γ φ(τs)
]T
(1+pi)A0g∗T
=
c˜0φ(τs)T (βR∗)
T
γ
(1+pi)g∗T
(A.16)
The intertemporal BC is the same as in the baseline case:
∞
∑
0
( n
R∗
)t
(zkt +wt) =
∞
∑
0
( n
R∗
)t
ct +R∗(d0− k0) (A.17)
From before, we know that consumption per capita grows at rate (βR∗)
1
γ φ(τs) until T and at (βR∗)
1
γ
afterwards:
ct = A0φmin(t,T )(βR∗)
t
γ c˜0
Rewrite the consumption part of the intertemporal BC:
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∞∑
t=0
( n
R∗
)t
ct =
∞
∑
t=0
( n
R∗
)t
A0φmin(t,T )(βR∗)
t
γ c˜0
= A0c˜0
T
∑
t=0
( n
R∗
)t
φ t(βR∗)
t
γ +A0c˜0φT
∞
∑
t=T+1
( n
R∗
)t
(βR∗)
t
γ
= A0c˜0
[
T
∑
t=0
(
φn
R∗
)t
(βR∗)
t
γ +φT
∞
∑
t=T+1
( n
R∗
)t
(βR∗)
t
γ
]
=
A0c˜0
(1− n(βR∗)
1
γ
R∗ )ψ(τs)
(A.18)
All elements influenced by τs are gathered in ψ(τs):
ψ(τs) =
(
1− n(βR
∗)
1
γ
R∗
)−1 T∑
t=0
(
φn(βR∗)
1
γ
R∗
)t
+φT
∞
∑
t=T+1
(
n(βR∗)
1
γ
R∗
)t−1
We omit the steps to get an expression for ψ(τs) as they are similar as in the baseline case with (βR∗)
1
γ
instead of g∗. We get:
ψ(τs) =
R∗−φn(βR∗) 1γ
R∗−n(βR∗) 1γ +
[
n(βR∗)
1
γ φ(τs)
R∗
]T
n(βR∗)
1
γ (1−φ(τs))
(A.19)
The consumption in period 0 in efficiency units can now be computed similarly as in the baseline case
using again:
wt + zkt = (w˜+ z˜k)A0(1+pit)g∗t
Plug the rewritten consumption part (A.18) and the former equation in the intertemporal version of the
budget constraint (A.17):
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∞∑
0
( n
R∗
)t
ct =
∞
∑
0
( n
R∗
)t
(zkt +wt)+R∗(k0−d0)
A0c˜0
(1− n(βR∗)
1
γ
R∗ )ψ(τs)
=
∞
∑
t=0
( n
R∗
)t
(w˜+ z˜k)A0(1+pit)g∗t +R∗(k0−d0)
c˜0 =
R∗−n(βR∗) 1γ
R∗
ψ(τs)
1
A0
(w˜+ z˜k)A0
∞
∑
t=0
( n
R∗
)t
(1+pit)g∗t
+
R∗−n(βR∗) 1γ
R∗
ψ(τs)
1
A0
R∗(k0−d0)
=
R∗−n(βR∗) 1γ
R∗
ψ(τs)(w˜+ z˜k)
∞
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
(1+pit)
+(R∗−n(βR∗) 1γ )ψ(τs)k0−d0A0
= . . .+(R∗−n(βR∗) 1γ )ψ(τs)(k˜0− d˜0)
c˜0 = (R∗−n(βR∗)
1
γ )ψ(τs)
[
w˜+ z˜k
R∗
∞
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
(1+pit)+(k˜0− d˜0)
]
(A.20)
Use the expression for d˜T (A.15) in the initial (unchanged)
4D
Y0
(A.1). The expression is similar as in the
baseline case:
4D
Y0
=
d˜T (g∗n)T (1+pi)− d˜0
y˜0
=
(
z˜k + w˜− c˜T
R∗−ng∗ + k˜
∗
)(
(g∗n)T (1+pi)
y˜0
)
− d˜0
y˜0
=
k˜∗(g∗n)T (1+pi)
y˜0
+
w˜+ z˜k
R∗−ng∗
(g∗n)T (1+pi)
y˜0
− c˜T
R∗−ng∗
(g∗n)T (1+pi)
y˜0
− d˜0
y˜0
Focus on the last term containing c˜T (A.16) and c˜0 (A.20) :
− c˜T
R∗−ng∗
(g∗n)T (1+pi)
y˜0
− c˜0φ(τs)
T (βR∗)
T
γ
(1+pi)g∗T
1
(R∗−ng∗)
(g∗n)T (1+pi)
y˜0
We get
−(R∗−n(βR∗) 1γ )ψ(τs)
[
w˜+ z˜k
R∗
∞
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
(1+pit)+(k˜0− d˜0)
]
φ(τs)T (βR∗)
T
γ
(1+pi)g∗T
1
(R∗−ng∗)
(g∗n)T (1+pi)
y˜0
which can be rewritten as
− (R
∗−n(βR∗) 1γ )(βR∗) Tγ
R∗−ng∗ φ(τs)
T nT
ψ(τs)
y˜0
[
w˜+ z˜k
R∗
∞
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
(1+pit)+(k˜0− d˜0)
]
The entire expression is:
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4D
Y0
=
k˜∗(g∗n)T (1+pi)
y˜0
+
w˜+ z˜k
R∗−ng∗
(g∗n)T (1+pi)
y˜0
− (R
∗−n(βR∗) 1γ )(βR∗) Tγ
R∗−ng∗ φ(τs)
T nT
ψ(τs)
y˜0
[
w˜+ z˜k
R∗
∞
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
(1+pit)+ k˜0− d˜0
]
− d˜0
y˜0
Note that only the third part differs compared to the baseline case.
For convenience, define a new variable:
Ω=
(R∗−n(βR∗) 1γ )(βR∗) Tγ
R∗−ng∗
The part of the equation gathering k˜∗ is the first response term as in the baseline case:
k˜∗
y˜0
(ng∗)T (1+pi) (I)
Focusing on terms containing k˜0, one gets the second element of the answer:
− (R
∗−n(βR∗) 1γ )(βR∗) Tγ
R∗−ng∗ φ(τs)
T nT
ψ(τs)
y˜0
k˜0
−Ω k˜0
y˜0
ψ(τs)[nφ(τs)]T (II)
As for the third one, take the terms containing d˜0:
ΩnT
ψ(τs)φ(τs)T
y˜0
d˜0− d˜0y˜0
d˜0
y˜0
(
Ωψ(τs)[nφ(τs)]T −1
)
(III)
Collecting the left-over terms of the initial expression, we have:
w˜+ z˜k
R∗−ng∗
(g∗n)T (1+pi)
y˜0
−Ω[φ(τs)n]T ψ(τs)y˜0
w˜+ z˜k
R∗
∞
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
(1+pit)
w˜+ z˜k
y˜0
nT
[
g∗T (1+pi)
R∗−ng∗ −Ω
ψ(τs)φ(τs)T
R∗
∞
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
(1+pit)
]
(IV)
If (βR∗)
1
γ = g∗, Ω= g∗T and the former expression is similar as in the baseline case (A.11). One cannot
use ψ(τs) to rewrite the first term in the brackets, get rid of the ∑∞ and obtain a closed-form solution. A
numerical approximation is possible but obviously, one needs R∗ > ng∗ for convergence.
The equation of the flows decomposition is constituted of the four expressions we have just computed
((I), (II), (III) and (IV)):
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4D
Y0
=
k˜∗
y˜0
(ng∗)T (1+pi)− k˜0
y˜0
ψ(τs)[nφ(τs)]TΩ+
d˜0
y˜0
[
Ωψ(τs)[nφ(τs)]T −1
]
+
w˜+ z˜k
y˜0
nT
[
g∗T (1+pi)
R∗−ng∗ −Ω
ψ(τs)φ(τs)T
R∗
∞
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
(1+pit)
]
By focusing on the first three terms, one sees the convergence and investment channels are identical to the
baseline case. Focus on the left-over terms:
k˜0
y˜0
(ng∗)T − k˜0
y˜0
ψ(τs) [nφ(τs)]T Ω+
d˜0
y˜0
[
Ωψ(τs)[nφ(τs)]T −1
]
k˜0(ng∗)T − d˜0
y˜0
+Ωψ(τs) [nφ(τs)]T
d˜0− k˜0
y˜0︸ ︷︷ ︸
trend
The saving channel is the fourth part of flows decomposition:
w˜+ z˜k
y˜0
nT
[
g∗T (1+pi)
R∗−ng∗ −Ω
ψ(τs)φ(τs)T
R∗
∞
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
(1+pit)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
saving
Compared to the following form in the baseline case:
w˜+ z˜k
y˜0
(g∗n)T
[
(1+pi)
R∗−ng∗ −
ψ(τs)φ(τs)T
R∗
∞
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t
(1+pit)
]
which Gourinchas and Jeanne were able to rewrite as:
w˜+ z˜k
y˜0
ψ(τs)
R∗
[ng∗φ(τs)]T
T−1
∑
t=0
(
ng∗
R∗
)t [
φ(τs)t−T (1+pi)− (1+pit)
]
A.2.6 Extension 3: wage friction
The friction is introduced in a similar fashion as for the investment wedge:
(1− τw)wt = w∗
In the model, factor prices are competitive. The wage in efficiency units of labor is:
w˜ = (1−α)k˜∗α
Obviously, the investment wedge-implied level of capital is the only driver of differences in wages among
regions as identical values for labor share (1−α) have been assumed. The introduction of a wage friction
would take place after the computation of investment wedges.
The labor wedge would directly enter the HH’s BC.
(1− τk)wt + zt = ct +n(kt+1−dt+1)+R∗(dt − kt)− τsR∗(dt − kt)
The total revenues of the wedges per capita are
zt = τkwt + τkRtkt + τsR∗(kt −dt)
In the BC, focus on the terms involving τk/τs and use zt :
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zt − τkwt + τsR∗(dt − kt)
τkwt + τkRtkt + τsR∗(kt −dt)− τkwt + τsR∗(dt − kt)
τkRtkt
Thus, the transfers are not influenced by the labor wedge. The BC has the same form as before and we get
the same steady-state debt.
Wage frictions do not enter the Euler equation. They would only matter through the labor-leisure trade-off
but one would have to introduce leisure in addition to consumption in the utility function of HH.
The expression for consumption, the intertemporal BC and as consequent the channels are identical.
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Appendix B
Appendix to “A Provincial View of
Global Imbalances”
B.1 Data Appendix
B.1.1 Population
Chinese population data are a topic of their own. Two main problems are plaguing them: the
underreported birth numbers as a consequence of the one child policy (Scharping, 2001) and
the “largest (voluntary) migration in human history” (Chan, 2013). We tried to address the
second issue. Basically, three sources of population estimates exist. The Hukou Household
Registration System population data is reported by the Public Security Authorities.1 It can be
considered as a de jure statistic because it does not capture migration flows adequately. Typically,
richer coastal provinces have an underestimated population and hinterland provinces a too high
population (Chan and Wang, 2008). An alternative is the use of regular sample surveys of around
1% of the population and population censuses (1982, 1990, 2000 and 2010). They should better
approximate resident population but unfortunately, the time of the survey as well as the definition
of permanent residents and migrants is not always consistent over time. They are usually referred
to as de facto data.
The yearbooks population data often are a combination of the three sources that we have al-
ready mentioned. We carefully compared CDC data, recent yearbooks, sample surveys, censuses
and existing studies to at least avoid sudden jumps due to changes in definition and assemble our
own population time series. We tried to consider de facto data as much as possible, particularly
for provinces traditionally heavily influenced by migration.2 In the end, we are not primarily in-
terested in a precise estimation of the correct level of population per se but at least want to avoid
1The Hukou aims at limiting rural migration by restricting access to welfare goods and services for non-urban
residents such as health care, insurances or education (Chan, 2010)
2Central China as well as Chongqing and Sichuan have been the main outflow regions. Shanghai, Guangdong and
to a lesser extent other eastern provinces have been net recipients (Chan, 2013).
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potential jumps in net output per capita due to (frequent) changes in data reporting methodology.
B.1.2 Net output
Net output is computed using data on GDP, government consumption and investment from the
regional statistical yearbooks. The choice of the appropriate deflator(s) of the components of
net output is of great importance. No official explicit regional GDP deflator data are published.
Brandt et al. (2012) constructed regional GDP deflators but their sample stops in 2007 and does
not include all provinces. A nation-wide GDP deflator is available from the IMF (IFS). While
CPI (consumer price index) data are largely available and capture a relatively broad price de-
velopment, our model is expressed in terms of tradable goods. PPIs (producer price indices)
are limited to agricultural and industrial products and are not available across the board. In our
opinion, a natural proxy is RPI (retail price index) which, like CPI, has the advantage of being
broadly available.
The noisiness of the data and the large differences in economic structure among provinces
force us to be sophisticated in our deflating methodology. First, we choose among two main
types of deflators: RPI from official statistics and GDP from IFS (both using national values).
While RPI certainly is a good proxy for the price of tradable goods, it may be inappropriate for
more developed provinces (e.g. the ones that have a sectoral structure close to China). We base
our deflator choice on key macroeconomic indicators. Using regional data on provincial sectoral
GDP, we compile statistics on the average size of the primary, construction, industry and tertiary
sector relative to China and observe the correlation of these variables over time between regional
and national data. Furthermore, we construct our own index of economic specialization relative
to the national economy using the share of GDP arising from the four preceding sectors.
Regions very similar to China in terms of the size, correlation and economic concentration
of sectors are deflated using the official GDP deflator from IFS (half of regions) while highly
specialized provinces will be deflated with national RPI (other half of sample). The use of na-
tional deflators instead of regional ones is motivated by the fact that the use of the tradable good
as the numéraire implies that inflation in that good should be similar inside China. Furthermore,
no regional off-the-shelf GDP deflator is available.3 At last, we use the (noisy) RPI regional data
in our indicator for internal price.
If investment has been a major driver of variations in Chinese output over the last decades,
this is even more the case on the regional level, particularly for less developed regions in the
West. We gather descriptive statistics on investment to output ratio. When necessary (for instance
when large shocks in investment and/or a very high level are observed), we deflate investment
3By using agriculture, industrial and service (or consumer) price indices, one could deflate the production approach
GDP components separately. We refrain from it for two reasons. First, we use expenditure approach GDP data as we
are interested in net exports dynamics. Second, numerous data issues strongly distort regional structural indicators
(see Brandt and Zhu (2010) for more).
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with regional PIFA (price of investment in fixed asset), starting as soon as data become available
(1992).
We thus end up with 4 different deflators for the three components of net output: national
GDP (3 provinces), national RPI (4), national GDP with regional PIFA for investment (12) and
national RPI with regional PIFA for investment (11). The provincial deflators are available on
Table 4.4.
B.1.3 Net exports
Net exports (i.e. external surplus or deficit) correspond to the regional difference between saving
and investment. Note that this indicator includes international and interprovincial flows in goods
and services. In the second chapter, we showed that large discrepancies in regional external
balances exist in China. As most provinces have near neutral or positive international trade
balance, a substantial part of theses cross-sectional differences stems from interregional capital
flows. Unfortunately, we were unable to include income and current transfers to extend the
analysis to the current account level.4
For regions having a considerable share of migrant workers in their labor force, we would
expect a high share of household remittances to lower their current account and increase it in hin-
terland provinces. Another important pattern is certainly linked to the capital outflows generated
by the returns on FDI of foreign firms. Here again, well-integrated coastal provinces certainly
have a lower true current account than we may think by using net exports. The potential large
transfers between government and/or state-owned enterprises among provinces are another issue.
One would expect them to raise the current account of less developed provinces. At last, it could
well be that Zhang’s argument that overreporting (underreporting) of exports (imports) has mag-
nified national net exports statistics affects more surplus provinces with a large share of foreign
and private firms (i.e. the East Coast and the Metropolises).
B.1.4 Domestic interest rate
The relevant domestic nominal interest rate is computed using the mean of the official deposit
and lending rate from the People’s Bank of China (IFS, May 2012 CD).5 The expected common
inflation (in terms of tradable goods) is proxied with national RPI (retail price index) inflation of
the preceding period. Note that regional inflation in RPI is used in the internal price indicator.
4By comparison, for China as a whole, trade and services capture most of the current account dynamics. Over the
last decades, income flows have been slightly negative with the exception of 2007 and 2008. Current transfers have
been more sizeable and stabilized at a positive level since the mid-2000s. Still, they only amount to 15% of the trade
balance between 2005 and 2010 on average.
5The PBC fixes an upper bound for deposit rate and a lower bound for lending rate. Both time series are highly
correlated.
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B.1.5 International interest rate
The nominal world interest rate is proxied with the yearly average of the Federal Reserve Board
3-Months Treasury Bill. Ex-post changes in exchange rate are proxied by the next period growth
rate of the nominal effective exchange rate index (IFS, May 2012 CD). The extent to which
regions are sensitive to the world interest rate is varying depending on their level of integration
with the world economy. This parameter (δ ) is integrated in the grid-search procedure.
B.1.6 Internal price
Numerous possibilities arise for computing a regional relative price index of non-tradable rel-
ative to tradable goods (∆qt+1 = (1−α)∆pt+1 ). For the regional share of non-tradables in
consumption expenditure (1−α), we use data from the urban and rural Household Survey avail-
able from 1993 to 2010. We define tradables as expenditures on food and clothes while non-
tradables is composed of healthcare, transport/communication, education/culture as well as res-
idence/housing. As household surveys expenditure data are separated between urban and rural
population, we take the average of both shares in non-tradables weighted by regional urbaniza-
tion rate.6 We end up with regional shares of non-tradables between 0.32 and 0.45.7 For the price
of tradable goods (i.e. the denominator of p), we take regional RPI (retail price index) data.
Approximating the price of non-tradable goods (the numerator of p) is more challenging.
To get a complete time series over the period, we combine different sources according to data
availability and scope. For 1984, we use regional CPI. From 1985 to 1999, we use SPI (services
price index) as we expect it to capture non-tradable expenditures better than CPI. The initial
years are exclusively urban observations (1985-1988) while the rest (1989-1999) is available
at the provincial level. Unfortunately, SPI stopped to be computed in the 2000s. We use data
on regional CPI categories to construct a non-tradable CPI index from 2000 to 2010 using the
relative mean expenditure weight of each category over urban and rural data.8
Against a backdrop of financial repression, the progressive liberalization of the housing mar-
ket in the 2000s led to a fast growth in real estate prices. Household quickly redirected their
savings towards housing and the ownership rate increased substantially. Unfortunately, hous-
ing price is not included directly in Chinese CPI but in fixed capital formation (Lijuan, 2010).
Rents, interest rates of housing loans and maintenance costs are considered but they certainly
miss the bulk of the dynamics. To correct for that, we integrate the regional average selling price
6For urbanization, we use Shen (2006), data from the Statistical Yearbooks and interpolated assuming constant
growth rates.
7The rapid increase in the expenditure share on non-tradable goods is a stylized fact of the reform period. While
our model does not allow for a time-varying 1−α , the fact that we only consider later reform years (1993-2010)
because of data availability issues means that our value is already relatively high. Furthermore, the upward trend is
very similar among provinces.
8For China, CPI on health expenditures would enter with a weight of 16%, transport/communication with 28%,
education/culture 23% and residence/housing 33%. In the tradables, food (82%) has a higher weight than clothing
(18%).
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of housing per square meter in the CPI of non-tradables from 2000 to 2010. We replace the cor-
responding category of CPI (residence/housing) with the housing price index but keep its relative
weight unchanged.9
On average, our indicator of relative prices more than tripled between 1984 and 2010. While
variations were low in the 1980s, the increase was most pronounced in the 1990s and continued
on a somewhat lower trend in the 2000s.
9Besides being available for a relative long period (1999-2010), the average selling price contains residential and
business transactions. It should thus be representative of the price patterns prevailing on the housing market.
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B.2 Mathematical Appendix
B.2.1 Bergin and Sheffrin model
B.2.1.1 The maximization problem and its solution (Bergin and Sheffrin, 2000)
The representative consumer maximizes ∑∞t=0β tE0U(CNt ,CTt). The relevant variable is a consumption
bundle C∗t = CαTtC
1−α
Nt with CRRA utility function C
∗(1−γ)
t /(1− γ). Remember that this kind of utility
function implies an elasticity of (1−γ). Thus it is isoelastic: a relative change in consumption is linked to
the same relative change in utility. By using the standard measure of risk aversion −CU ′′(C)/U ′(C), one
can see that it is constant and equal to γ . The higher γ , the more risk averse you are. The intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is given by −U ′(C)/(CU ′′(C)) for the typical Euler equation. It is equal to the
inverse of the coefficient of risk aversion (i.e. 1/γ). The higher it is, the more one is willing to let his
consumption react to a change in interest rate.
The traded good is the numeraire. Thus, Pt = PN/PT and PT can be normalized to 1 wlog. The budget
constraint is Yt + rwt Bt−1 = Bt −Bt−1+Ct +Gt + It where B is the stock of foreign assets at the beginning
of the period. The current account can be written in the following way:
Yt −Gt − It −Ct = Bt − (1+ rwt )Bt−1
NOt −Ct = Bt −Bt−1− rwt Bt−1
∆Bt =CAt = NOt −Ct + rwt Bt−1
In a first step, we solve the standard problem by using the BC expressed in tradable goods. The value of
consumption in terms of tradables is Ct =CTt +PtCNt .
L = β
(
CαTtC
1−α
Nt
)
1− γ
1−γ
+βλt (Yt +(1+ rwt )Bt−1−Bt −CTt −PtCNt − It −Gt)
∂L
∂CTt
⇒ (CαTtC1−αNt )−γαCα−1Tt C1−αNt = λt
∂L
∂CNt
⇒ (CαTtC1−αNt )−γCαTt(1−α)C−αNt = λtPt
With optimality condition
Pt =
PNt
PTt
=
1−α
α
CTt
CNt
The intratemporal elasticity of subsitution between tradable and non-tradable goods is constant and equal
to 1. Remember that the elasticity can be written using
d log(x)
dx
=
1
x
ε =
d log(x)
d log(y)
=
dx/x
dy/y
Rearrange the result and take dlog:
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CTt
CNt
=
α
1−α
PNt
PTt
d log(CTt/CNt) = d log(α/1−α)+d log(PNt/PTt)
d log(CTt/CNt)
d log(PNt/PTt)
= 1
Note that relative demand will only depend on relative prices, not income.
The next step is to compute the demand functions. Use CTt = Ct −PtCNt and CNt = (Ct −CTt)/Pt in
the preceding optimality condition to get them. First, find the optimal CN :
Pt =
1−α
α
Ct −PtCNt
CNt
PtCNt =
1−α
α
(Ct −PtCNt)
1−α
α
Ct = PtCNt +
1−α
α
PtCNt
1−α
α
Ct = PtCNt
(
1+
1−α
α
)
CNt = (1−α)CtPt
and the optimal CT :
Pt =
1−α
α
CTt
(Ct −CTt)/Pt
CtPt −CTtPt = 1−αα CTtPt
PtCt =
1−α
α
CTtPt +PtCTt
PtCt = PtCTt(
1−α
α
+1)
CTt = αCt
These expressions can be used in the consumption bundle C∗t :
C∗t = C
α
TtC
(1−α)
Nt
= (αCt)α
(
(1−α)Ct
Pt
)1−α
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Now the Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) trick is used: define P∗t as the price index of aggregate consumption
C∗t that minimizes consumption expenditure Ct given Pt :
C∗t = (αP
∗
t C
∗
t )
α((1−α)P
∗
t C
∗
t
Pt
)1−α
C∗t = α
αP∗αt C
∗α
t (1−α)1−α
P∗1−αt C∗1−αt
P1−αt
P∗t = P
1−α
t α
−α(1−α)−(1−α)
It is now possible to rewrite the maximization problem using the consumption bundle C∗t :
L = β t
C∗t
1− γ
1−γ
+β tλt(Yt +Bt−1(1+ rwt )−Bt −P∗t C∗t − It −Gt)
∂L
∂C∗t
⇒ C∗−γt = λtP∗t
λt =
C∗−γt
P∗t
λt+1 =
C∗−γt+1
P∗t+1
∂L
∂Bt
⇒ β t+1λt+1(1+ rwt+1) = β tλt
β
C∗−γt+1
P∗t+1
(1+ rwt+1) =
C∗−γt
P∗t
Et
[
β (1+ rwt+1)
P∗t
P∗t+1
(
C∗t
C∗t+1
)γ
]
= 1 (B.1)
The expressions for C∗t and P∗t from before are used to transform the Euler back.
(
C∗t
C∗t+1
)γ =
(αCt)αγ
(
(1−α)CtPt
)(1−α)γ
(αCt+1)αγ
(
(1−α)Ct+1Pt+1
)(1−α)γ
=
ααγCαγt (1−α)(γ−γα)(Ct/Pt)(γ−γα)
ααγCαγt+1(1−α)(γ−γα)(Ct+1/Pt+1)(γ−γα)
= (
Ct
Ct+1
)αγ(
Pt+1
Pt
)
(γ−γα)C(γ−γα)t
C(γ−γα)t+1
= (
Ct
Ct+1
)γ(
Pt+1
Pt
)(γ−γα)
P∗t
P∗t+1
=
P1−αt α−α(1−α)−(1−α)
P1−αt+1 α−α(1−α)−(1−α)
= (
Pt
Pt+1
)1−α
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Use them in Euler:
Et
[
β (1+ rwt+1)(
Pt
Pt+1
)1−α
(
Pt+1
Pt
)γ(1−α)
(
Ct
Ct+1
)γ
]
= 1
Et
[
β (1+ rwt+1)(
Ct
Ct+1
)γ
(
Pt
Pt+1
)(1−α)(1−γ)]
= 1 (B.2)
From that point on, some assumptions concerning the distribution are made. Remember that if X is a
random variable with normal distribution, then exp(X) = Y has a log-normal distribution (if Y is log-
normal, then X = log(Y ) is normally distributed).
The first and second moments are:
E(Y ) = exp(µ+
1
2
σ2)
Var(Y ) = (eσ
2 −1)e2µ+σ2
Now assume that the entire Euler, say Yt , is jointly log normal distributed. Variance and covariance
between them are not time-varying. Thus, log(Yt) has a normal distribution with moments µ and σ2. For
the variance part, use var(αx+βy) = α2σx+β 2σy+αβ2cov(x,y):
µ = Et(log(Yt))
= log(β )+Et(rwt+1)− γEt(∆ct+1)− (1− γ)(1−α)Et(∆pt+1)
σ2 = var(log(Yt))
= var(rwt+1)+ γ
2var(∆ct+1)+(1− γ)2(1−α)2var(∆pt+1)
−2γcov(rwt+1,∆ct+1)−2(1− γ)(1−α)cov(rwt+1,∆pt+1)
+2γ(1− γ)(1−α)cov(∆ct+1,∆pt+1)
= σ2r + γ
2σ2c +(1− γ)2(1−α)2σ2p −2γσr,c−2(1− γ)(1−α)σr,p
+2γ(1− γ)(1−α)σc,p
At this point one gets the expectation of Yt as:
E(Yt) = exp(µ+
1
2
σ2) = 1
Take log on both sides and rearrange:
0 = µ+0.5σ2
= log(β )+Et(rwt+1)− γEt(∆ct+1)− (1− γ)(1−α)Et(∆pt+1)
+0.5σ2r +0.5γ
2σ2c +0.5(1− γ)2(1−α)2σ2p − γσr,c− (1− γ)(1−α)σr,p
+γ(1− γ)(1−α)σc,p
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Put γEt(∆ct+1) on the left-hand side and divide by γ:
Et(∆ct+1) =
1
γ
log(β )+
1
γ
Et(rwt+1)−
1
γ
(1− γ)(1−α)Et(∆pt+1)
+
0.5
γ
σ2r +0.5γσ
2
c +
0.5
γ
(1− γ)2(1−α)2σ2p −σr,c−
(1− γ)
γ
(1−α)σr,p
+(1− γ)(1−α)σc,p
Use 1/γ = η , noting that (1− γ)/γ = (η − 1) and (1− γ)2/γ = (1− 1/η)2/(1/η) = ((η − 1)/η)2η =
(η−1)2/η :
Et(∆ct+1) = η log(β )+ηEt(rwt+1)− (η−1)(1−α)Et(∆pt+1)
+0.5ησ2r +0.5
1
η
σ2c +0.5
(η−1)2
η
(1−α)2σ2p −σr,c− (η−1)(1−α)σr,p
+
(η−1)
η
(1−α)σc,p
Rearrange somewhat by taking the r and p terms to the front:
Et(∆ct+1) = η(Et(rwt+1)−
η−1
η
(1−α)Et(∆pt+1))
+η log(β )+0.5ησ2r +0.5
1
η
σ2c +0.5
(η−1)2
η
(1−α)2σ2p
−σr,c− (η−1)(1−α)σr,p+ (η−1)η (1−α)σc,p
= η(Et(rwt+1)+
1−η
η
(1−α)Et(∆pt+1))+ const
The variance and covariance parts can be gathered in a time-invariant constant. Define the consumption-
based real interest rate as r∗t+1 = r
w
t+1+
1−η
η (1−α)∆pt+1 to get:
Et(∆ct+1) = ηEt(r∗t+1)+ const
= ηEt
[
rwt+1+
1−η
η
(1−α)∆pt+1
]
+ const
The variable r∗t reflects both the normal interest rate (rw) and the change in relative price of non-traded
goods (∆p). The optimal consumption profile is thus influenced by the world interest rate and the changes
in relative price of goods. There are three effects: intertemporal effect 1, intratemporal effect and intertem-
poral effect 2.
• Intertemporal effect 1: if the world interest rate is higher, the consumption-based real interest rate
is higher as well. As a consequence, consumption today is lower and future consumption higher.
Intuition: current consumption is more expensive in terms of future one, the agent substitute with
elasticity η = 1/γ and save more (intertemporal elasticity of substitution).
Assume the price of non-tradables is temporarily low (at t) and expected to rise relative to tradables (at
176
t +1) or Et(∆pt+1)> 0 as Pt = PN/PT . We have (1−η)(1−α)∆pt+1. Now the effect depends on 1−η
being positive or negative. Assume that η = 1/γ < 1, as it is often the case in macro (i.e. with coefficients
of relative risk aversion bigger than one). In this case, we have that (1−η)(1−α)∆pt+1 is positive. The
term Et(∆ct+1) has to be higher. Consumption today is lower relative to future consumption. Intuition: the
consumption-based real interest rate rises above the world interest rate, supplementary incentive to save
because of expected increase in price of non-tradables. Let’s look under the hood:
• Intratemporal effect: intra elasticity is unity and the effect is 1× (1−α). This effect tends to push
the consumption-based real interest rate up compared to world interest rate (incentive to save).
Intuition: PT is high today relative to PN . Remember the value of consumption in terms of tradables
is Ct =CTt +
PN
PT
CNt . As a result, total current consumption expenditures are lower by the share of
non-tradables in the consumption bundle (1−α).
• Intertemporal effect 2: it is−η(1−α)=−(1/γ)(1−α). This effect tends to push the consumption-
based real interest rate down compared to world interest rate (incentive to save less). If PT is high
today and low tomorrow (i.e. PN low today and high tomorrow, Et(∆pt+1) > 0), the repayment of
a loan taken today in traded goods is high. A loan in traded goods will thus cost a lot. A loan in
terms of the consumption bundle costs less in value because PNPT is low and the non-tradable part is
thus less expensive in terms of tradables. The future repayment has thus a lower cost in terms of the
consumption bundle than in terms of the tradables. Current consumption is thus higher and saving
lower.
In our case, as η = 1/γ < 1, the intratemporal effect dominates the intertemporal effect 2 and HH save
more if PN is expected to rise. In conclusion, one sees that borrowing and lending using the world interest
rate has to be thought of in terms of the price of tradable goods while using the consumption-based real
interest rate has to be thought of in terms of the price of the consumption bundle.
If η = 1/γ > 1, (1−η)(1−α)∆pt+1 becomes negative. Et(∆ct+1) has to be lower, consumption
today is higher relative to future consumption. The consumption-based real interest rate is below the
world interest rate. It makes people save less.
B.2.1.2 Saving wedge extension
Follow the same steps as in the original paper but introduce a saving wedge:
1+ rTt = (1+ r
w
t )(1− τst )
The budget constraint is:
Yt +(1+ rTt )Bt−1 = Bt +Ct +Gt + It
Yt +(1+ rwt )(1− τst )Bt−1 = Bt +Ct +Gt + It
Using (1+ rwt )(1− τst ) = 1− τst + rwt − rwt τst , we get that the current accout is:
∆Bt =CAt = NOt −Ct +[rwt (1− τst )− τst ]Bt−1
The solution of the maximization problem is identical to the baseline case:
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Pt =
PNt
PTt
=
1−α
α
CTt
CNt
The demand functions are identical as well:
CNt = (1−α)CtPt
CTt = αCt
As before, these expressions can be used in the consumption bundle C∗t :
C∗t = C
α
TtC
(1−α)
Nt
= (αCt)α
(
(1−α)Ct
Pt
)1−α
The price of aggregate consumption is the same as before:
P∗t = P
1−α
t α
−α(1−α)−(1−α)
It is now possible to rewrite the maximization problem using the consumption bundle C∗t and find the new
Euler:
Et
[
β (1+ rwt+1)(1− τst+1)
P∗t
P∗t+1
(
C∗t
C∗t+1
)γ
]
= 1
Transform Euler back:
Et
[
β (1+ rwt+1)(1− τst+1)(
Ct
Ct+1
)γ
(
Pt
Pt+1
)(1−α)(1−γ)]
= 1
In the steps following the log normal distribution assumption, the wedge behaves like rw but with opposite
sign cause log(1− x)≈−x. We end up with:
Et(∆ct+1) = η(Et(rwt+1)−Et(τst )+
1−η
η
(1−α)Et(∆pt+1))+ const
Define the consumption-based real interest rate (with wedge) as r∗t+1 = r
w
t+1− τst + 1−ηη (1−α)∆pt+1 to
get:
Et(∆ct+1) = ηEt(r∗t+1)+ const
= ηEt
[
rwt+1− τst +
1−η
η
(1−α)∆pt+1
]
+ const
If the saving wedge is positive, the consumption-based real interest rate is lower than the world interest
rate, Et(∆ct+1) has to be lower, consumption today is higher relative to future consumption, people save
less. It acts like a tax on savings.
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B.2.1.3 Alternative derivation of Bergin and Sheffrin (2000)10
The maximization problem for the representative household is
max
∞
∑
t=0
β tE0U(CT,t ,CN,t), s.t.
Yt −CT,t −QtCN,t − It −Gt + rtBt−1 = Bt −Bt−1,∀t
With U(CT,t ,CN,t) = 11−γ
(
CaT,tC
1−a
N,t
)1−γ
.
Note that prices are in terms of tradables (Qt = PN/PT ).
Define an aggregate consumption index:
Ct =CaT,tC
1−a
N,t
First, the cost of consuming a certain amount of Ct is minimized:
minCT,t +QtCN,t s.t.
CaT,tC
1−a
N,t =Ct
The Lagrangian is
L=CT,t +QtCN,t +λt(Ct −CaT,tC1−aN,t )
The first-order conditions with respect to CT , CN and λ are
1−λtaCa−1T,t C1−aN,t = 0
Qt −λt(1−a)CaT,tC−aN,t = 0
Ct −CaT,tC1−aN,t = 0
Find λ with the first equation:
λt =
1
a
C1−aT,t C
a−1
N,t
Plug it in the second one:
Qt = λt(1−a)CaT,tC−aN,t
=
1−a
a
CT,tC−1N,t
1
Qt
=
a
1−a
CN,t
CT,t
10We are thankful to Alexander Rathke for suggesting us that approach.
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Take first FOC and expand with CT to simplify the expression using the definition of the consumption
index and get the demand equation for tradable goods:
1
λt
= aCa−1T,t C
1−a
N,t
CT,t
CT,t
1
λt
= a
Ct
CT,t
CT,t = a
(
1
λt
)−1
Ct
In the same spirit, take second FOC and expand with CN to get the demand for non-tradable goods:
Qt = λt(1−a)CaT,tC−aN,t
CN,t
CN,t
= λt(1−a)CtC−1N,t
CN,t = (1−a)
(
Qt
λt
)−1
Ct
Plug both demands into the definition of Ct and get the shadow price:
Ct =CaT,tC
1−a
N,t
Ct =
(
a
(
1
λt
)−1
Ct
)a(
(1−a)
(
Qt
λt
)−1
Ct
)1−a
Ct = aa
(
1
λt
)−a
Cat (1−a)1−a
(
Qt
λt
)−(1−a)
C1−at
1 = aaλ at (1−a)1−aQ−(1−a)t λ (1−a)t
λt = a−a(1−a)−(1−a)Q(1−a)t
= Pt
Get consumption expenditures in terms of traded goods using both demands and Pt for λt :
CT,t +QtCN,t =
a
(
1
Pt
)−1
Ct +Qt(1−a)
(
Qt
Pt
)−1
Ct = PtCt
Now we can solve the maximization problem directly using the consumption bundle. Maximize with
respect to consumption and bonds:
max E0
∞
∑
t=0
β t
1
1− γC
1−γ
t ,
s.t.
Yt −PtCt − It −Gt + rtBt−1 = Bt −Bt−1,∀t
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L = β t
(
1
1− γC
1−γ
t +Λt(Yt −PtCt − It −Gt +(1+ rt)Bt−1−Bt)
)
FOC with respect to Ct and Bt :
C−γt −ΛtPt = 0
−β tΛt +β t+1Et(1+ rt+1)Λt+1 = 0
Rearrange:
Λt =
C−γt
Pt
βEt(1+ rt+1)
Λt+1
Λt
= 1
Use expression of first equation in second one:
βEt(1+ rt+1)
C−γt+1/Pt+1
C−γt /Pt
= 1
βEt(1+ rt+1)
Cγt
Cγt+1
Pt
Pt+1
= 1 (B.3)
Note that this equation is similar to equation (B.1) with a different notation (i.e. C = C∗ and P = P∗).
Rewriting it in expanding with Pt and Pt+1 (C ratio part) and use preceding result for P (P ratio part). In
terms of consumption expenditure Ct and the real exchange rate defined as the price of non-tradables in
terms of tradables, one finds:
βEt(1+ rt+1)
(PtCt)γP
γ
t+1
(Pt+1Ct+1)γP
γ
t
a−a(1−a)−(1−a)Q(1−a)t
a−a(1−a)−(1−a)Q(1−a)t+1
= 1
Use the expression for P again:
βEt(1+ rt+1)
(PtCt)γ(a−a(1−a)−(1−a)Q(1−a)t+1 )γ
(Pt+1Ct+1)γ(a−a(1−a)−(1−a)Q(1−a)t )γ
Q(1−a)t
Q(1−a)t+1
= 1
βEt(1+ rt+1)
(PtCt)γQ
γ(1−a)
t+1
(Pt+1Ct+1)γQ
γ(1−a)
t
Q(1−a)t
Q(1−a)t+1
= 1
βEt(1+ rt+1)
(PtCt)γ
(Pt+1Ct+1)γ
Q(1−a)−γ(1−a)t
Q(1−a)−γ(1−a)t+1
= 1
βEt(1+ rt+1)
(PtCt)γ
(Pt+1Ct+1)γ
Q(1−a)(1−γ)t
Q(1−a)(1−γ)t+1
= 1
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Assuming C˜t = PtCt , the intertemporal Euler equation is
Et
[
β
(1+ rt+1)C˜
−γ
t+1
C˜−γt
Qt
Qt+1
(1−γ)(1−a)
]
= 1 (B.4)
It corresponds to equation (B.2), albeit with a different notation (i.e. C˜ = C and Q = P). Assume that
Xt = β
(1+rt+1)C˜
−γ
t+1
C˜−γt
Qt
Qt+1
(1−γ)(1−a)
is jointly log normal distributed.
We know that
Et(Xt) = Et
[
β
(1+ rt+1)C˜
−γ
t+1
C˜−γt
Qt
Qt+1
(1−γ)(1−a)
]
= 1
and log(Xt) = rt+1+ logβ − γ∆c˜t+1− (1− γ)(1−a)∆qt+1 has a normal distribution with expected value
Et (log(Xt)) = Et(rt+1)+ log(β )− γEt (∆c˜t+1)− (1− γ)(1−a)Et (∆qt+1)
where ∆c˜t+1 = logC˜t+1− logC˜t and ∆qt+1 = logQt+1− logQt .
The Variance is
Var(log(Xt)) =Var(rt+1)+ γ2Var(∆c˜t+1)+(1− γ)2(1−a)2Var(∆qt+1)
−2γCov(rt+1,∆c˜t+1)−2(1− γ)(1−a)Cov(rt+1,∆qt+1)
+2γ(1− γ)(1−a)Cov(∆c˜t+1,∆qt+1)
=σ2r + γ
2σ2c +(1− γ)2(1−a)2σ2q
−2γσr,c−2(1− γ)(1−a)σr,q+2γ(1− γ)(1−a)σc,q
Remember the first moment of a log normal distribution is exp
(
µ+0.5σ2
)
.
Start with
exp(Et(logXt)+0.5Var(logXt)) = 1
or
0 = Et(logXt)+0.5Var(logXt)
0 = Et (rt+1)+ log(β )− γEt (∆c˜t+1)− (1− γ)(1−a)Et (∆qt+1)+
0.5(σ2r + γ
2σ2c +(1− γ)2(1−a)2σ2q )+
0.5(−2γσr,c−2(1− γ)(1−a)σr,q+2γ(1− γ)(1−a)σc,q)
γEt (∆c˜t+1) = Et (rt+1)+ log(β )− (1− γ)(1−a)Et (∆qt+1)+
0.5(σ2r + γ
2σ2c +(1− γ)2(1−a)2σ2q )+
0.5(−2γσr,c−2(1− γ)(1−a)σr,q+2γ(1− γ)(1−a)σc,q)
Et (∆c˜t+1) = (1/γ)Et (rt+1)+ log(β )/γ− ((1− γ)(1−a)/γ)Et (∆qt+1)+
0.5(σ2r /γ+ γσ
2
c +
(
(1− γ)2(1−a)2/γ)σ2q )
0.5(−2σr,c− (2(1− γ)(1−a)/γ)σr,q+2(1− γ)(1−a)σc,q)
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Now η = 1/γ , note that 1−γγ =
1−1/η
1/η = η−1 and (1−γ)
2
γ =
(
η−1
η
)2
η = (η−1)
2
η :
Et (∆c˜t+1) = ηEt (rt+1)+η log(β )− (η−1)(1−a)Et (∆qt+1)+
0.5(ησ2r +
σ2c
η
+
(η−1)2
η
(1−a)2σ2q )+
0.5(−2σr,c−2(η−1)(1−a)σr,q+2 (η−1)η (1−a)σc,q)
Rearrange
Et (∆c˜t+1) = η [Et (rt+1)+
1−η
η
(1−a)Et∆qt+1]+
+η [logβ +0.5(σ2r +
σ2c
η2
+
(η−1)2
η2
(1−a)2σ2q )]+
0.5η [− 2
η
σr,c−2 (η−1)η (1−a)σr,q+2
(η−1)
η2
(1−a)σc,q]
Et(∆c˜t+1) = ηEt
(
rt+1+
1−η
η
(1−a)∆qt+1
)
+ const
which is exactly the result obtained in the original paper (remember ∆q stands for relative prices ∆p and
∆c˜ corresponds to ∆c in original paper).
One can get this result by log-linearizing around the steady-state. That’s the methodology that we use later
for the CES case (I) in Section B.2.1.4. Start with the Euler equation (B.3) and use 1+ rt+1 = Rt+1:
Et
[
Rt+1
Cγt
Cγt+1
Pt
Pt+1
]
= 1/β
Et
[
Rt+1
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ (Pt+1
Pt
)−1]
= 1/β
In SS it is:
R¯(
C¯
C¯
)γ
P¯
P¯
=
1
β
R¯ =
1
β
Remember:
xˆ
∂ f (x¯, y¯)
∂ x¯
x¯+ yˆ
∂ f (x¯, y¯)
∂ y¯
y¯≈ 0
Log-linearizing around the steady-state:
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Et
[
Rt+1C
−γ
t+1C
γ
t P
−1
t+1Pt
]
= 1/β
Et
[
Rˆt+1R¯C¯−γC¯γ P¯−1P¯+Cˆt+1C¯(−γ)C¯−γ−1C¯γ P¯−1P¯R¯+CˆtC¯γC¯γ−1C¯−γ P¯−1P¯R¯
]
+
Pˆt+1P¯(−1)P¯−2P¯R¯C¯−γC¯γ + Pˆt P¯P¯−1R¯C¯−γC¯γ ≈ 0
Et
[
Rˆt+1R¯− γCˆt+1R¯+ γCˆt R¯− Pˆt+1R¯+ Pˆt R¯
] ≈ 0
Et
[
Rˆt+1− γ(Cˆt+1−Cˆt)− (Pˆt+1− Pˆt)
]≈ 0
Remember that Xˆt = log(Xt)− log(X¯) = log(Xt/X¯)≈ Xt−X¯X¯ = dXtX .
Note that Rˆt+1 = (Rt+1− R¯) = (1+ rt+1)− (1+ r¯) = rt+1− r¯. Use it:
Et [rt+1− r¯− γ∆ct+1−∆pt+1] ≈ 0
Et (∆ct+1) ≈ 1γ Et (rt+1)−
1
γ
Et (∆pt+1)− 1γ r¯
So the only difference between a standard log-linearization and Bergin and Sheffrin is the constant. Ignore
it and use 1γ = η :
Et (∆ct+1) = ηEt (rt+1)−ηEt (∆pt+1)
Linearize the consumption price inflation PtPt−1 =
a−a(1−a)−(1−a)Q(1−a)t
a−a(1−a)−(1−a)Q(1−a)t−1
by taking logs:
Pt
Pt−1
=
(
Qt
Qt−1
)1−α
∆pt = (1−a)∆qt
Alternatively, could log-linearize the former expression:
PtP−1t−1 = Q
1−α
t Q
α−1
t−1
Pˆt P¯P¯−1+ Pˆt−1P¯(−1)P¯−2P¯ ≈ QˆtQ¯(1−α)Q¯−α Q¯α−1+ Qˆt−1Q¯(α−1)Q¯α−2Q¯1−α
Pˆt − Pˆt−1 ≈ (1−α)(Qˆt − Qˆt−1)
∆Pˆt ≈ (1−α)∆Qˆt
Remember that Pˆt = log(Pt)− log(P¯) = log(Pt/P¯)≈ Pt−P¯P¯ = dPtP .
Use this definition results in:
log(Pt)− log(P¯)− (log(Pt−1)− log(P¯)) ≈ (1−α)
[
log(Qt)− log(Q¯)− (log(Qt−1)− log(Q¯))
]
∆pt ≈ (1−α)∆qt
Remember the definition of consumption expenditure and take logs:
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C˜t = PtCt
c˜t = pt + ct
∆c˜t = ∆pt +∆ct
∆c˜t+1 = ∆pt+1+∆ct+1
Again, as we take the first difference log-linearizing would be equivalent. The steady-state is:
¯˜C = P¯C¯
The log-linearization is:
ˆ˜Ct ¯˜C ≈ Pˆt P¯C¯+CˆtC¯P¯
ˆ˜Ct ≈ Pˆt +Cˆt
logC˜t − log ¯˜C ≈ logPt − log P¯+ logCt − logC¯
Now by taking the first difference for period t+1 one gets:
∆ ˆ˜Ct+1 ≈ ∆Pˆt+1+∆Cˆt+1
∆c˜t+1 ≈ ∆pt+1+∆ct+1
Rewriting the linear Euler equation in terms of consumption expenditure ∆ct+1 = ∆c˜t+1−∆pt+1:
Et (∆ct+1) = ηEt (rt+1)−ηEt (∆pt+1)− 1γ r¯
Et (∆c˜t+1)−Et (∆pt+1) = ηEt (rt+1)−ηEt (∆pt+1)+ const
Et (∆c˜t+1) = ηEt (rt+1)− (η−1)Et (∆pt+1)+ const
Use the log-linearized price inflation equation ∆pt = (1−α)∆qt :
Et (∆c˜t+1) = ηEt (rt+1)− (η−1)(1−a)Et (∆qt+1)+ const
= η
[
Et (rt+1)+
(1−η)
η
(1−a)Et (∆qt+1)
]
+ const
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B.2.1.4 The CES case (I)11
Now assume a CES aggregator. Again, the household will minimize the cost of buying a certain level of
the composite consumption index Ct :
min
CTt ,C
N
t
CTt +QtC
N
t
s.t.
Ct = [(1−α) 1θ (CTt )
θ−1
θ +α
1
θ (CNt )
θ−1
θ ]
θ
θ−1 .
As before prices are in terms of tradables (Qt = PN/PT ). Note that now α is the expenditure share of
non-tradable goods whereas, before, it was the share of tradable goods. The intratemporal elasticity of
substitution is θ . The coefficient of relative risk aversion is γ and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
is η = 1/γ .
The first-order conditions with respect to tradables and non-tradables are:
1−ψt [(1−α) 1θ (CTt )
θ−1
θ +α
1
θ (CNt )
θ−1
θ ]
1
θ−1 (1−α) 1θ CTt −
1
θ = 0,
Qt −ψt [(1−α) 1θ (CTt )
θ−1
θ +α
1
θ (CNt )
θ−1
θ ]
1
θ−1α
1
θ CNt
− 1θ = 0,
where ψt is the Lagrange multiplier of the minimization problem.
Define Xt = [(1−α) 1θ (CTt )
θ−1
θ +α
1
θ (CNt )
θ−1
θ ]
1
θ−1 and rewrite both FOCs:
1 = ψtXt(1−α) 1θ CTt −
1
θ
Qt = ψtXtα
1
θ CNt
− 1θ
From first one, get that:
ψt = X−1t (1−α)−
1
θ C
T 1θ
t
Plug in the second FOC:
Qt =
(
α
1−α
) 1
θ
(
CTt
CNt
) 1
θ
CTt
CNt
=
1−α
α
(
1
Qt
)−θ
The demand functions for CTt and C
N
t can be derived from the first-order conditions. Note that X
θ
t =Ct .
Take first FOC at the power of θ and use definition of Ct :
11We are thankful to Alexander Rathke for suggesting us that approach.
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1 = ψθt X
θ
t (1−α)CT−1t
1 = ψθt Ct(1−α)CT−1t
CTt = (1−α)
(
1
ψt
)−θ
Ct
Do same with second FOC:
Qθt = ψ
θ
t X
θ
t αC
N−1
t
Qθt = ψ
θ
t CtαC
N−1
t
CNt = α
(
Qt
ψt
)−θ
Ct
Plugging into the definition of the consumption index (Ct ) and get the shadow price:
Ct =
(1−α) 1θ ((1−α)( 1
ψt
)−θ
Ct
) θ−1
θ
+α
1
θ
(
α
(
Qt
ψt
)−θ
Ct
) θ−1
θ

θ
θ−1
C
θ−1
θ
t = (1−α)
1
θ (1−α) θ−1θ ψθ−1t C
θ−1
θ
t +α
1
θ α
θ−1
θ Q1−θt ψ
θ−1
t C
θ−1
θ
t
1 = (1−α)ψθ−1t +αQ1−θt ψθ−1t
ψ1−θt = (1−α)+αQ1−θt
ψt =
(
(1−α)+αQ1−θt
) 1
1−θ
≡ Pt
Using ψt = Pt , optimal behavior also implies that minimum expenditures for Ct are given as
CTt +QtC
N
t = (1−α)
(
1
Pt
)−θ
Ct +Qtα
(
Qt
Pt
)−θ
Ct
Ct((1−α)+αQ1−θt )Pθt
CtP1−θt P
θ
t =CtPt
The optimization problem of the general consumption bundle and the Euler equation are the same as in
the baseline case (B.3):
βEt
[
(1+ rt+1)
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ (Pt+1
Pt
)−1]
= 1
Log-linearizing around the steady-state (or taking logs) as before:
Et (∆ct+1) = ηEt (rt+1)−ηEt (∆pt+1)+ const
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From this section, we know that the new consumption price index is
Pt =
(
(1−α)+αQ1−θt
) 1
1−θ
We log-linearize. The steady-state is:
P¯ =
(
(1−α)+αQ¯1−θ
) 1
1−θ
Log-linearize the consumption-price ratio:
PtP−1t−1 =
(
(1−α)+αQ1−θt
) 1
1−θ (
(1−α)+αQ1−θt−1
)− 11−θ
P¯Pˆt P¯−1+ P¯Pˆt−1(−1)P¯−2P¯≈ Q¯Qˆt 11−θ
(
(1−α)+αQ¯1−θ
) 1
1−θ −1− 11−θ
(1−θ)αQ¯−θ
+Q¯Qˆt−1
(
− 1
1−θ
)(
(1−α)+αQ¯1−θ
)− 11−θ −1+ 11−θ
(1−θ)αQ¯−θ
Pˆt − Pˆt−1 ≈ αQ¯1−θ
(
(1−α)+αQ¯1−θ
)−1
(Qˆt − Qˆt−1)
∆Pˆt ≈ αQ¯1−θ
(
(1−α)+αQ¯1−θ
)−1
∆Qˆt
As in the baseline case, because Xˆt = log(Xt)− log(X¯) = log(Xt/X¯)≈ Xt−X¯X¯ = dXtX , the steady-state vari-
ables disappear in first differences and one gets that:
∆pt ≈ αQ¯1−θ
(
(1−α)+αQ¯1−θ
)−1
∆qt
This means that if Q = 1 then consumption price inflation becomes:
∆pt = α∆qt
Thus, the coefficient of the intratemporal elasticity of substitution disappears and we are left with the same
expression as in the baseline case (beware the change in notation of the share of non-tradables). Note that
if θ = 1, one finds the initial equation as well.
Rewrite the linear Euler equation in terms of consumption expenditure ∆ct+1 = ∆c˜t+1−∆pt+1 and use
the preceding log-linearized inflation equation as in the baseline case:
Et∆c˜t+1 = ηEtrt+1− (η−1)Et∆pt+1+ const
Et∆c˜t+1 = ηEtrt+1− (η−1)αQ¯1−θ
(
(1−α)+αQ¯1−θ
)−1
Et∆qt+1+ const
Et∆c˜t+1 = η
Etrt+1+ α (1−η)η Q¯1−θ
(1−α)+αQ¯1−θ Et∆qt+1
+ const
B.2.1.5 The CES case (II)
Problem of the preceding approach: one has to make a statement about Q¯. We could include it in the
grid-search as Q¯(1−θ) or estimate it from the data but in the case of a fast growing economy like China,
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it definitely would be more sensible to linearize not around a constant steady-state level but around a
constant steady-state growth path of Q.
We start with the price ratio of the preceding section:
log
(
Pt
Pt−1
)
= log
[ (1−α)+αQ1−θt
(1−α)+αQ1−θt−1
] 1
1−θ

Define the growth rate of Q = PN/PT :
Qt −Qt−1
Qt−1
≈ log(Qt)− log(Qt−1) = ∆qt
Qt ≈ Qt−1(1+∆qt)
Plug it in the first expression:
log
(
Pt
Pt−1
)
= log
[ (1−α)+αQ1−θt−1 (1+∆qt)1−θ
(1−α)+αQ1−θt−1
] 1
1−θ

By using a Taylor approximation of first order, we want to linearize this expression around ∆q¯. In the
following, we will assume ∆q¯= q× t. We approximate f (∆qt) at ∆q¯ (keep value flexible for the moment).
f (∆q¯)+
∂ f (∆q¯)
∂∆q¯
(∆qt −∆q¯)
One gets:
1
1−θ log
(
(1−α)+αQ1−θt−1 (1+∆q¯)1−θ
(1−α)+αQ1−θt−1
)
+
1
1−θ
(
(1−α)+αQ1−θt−1
(1−α)+αQ1−θt−1 (1+∆q¯)1−θ
)
(
αQ1−θt−1 (1−θ)(1+∆q¯)−θ
(1−α)+αQ1−θt−1
)
(∆qt −∆q¯)
After simplifying:
1
1−θ log
(
(1−α)+αQ1−θt−1 (1+∆q¯)1−θ
(1−α)+αQ1−θt−1
)
+
(
αQ1−θt−1 (1+∆q¯)
−θ
(1−α)+αQ1−θt−1 (1+∆q¯)1−θ
)
(∆qt −∆q¯)
Using the assumption of constant linear growth (∆q¯ = q× t):
log
(
Pt
Pt−1
)
≈ 1
1−θ log
(
(1−α)+αQ1−θt−1 (1+q× t)1−θ
(1−α)+αQ1−θt−1
)
+
(
αQ1−θt−1 (1+q× t)−θ
(1−α)+αQ1−θt−1 (1+q× t)1−θ
)
(∆qt−q×t)
Forward it to ∆pt+1 and use in the final Bergin and Sheffrin equation:
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Et∆c˜t+1 = ηEtrt+1− (η−1)Et∆pt+1+ const
= ηEtrt+1+(1−η)×
Et [
1
1−θ log
(
(1−α)+αQ1−θt (1+q× t)1−θ
(1−α)+αQ1−θt
)
+(
αQ1−θt (1+q× t)−θ
(1−α)+αQ1−θt (1+q× t)1−θ
)
(∆qt+1−q× t)]
The preceding expressions certainly looks messy. If we approximate it around ∆q¯= 0 (from the simplified
expression) we get:
log
(
Pt
Pt−1
)
≈ 1
1−θ log(1)+
αQ1−θt−1
(1−α)+αQ1−θt−1
∆qt
∆pt ≈
αQ1−θt−1
(1−α)+αQ1−θt−1
∆qt
With:
α → 1 then ∆pt → ∆qt
Qt−1→ 1 then ∆pt → α∆qt
Qt−1→ 0 then ∆pt → 0
Qt−1→ ∞ then ∆pt → ∆qt
Note that if one assumes Qt−1 = Q¯, one finds the same result as in the preceding section for ∆pt .
B.2.1.6 The CES case (III)
It is the same approach as before but we assume another functional growth form for Q. Note that
exp(log(1+∆ql))≈ exp(∆ql) and that exp(x)exp(y) = exp(x+ y)
Qt = Q0
t
∏
l=1
(1+∆ql)
= Q0 exp(log(
t
∏
l=1
(1+∆ql)))
= Q0 exp(
t
∑
l=1
∆ql)
= Q0
t
∏
l=1
exp(∆ql)
and
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Qt−1 = Q0 exp(
t−1
∑
l=1
∆ql)
For example:
Q3 = Q0 exp(∆q1)exp(∆q2)exp(∆q3)
= Q0 exp(∆q1+∆q2+∆q3)
For instance, if the steady-state is growing at rate ∆q¯, here in period 3:
Q¯3 = Q0 exp(3×∆q¯)
Thus, the general form is:
Q¯t = Q0 exp(t×∆q¯)
We start from the development of relative prices over time found in the preceding sections:
log
(
Pt
Pt−1
)
= log
[ (1−α)+αQ1−θt
(1−α)+αQ1−θt−1
] 1
1−θ

Plug Qt and Qt−1 in it:
log
(
Pt
Pt−1
)
= log
[ (1−α)+αQ1−θ0 exp((1−θ)∑tl=1∆ql)
(1−α)+αQ1−θ0 exp((1−θ)∑t−1l=1∆ql)
] 1
1−θ

=
1
1−θ log
(
(1−α)+αQ1−θ0 exp((1−θ)
t
∑
l=1
∆ql)
)
− 1
1−θ log
(
(1−α)+αQ1−θ0 exp((1−θ)
t−1
∑
l=1
∆ql)
)
We want to elaborate on log(Pt+k/Pt+k−1)≈ ∆pt+k:
log
(
Pt+k
Pt+k−1
)
= log
[ (1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)∑kl=1∆qt+l)
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)∑k−1l=1 ∆qt+l)
] 1
1−θ

=
1
1−θ log
(
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)
k
∑
l=1
∆qt+l)
)
− 1
1−θ log
(
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)
k−1
∑
l=1
∆qt+l)
)
(B.5)
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Let’s stop and think this functional form through. It is a function of ∆qt+l |l=1, ∆qt+l |l=2, ..., ∆qt+l |l=k−1,
∆qt+l |l=k. It can be written as f (∆qt+1,∆qt+2, ...,∆qt+l , ...,∆qt+k).
If k = 1, then the function is
f (∆qt+1) =
1
1−θ log
(
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)∆qt+1)
(1−α)
)
If k = 2, it is:
f (∆qt+1,∆qt+2) =
1
1−θ log
(
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)(∆qt+1+∆qt+2))
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)∆qt+1)
)
If k = k, it is:
f (∆qt+1,∆qt+2, ...,∆qt+l , ...,∆qt+k) =
1
1−θ log
(
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)(∆qt+1+ ...+∆qt+l + ...+∆qt+k−1+∆qt+k))
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)(∆qt+1+ ...+∆qt+l + ...+∆qt+k−1))
)
As before, use a Taylor approximation of first order. We want to linearize this expression not around ∆q¯
but for each individual ∆qt+l at ∆q¯. We need ∑tl=1
∂ f ()
∆qt+l
|∆qt+l=∆q¯× (∆qt+l −∆q¯). The linearization is of
the following form and we will get an approximation for each realized l:
f (∆q¯)+

∂ f ()
∂∆qt+1
∂ f ()
∂∆qt+2
...
∂ f ()
∂∆qt+l
...
∂ f ()
∂∆qt+k


|∆qt+1=∆q¯
|∆qt+2=∆q¯
...
|∆qt+l=∆q¯
...
|∆qt+k=∆q¯

×

∆qt+1−∆q¯
∆qt+2−∆q¯
...
∆qt+l−∆q¯
...
∆qt+k−∆q¯

The f (∆q¯) term is:
1
1−θ log
(
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)∑kl=1∆q¯)
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)∑k−1l=1 ∆q¯)
)
=
1
1−θ log
(
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)k×∆q¯)
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)(k−1)×∆q¯)
)
Get the expression for ∂ f ()∂∆qt+1 using the log expression (B.5):
1
1−θ
αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)∑kl=1∆qt+l)(1−θ)
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)∑kl=1∆qt+l)
− 1
1−θ
αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)∑k−1l=1 ∆qt+l)(1−θ)
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)∑k−1l=1 ∆qt+l)
=
αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)∑kl=1∆qt+l)
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)∑kl=1∆qt+l)
− αQ
1−θ
t exp((1−θ)∑k−1l=1 ∆qt+l)
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)∑k−1l=1 ∆qt+l)
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Realize that ∂ f ()∂∆qt+2 and the following ones until k−1 are similar.
Note that ∂ f ()∂∆qt+k is different because t + k only shows up in the numerator (i.e. in the first part of the log
expression B.5):
1
1−θ
αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)∑kl=1∆qt+l)(1−θ)
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)∑kl=1∆qt+l)
=
αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)∑kl=1∆qt+l)
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)∑kl=1∆qt+l)
We evaluate all t+ ls at ∆q¯.
For l = 1, ...,k−1 one gets:
αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)k∆q¯)
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)k∆q¯)
− αQ
1−θ
t exp((1−θ)(k−1)∆q¯)
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)(k−1)∆q¯)
For l = k:
αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)k∆q¯)
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)k∆q¯)
The Taylor approximation is then:
∆pt+k ≈ 11−θ log
(
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)k×∆q¯)
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)(k−1)×∆q¯)
)
+
k−1
∑
l=1
(
αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)k∆q¯)
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)k∆q¯)
− αQ
1−θ
t exp((1−θ)(k−1)∆q¯)
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)(k−1)∆q¯)
)
×(∆qt+l−∆q¯)
+
αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)k∆q¯)
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)k∆q¯)
×(∆qt+k−∆q¯)
For convenience, rewrite the approximation using:
b(t,k) = αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)k×∆q¯)
We get:
∆pt+k ≈ 11−θ log
(
(1−α)+b(t,k)
(1−α)+b(t,k−1)
)
+
k−1
∑
l=1
(
b(t,k)
(1−α)+b(t,k) −
b(t,k−1)
(1−α)+b(t,k−1)
)
×(∆qt+l−∆q¯)
+
b(t,k)
(1−α)+b(t,k) ×(∆qt+k−∆q¯)
Define
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Ψ(t,k) =
b(t,k)
(1−α)+b(t,k)
=
αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)k∆q¯)
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)k∆q¯)
So that one can rewrite the approximation as:
∆pt+k ≈ 11−θ log
(
(1−α)+b(t,k)
(1−α)+b(t,k−1)
)
+
k−1
∑
l=1
Ψ(t,k)
(
1− b(t,k−1)
(1−α)+b(t,k−1)
(1−α)+b(t,k)
b(t,k)
)
×(∆qt+l−∆q¯)
+Ψ(t,k) ×(∆qt+k−∆q¯)
Focus on the middle term:
b(t,k−1)
(1−α)+b(t,k−1)
(1−α)+b(t,k)
b(t,k)
=
(1−α)b(t,k−1)+b(t,k−1)b(t,k)
(1−α)b(t,k)+b(t,k−1)b(t,k) =
(1−α)b(t,k−1)/b(t,k)+b(t,k−1)
(1−α)+b(t,k−1)
Focus on b(t,k−1)/b(t,k):
b(t,k−1)
b(t,k)
=
αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)(k−1)×∆q¯)
αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)k×∆q¯)
= exp((1−θ)(k−1)∆q¯− (1−θ)k∆q¯)
= exp((1−θ)(−∆q¯))
One gets:
(1−α)b(t,k−1)/b(t,k)+b(t,k−1)
(1−α)+b(t,k−1) =
(1−α)exp((1−θ)(−∆q¯))+b(t,k−1)
(1−α)+b(t,k−1)
=
(1−α)exp((1−θ)(−∆q¯))+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)(k−1)×∆q¯)
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)(k−1)×∆q¯)
Our new expression for ∆pt+k is:
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∆pt+k ≈ 11−θ log
(
(1−α)+b(t,k)
(1−α)+b(t,k−1)
)
+
k−1
∑
l=1
Ψ(t,k)
(
1− (1−α)exp((1−θ)(−∆q¯))+b(t,k−1)
(1−α)+b(t,k−1)
)
×(∆qt+l−∆q¯)
+Ψ(t,k) ×(∆qt+k−∆q¯)
The expression for ∆pt+1 simplifies to:
∆pt+1 ≈ 11−θ log
(
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)×∆q¯)
(1−α)+αQ1−θt
)
+
αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)∆q¯)
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)∆q¯)
× (∆qt+1−∆q¯)
Rewrite the linear Euler equation in terms of consumption expenditure ∆ct+1 = ∆c˜t+1−∆pt+1 and use the
preceding log-linearized inflation equation as in the baseline case:
Et∆c˜t+1 = ηEtrt+1− (η−1)Et∆pt+1+ const
= η
(
Etrt+1+
1−η
η
Et∆pt+1
)
+ const
Note that the first part of ∆pt+1 does not become part of the constant, it is varying over time:
Et∆c˜t+1 = η [Etrt+1+
1−η
η
1
1−θ log
(
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)×∆q¯)
(1−α)+αQ1−θt
)
+
1−η
η
αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)∆q¯)
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)∆q¯)
(Et∆qt+1−∆q¯)]+ const
Now one can be more general:
Et∆c˜t+k = η
(
Ert+k +
1−η
η
Et∆pt+k
)
+ const
=
1
γ
Etrt+k +
γ−1
γ
Et∆pt+k + const
It becomes:
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Et∆c˜t+k =
1
γ
Etrt+k
+
γ−1
γ
1
1−θ log
(
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)k×∆q¯)
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)(k−1)×∆q¯)
)
+
γ−1
γ
k−1
∑
l=1
Ψ(t,k)
(
1− (1−α)exp((1−θ)(−∆q¯))+αQ
1−θ
t exp((1−θ)(k−1)×∆q¯)
(1−α)+αQ1−θt exp((1−θ)(k−1)×∆q¯)
)
×(Et∆qt+l−∆q¯)
+
γ−1
γ
Ψ(t,k)× (Et∆qt+k−∆q¯)
+ const
B.2.2 Kano’s log-linearization with saving wedge
B.2.2.1 Rearranging the budget constraint
The budget constraint is:
Yt −Gt − It −Ct = Bt+1− (1+ rTt )Bt
We introduce a saving wedge:
1+ rTt = (1+ r
w
t )(1− τst )
The new budget constraint with saving wedge is:
Yt −Gt − It −Ct = Bt+1− (1+ rwt )(1− τst )Bt
Solve forward to find the ex ante intertemporal budget constraint:
Bt = Et
[
((1+ rwt )(1− τst ))−1 (Bt+1+Ct −NOt)
]
Bt+1 = Et+1
[(
(1+ rwt+1)(1− τst+1)
)−1
(Bt+2+Ct+1−NOt+1)
]
Bt+2 = Et+2
[(
(1+ rwt+2)(1− τst+2)
)−1
(Bt+3+Ct+2−NOt+2)
]
Bt+3 = . . .
Bt = Et
[
((1+ rwt )(1− τst ))−1 (Et+1
[(
(1+ rwt+1)(1− τst+1)
)−1
(Bt+2−NOt+1+Ct+1)
]
+Ct −NOt)
]
= Et [((1+ rwt )(1− τst ))−1
(
(1+ rwt+1)(1− τst+1)
)−1 Bt+2]+Et [((1+ rwt )(1− τst ))−1(
(1+ rwt+1)(1− τst+1)
)−1
(Ct+1−NOt+1)]+Et
[
((1+ rwt )(1− τst ))−1 (Ct −NOt)
]
lim
k→∞
(
Et
k
∏
l=0
(
(1+ rwt+l)(1− τst+l)
)−1 Bt+k+1
)
= 0
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Bt =
∞
∑
k=0
Et
{
(Ct+k−NOt+k)
k
∏
l=0
(
(1+ rwt+l)(1− τst+l)
)−1}
Rt+k =
k
∏
l=0
(
(1+ rwt+l)(1− τst+l)
)
Take Bt , divide it by NOt and expand the first part with Ct :
Bt
NOt
=
∞
∑
k=0
Et
{
R−1t+k
(
Ct
NOt
Ct+k
Ct
− NOt+k
NOt
)}
Take this expression for k = 0 and k ≥ 1:
Bt
NOt
= Et
{
((1+ rwt )(1− τst ))−1
[
Ct
NOt
Ct
Ct
− NOt
NOt
]}
+
∞
∑
k=1
Et
{
R−1t+k
[
Ct
NOt
Ct+k
Ct
− NOt+k
NOt
]}
(1+ rwt )(1− τst )
Bt
NOt
=
Ct
NOt
−1+(1+ rwt )(1− τst )×
∞
∑
k=1
Et
{
k
∏
l=0
(
(1+ rwt+l)(1− τst+l)
)−1 [ Ct
NOt
Ct+k
Ct
− NOt+k
NOt
]}
(1+ rwt )(1− τst )
Bt
NOt
=
Ct
NOt
−1+
∞
∑
k=1
Et
{
k
∏
l=1
(
(1+ rwt+l)(1− τst+l)
)−1 [ Ct
NOt
Ct+k
Ct
− NOt+k
NOt
]}
=
Ct
NOt
Et
[
1+
∞
∑
k=1
k
∏
l=1
(
(1+ rwt+l)(1− τst+l)
)−1 Ct+k
Ct
]
−Et
[
1+
∞
∑
k=1
k
∏
l=1
(
(1+ rwt+l)(1− τst+l)
)−1 NOt+k
NOt
]
The next step is more tricky. Use exp(log(. . .)) and rewrite k using l. Here we show it for the consumption
term. The strategy for the net output term is similar. Remember that by using a Taylor approximation one
can show that for small x, log(1+ x)≈ x and log(1− x)≈−x:
∞
∑
k=1
exp
(
log
(
k
∏
l=1
(
(1+ rwt+l)(1− τst+l)
)−1 Ct+k
Ct
))
∞
∑
k=1
exp
(
k
∑
l=1
[
log(Ct+k)− log(Ct)− log(1+ rwt+l)− log(1− τst+l)
])
k = 1 ⇒ exp(log(Ct+1)− log(Ct)− rwt+1+ τst+1)
k = 2 ⇒ exp(log(Ct+2)− log(Ct)− rwt+1+ τst+1− rwt+2+ τst+2)
k = 3 ⇒ . . .
Note that it can be rewritten using ∆ for first difference because some terms disappear:
∞
∑
k=1
exp
(
k
∑
l=1
[
∆ct+l− rwt+l + τst+l
])
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k = 1 ⇒ exp(∆ct+1− rwt+1+ τst+1)
exp(log(Ct+1)− log(Ct)− rwt+1+ τst+1)
k = 2 ⇒ exp(∆ct+1− rwt+1+ τst+1+∆ct+2− rwt+2+ τst+2)
exp(log(Ct+1)− log(Ct)− rwt+1+ τst+1+ log(Ct+2)− log(Ct+1)− rwt+2+ τst+2)
exp(log(Ct+2)− log(Ct)− rwt+1+ τst+1− rwt+2+ τst+2)
k = 3 ⇒ . . .
Thus, we can rewrite the RHS of the intertemporal BC as:
Ct
NOt
Et
[
1+
∞
∑
k=1
exp
(
k
∑
l=1
[
∆ct+l− rwt+l + τst+l
])]−Et [1+ ∞∑
k=1
exp
(
k
∑
l=1
[
∆not+l− rwt+l + τst+l
])]
(B.6)
The LHS can be rewritten using exp(log(. . .)) as well:
exp
(
log
(
(1+ rwt )(1− τst )
NOt−1
NOt
Bt
NOt−1
))
exp
(
rwt − τst −∆not + log(
Bt
NOt−1
)
)
exp(rwt − τst −∆not)
Bt
NOt−1
(B.7)
B.2.2.2 Warm-up
At this point, a warm-up is necessary.
Remember the log-linearization using an implicit function f (x¯, y¯) = 0. By implicit differentiation get:
∂ f (x¯, y¯)
∂x
dx+
∂ f (x¯, y¯)
∂y
dy = 0
Now observe that dxx¯ =
x−x¯
x¯ ≈ log(x)− log(x¯) = x˜.
∂ f (x¯, y¯)
∂x
dx
x¯
x¯+
∂ f (x¯, y¯)
∂y
dy
y¯
y¯ = 0
∂ f (x¯, y¯)
∂x
x˜x¯+
∂ f (x¯, y¯)
∂y
y˜y¯ = 0
Alternatively, one could take the log of the expression and then directly linearize using a Taylor approx-
imation: if have a function f (x) evaluated at point a (in our case the steady-state), the general formula
is:
∞
∑
n=0
f (n)(a)
n!
(x−a)n = f (a)+ f
′(a)
1!
(x−a)+ f
′′(a)
2!
(x−a)2+ . . .
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With a function f (x,y) evaluated at steady-states x¯ and y¯, the first order approximation is:
f (x¯, y¯)+
∂ f (x¯, y¯)
∂ x¯
(x− x¯)+ ∂ f (x¯, y¯)
∂ y¯
(y− y¯)
f (x¯, y¯)+
∂ f (x¯, y¯)
∂ x¯
x˜+
∂ f (x¯, y¯)
∂ y¯
y˜
Compared to the implicit function case, we have a constant and we do not need to multiply with the steady
state value. Thereafter, we mostly take exp(log(...)). Thus, one does not need to log-linearize but only
linearize. Ignoring the constant, one could use the expression:
∂ f (x¯, y¯)
∂x
x˜+
∂ f (x¯, y¯)
∂y
y˜
Before beginning with the log-linearization, observe that, using the implicit theorem:
exp(log(1+ rt))
exp(log(rˆt(1+ r¯)))
exp(log(rˆt)+ log(1+ r¯))
exp(log(rˆt))exp(log(1+ r¯))
r˜t exp(r¯)
Alternatively, one could take log and use Taylor expansion::
exp(log(1+ rt)) ≈ exp(rt)
exp(r¯)+ exp(r¯)r˜t
See that the difference is the constant.
Use implicit function:
XtX−1t−1
X˜t X¯ X¯−1+ X˜t−1X¯ X¯ X¯−2(−1)
X˜t − X˜t−1 = (Xt − X¯)− (Xt−1− X¯)
Xt −Xt−1
Thus, the log difference of a variable (e.g. growth rate) is identical to its the log difference of the deviation
from its steady-state.
Another example. Use Taylor approximation:
exp(log(Ct+1/Ct) ) = exp(∆ct+1)
exp(∆¯c)+ exp(∆¯c)∆c˜t+1
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The key to understanding the following log-linearizations is:
exp(log
[(
(1+ rwt+1)(1− τst+1)
)Ct+1
Ct
]
)
exp(rwt+1− τst+1+∆ct+1)
exp(r¯− τ¯+ ∆¯c)+ exp(r¯− τ¯+ ∆¯c)r˜t+1− exp(r¯− τ¯+ ∆¯c)τ˜t+1+ exp(r¯− τ¯+ ∆¯c)∆c˜t+1
exp(r¯− τ¯+ ∆¯c)+ exp(r¯− τ¯+ ∆¯c)(r˜t+1− τ˜t+1+∆c˜t+1)
exp(r¯− τ¯+ ∆¯c)+ exp(r¯− τ¯+ ∆¯c)((rwt+1− r¯)− (τst+1− τ¯)+(ct+1− c¯)− (ct − c¯))
exp(r¯− τ¯+ ∆¯c)(1− r¯+ τ¯)+ exp(r¯− τ¯+ ∆¯c)(rwt+1− τst+1+∆ct+1)
B.2.2.3 Log-linearization
Let us start with the log-linearization of the LHS (B.7). We use a Taylor approximation of first order and
ignore the constant. Observe that exp(x− y) = exp(y− x)−1:
exp(rwt − τst −∆not)
Bt
NOt−1
exp(rwt − τst −∆not)B∗
r˜t exp(r¯− τ¯−∆n¯o)B¯∗− τ˜t exp(r¯− τ¯−∆n¯o)B¯∗−∆n˜ot exp(r¯− τ¯−∆n¯o)B¯∗+ exp(r¯− τ¯−∆n¯o)B˜∗
(r˜t − τ˜t −∆n˜o)exp(r¯− τ¯−∆n¯o)B¯∗+ B˜∗ exp(r¯− τ¯−∆n¯o)
(r˜t − τ˜t −∆n˜o)B¯∗ 1exp( ¯∆no−r¯+ τ¯) + B˜∗ 1exp( ¯∆no−r¯+ τ¯) (B.8)
Now we turn to the RHS (B.6). We have to rewrite both 1+ exp() terms (here with the first block of the
RHS, the consumption part). We start without the constant with:
Et
[
∞
∑
k=1
exp
(
k
∑
l=1
[
∆ct+l− rwt+l + τst+l
])]
Write it for k = 1, k = 2, k = 3, . . .:
k = 1 ⇒ exp(∆ct+1− rwt+1+ τst+1)
k = 2 ⇒ exp(∆ct+1− rwt+1+ τst+1+∆ct+2− rwt+2+ τst+2)
k = 3 ⇒ exp(∆ct+1− rwt+1+ τst+1+∆ct+2− rwt+2+ τst+2+∆ct+3− rwt+3+ τst+3)
. . .
Which gives:
exp(∆ct+1− rwt+1+ τst+1)+ exp(∆ct+1− rwt+1+ τst+1)exp(∆ct+2− rwt+2+ τst+2)+
exp(∆ct+1− rwt+1+ τst+1)exp(∆ct+2− rwt+2+ τst+2)exp(∆ct+3− rwt+3+ τst+3) . . .
Linearizing gives:
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(∆c˜t+1− r˜t+1+ τ˜t+1)exp(∆¯c− r¯+ τ¯)+(∆c˜t+1− r˜t+1+ τ˜t+1)exp(2(∆¯c− r¯+ τ¯))+
(∆c˜t+2− r˜t+2+ τ˜t+2)exp(2(∆¯c− r¯+ τ¯))+(∆c˜t+1− r˜t+1+ τ˜t+1)exp(3(∆¯c− r¯+ τ¯))+
(∆c˜t+2− r˜t+2+ τ˜t+2)exp(3(∆¯c− r¯+ τ¯))+(∆c˜t+3− r˜t+3+ τ˜t+3)exp(3(∆¯c− r¯+ τ¯))+ . . .
The trick is the following: for k = 1 we have l = 1, for k = 2 l = 1,2, for k = 3 l = 1,2,3 and so on and so
forth. Thus, if one gathers all k terms for l = 1, one gets ∑∞k=1. Similarly, for l = 2 one has ∑
∞
k=2 and for
l = 3, ∑∞k=3.
Et
[
1+
∞
∑
k=1
exp
(
k
∑
l=1
[
∆ct+l− rwt+l + τst+l
])] ⇒ const
+
∞
∑
k=1
exp
(
k
∑
l=1
(∆¯c− r¯+ τ¯)
)
(∆c˜t+1− r˜t+1+ τ˜t+1)
+
∞
∑
k=2
exp
(
k
∑
l=1
(∆¯c− r¯+ τ¯)
)
(∆c˜t+2− r˜t+2+ τ˜t+2)
+ . . .
Focus on the first row. Distinguish between the first k of the series (here k = 1) and the following ones.
We can rewrite it as:
exp(∆c¯− r¯+ τ¯)(∆c˜t+1− r˜t+1+ τ˜t+1) +
exp(∆c¯− r¯+ τ¯)(∆c˜t+1− r˜t+1+ τ˜t+1)
∞
∑
k=1
exp(
k
∑
l=1
(∆c¯− r¯+ τ¯))
Do the same for the second row. Distinguish between the first k of the series (here k= 2) and the following
ones. We can rewrite it as:
exp(2(∆c¯− r¯+ τ¯))(∆c˜t+2− r˜t+2+ τ˜t+2) +
exp(2(∆c¯− r¯+ τ¯))(∆c˜t+2− r˜t+2+ τ˜t+2)
∞
∑
k=1
exp(
k
∑
l=1
(∆c¯− r¯+ τ¯))
We can rewrite the (initial) first and second rows as:
=
[
1+
∞
∑
k=1
exp(
k
∑
l=1
(∆c¯− r¯+ τ¯))
]
[exp(∆c¯− r¯+ τ¯)(∆c˜t+1− r˜t+1+ τ˜t+1)+ exp(2(∆c¯− r¯+ τ¯))(∆c˜t+2− r˜t+2−+τ˜t+2)]
Focus on the second term of the first parenthesis:
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∞∑
k=1
exp(
k
∑
l=1
(∆¯c− r¯+ τ¯))
k = 1 ⇒ e∆¯c−r¯+τ¯
k = 2 ⇒ e2(∆¯c−r¯+τ¯)
k = 3 ⇒ e3(∆¯c−r¯+τ¯)
. . .
If one defines x = ∆c¯− r¯− τ¯ , it is obvious that the preceding expression is of the form:
ex+(ex)2+(ex)3 + . . .
∞
∑
k=1
(ex)k =
1
1− ex −1
The result is that:
1+
∞
∑
k=1
exp(
k
∑
l=1
(∆c¯− r¯+ τ¯)) = 1+ 1
1− exp(∆c¯− r¯+ τ¯) −1
Thus the final result for the consumption part is:
Et
[
1+
∞
∑
k=1
exp
(
k
∑
l=1
[∆c˜t+l− r˜t+l + τ˜t+l ]
)]
⇒
const+
1
1− exp(∆c¯− r¯+ τ¯)Et
∞
∑
k=1
exp(k(∆c¯− r¯+ τ¯))(∆c˜t+k− r˜t+k + τ˜t+k)) (B.9)
Now go back to the entire expression for the right hand side:
Ct
NOt
Et
[
1+
∞
∑
k=1
exp
(
k
∑
l=1
[
∆ct+l− rwt+l + τst+l
])]−Et [1+ ∞∑
k=1
exp
(
k
∑
l=1
[
∆not+l− rwt+l + τst+l
])]
Focus on the terms one after another:
Et
(
Ct
NOt
)
⇒ C˜tC¯ 1N¯O +
˜NOt N¯O(−1) C¯¯NO2
C˜t
C¯
N¯O
− ˜NOt C¯N¯O(
C˜t − ˜NOt
) C¯
N¯O
If we consider Ct/NOt as a block variable C∗, the log-linearization is:
Et (C∗) ⇒ C˜∗C¯∗
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Note we just linearize the expression (i.e. the steady-state term is not needed).
This term is multiplied with the expectation of 1+∑∞k=1 exp
(
∑kl=1
[
∆ct+l− rwt+l + τst+l
])
:
1+
∞
∑
k=1
exp
(
k
∑
l=1
[∆c¯− r¯+ τ¯]
)
1+
∞
∑
k=1
exp(k[∆c¯− r¯+ τ¯])
1+ e(∆c¯−r¯+τ¯)+(e(∆c¯−r¯+τ¯))2+(e(∆c¯−r¯+τ¯))3+ . . .
1
1− exp(∆c¯− r¯+ τ¯)
In the end, one gets:
C˜∗
1
1− exp(∆c¯− r¯+ τ¯) (B.10)
The second and third parts should be easier to understand as they are based on the preceding thoughts. By
using (B.8), (B.9) and (B.10) we get the linearized expression for (B.6) and (B.7):
(r˜t − τ˜t −∆n˜o)B¯∗ 1exp( ¯∆no−r¯+ τ¯) + B˜∗ 1exp( ¯∆no−r¯+ τ¯) ≈
C˜∗
1
1− exp(∆c¯− r¯+ τ¯) +
C¯∗
1
1− exp(∆c¯− r¯+ τ¯)Et
∞
∑
k=1
exp(k(∆c¯− r¯+ τ¯))(∆c˜t+k− r˜t+k + τ˜t+k)) −
1
1− exp(∆n¯o− r¯+ τ¯)Et
∞
∑
k=1
exp(k( ¯∆no− r¯+ τ¯))(∆n˜ot+k− r˜t+k + τ˜t+k))
Define some new variables:
α = exp(∆¯c− r¯+ τ¯)
κ = exp(∆n¯o− r¯+ τ¯)
Rewrite the preceding result using them:
(r˜t − τ˜t −∆n˜ot)B¯∗ 1κ + B˜
∗ 1
κ
≈
C˜∗
1
1−α +
C¯∗
1
1−α Et
∞
∑
k=1
exp(k(∆¯c− r¯+ τ¯))(∆c˜t+k− r˜t+k + τ˜t+k)) −
1
1−κ Et
∞
∑
k=1
exp(k( ¯∆no− r¯+ τ¯))(∆n˜ot+k− r˜t+k + τ˜t+k))
Solve for C˜∗:
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C˜∗ ≈ 1−α
κ
B¯∗(r˜t − τ˜t −∆n˜ot)+ 1−ακ B˜
∗ −
C¯∗Et
∞
∑
k=1
exp(k(∆¯c− r¯+ τ¯))(∆c˜t+k− r˜t+k + τ˜t+k)) +
1−α
1−κ Et
∞
∑
k=1
exp(k( ¯∆no− r¯+ τ¯))(∆n˜ot+k− r˜t+k + τ˜t+k))
Use definitions of α and κ again:
C˜∗ ≈ 1−α
κ
B¯∗(r˜t − τ˜t −∆n˜ot)+ 1−ακ B˜
∗ −
C¯∗Et
∞
∑
k=1
αk(∆c˜t+k− r˜t+k + τ˜t+k)) +
1−α
1−κ Et
∞
∑
k=1
κk(∆n˜ot+k− r˜t+k + τ˜t+k)) (B.11)
From the BC, we know that Bt+1 = (1+ rwt )(1− τst )Bt +Yt − It −Gt −Ct and (1+ rwt )(1− τst ) = 1− τst +
rwt − rwt τst . Ignore the very small last term (rwt τst ≈ 0). We have:
∆Bt+1 =CAt = NOt −Ct +[rwt − τst ]Bt
CAt
NOt
= 1− Ct
NOt
+
[rwt − τst ]Bt
NOt
(B.12)
Expand last element with NOt−1:
Bt
NOt−1
NOt−1
NOt
[rwt − τst ] (B.13)
Use exp(log(. . .)) on the second term:
exp(log(
NOt−1
NOt
[rwt − τst ])) = exp(−∆not + log([rwt − τst ])
=
rwt − τst
exp(∆not)
(B.14)
Note that log(1+ rt)≈ log(exp(rt)) = rt , (1+ rt)≈ exp(rt), rt = exp(rt)−1. Now use it with the wedge:
log((1+ rwt )(1− τst )) ≈ rwt − τst = log(exp(rwt − τst ))
(1+ rwt )(1− τst ) ≈ exp(rwt − τst )
1− τst + rwt − rwt τst︸︷︷︸
0
≈ exp(rwt − τst )
exp(rwt − τst )−1 ≈ rwt − τst (B.15)
Use (B.15) in (B.14), plug it back in (B.13) and then (B.12):
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CAt
NOt
= 1− Ct
NOt
+
exp(rwt − τst )−1
exp(∆not)
Bt
NOt−1
CA∗ = 1−C∗+ exp(r
w
t − τst )−1
exp(∆not)
B∗
Before linearizing this expression, note that:
Et
(
exp(rwt − τst )−1
exp(∆not)
)
=
exp(r¯− τ¯)−1
exp( ¯∆no)
= exp(r¯− τ¯)exp( ¯∆no)−1− exp( ¯∆no)−1
=
exp(r¯− τ¯)
exp( ¯∆no)
− 1
exp( ¯∆no)
=
1
exp( ¯∆no− r¯+ τ¯)) −
1
exp( ¯∆no)
Use it in the expression for the relative current account:
CA∗ = 1−C∗+
(
1
exp(∆not − rwt + τst ))
− 1
exp(∆not)
)
B∗
Let’s linearize using exp(r¯) = (exp(−r¯))−1:
C˜A∗ ≈−C˜∗+ B˜∗
(
1
exp( ¯∆no− r¯+ τ¯) −
1
exp( ¯∆no)
)
+
r˜t
1
exp( ¯∆no− r¯+ τ¯) B¯
∗− τ˜t 1exp( ¯∆no− r¯+ τ¯) B¯
∗
−∆n˜ot
(
1
exp( ¯∆no− r¯+ τ¯) −
1
exp( ¯∆no)
)
B¯∗ (B.16)
Now come back to C˜∗ (B.11). Assume that α = κ → exp(∆¯c− r¯+ τ¯) = exp( ¯∆no− r¯+ τ¯)→ ∆¯c = ¯∆no.
Observe that αk = exp(k(∆¯c− r¯+ τ¯)) = exp(k( ¯∆no− r¯+ τ¯)) = κk. So just express it all in using κ:
C˜∗ ≈ 1−κ
κ
B¯∗(r˜t − τ˜t −∆n˜ot)+ 1−κκ B˜
∗ −
C¯∗Et
∞
∑
k=1
κk(∆c˜t+k− r˜t+k + τ˜t+k) +
1−κ
1−κ Et
∞
∑
k=1
κk(∆n˜ot+k− r˜t+k + τ˜t+k) (B.17)
The expression for C˜A∗(B.16) is not influenced by this assumption.
Plug C˜∗ (B.17) in C˜A∗ (B.16):
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C˜A∗ ≈ κ−1
κ
B¯∗(r˜t − τ˜t −∆n˜ot)+ κ−1κ B˜
∗ +
C¯∗Et
∞
∑
k=1
κk(∆c˜t+k− r˜t+k + τ˜t+k)−Et
∞
∑
k=1
κk(∆n˜ot+k− r˜t+k + τ˜t+k) +
B˜∗
(
1
κ
− 1
exp( ¯∆no)
)
+ r˜t
1
κ
B¯∗− τ˜t 1κ B¯
∗ −
∆n˜ot
(
1
κ
− 1
exp(∆n¯o)
)
B¯∗
Focus on the standalone r˜ terms:
κ−1
κ
B¯∗r˜t +
1
κ
B¯∗r˜t = B¯∗r˜t
Focus on standalone wedge terms:
−κ−1
κ
τ˜t B¯∗− 1κ τ˜t B¯
∗ =− B¯∗τ˜t
Focus on the B˜∗ terms:
κ−1
κ
B˜∗+ B˜∗
(
1
κ
− 1
exp( ¯∆no)
)
B˜∗(1− 1
exp(∆n¯o)
)
Focus on the ˜∆no terms:
−κ−1
κ
B¯∗∆n˜ot −
(
1
κ
− 1
exp(∆n¯o)
)
B¯∗∆n˜ot =(
1
exp(∆n¯o)
−1
)
B¯∗∆n˜ot
The general expression becomes:
C˜A∗ ≈
C¯∗Et
∞
∑
k=1
κk(∆c˜t+k− r˜t+k + τ˜t+k)
−Et
∞
∑
k=1
κk(∆n˜ot+k− r˜t+k + τ˜t+k)
+B¯∗r˜t − B¯∗τ˜t
+B˜∗(1− 1
exp(∆n¯o)
)
+
(
1
exp(∆n¯o)
−1
)
B¯∗∆n˜ot
To get the expression of Kano (4.1), we need that both last terms disappear:
206
B˜∗− B¯∗∆n˜ot + B¯∗∆n˜ot 1exp(∆n¯o) − B˜
∗ 1
exp(∆n¯o)
= 0
Let’s check it. Remember that:
B∗ =
Bt
NOt−1
=
Bt
NOt
NOt
NOt−1
exp(log(
Bt
NOt
)+∆not)
Bt
NOt
exp(∆not)
So that:
B¯∗ =
B¯
N¯O
exp(∆n¯o)
The linearization is:
B¯
N¯O
exp(∆n¯o)+ B˜∗ exp(∆n¯o)+∆ ˜not
B¯
N¯O
exp(∆n¯o)
Find an expression for B˜∗ = ∆ ˜not B¯N¯O − B¯N¯O and plug it in the expression to check it is true indeed (neglect
constant terms):
∆ ˜not
B¯
N¯O
− B¯
N¯O
− B¯∗∆n˜ot + B¯∗∆n˜ot 1exp(∆n¯o) −∆ ˜not
B¯
N¯O
1
exp(∆n¯o)
+
B¯
N¯O
1
exp(∆n¯o)
= 0
We get Kano’s log-linearization (4.1) with a saving wedge:
C˜A∗ ≈ B¯∗r˜t − B¯∗τ˜t +C¯∗
∞
∑
k=1
κkEt(∆c˜t+k− r˜t+k + τ˜t+k)−
∞
∑
k=1
κkEt(∆n˜ot+k− r˜t+k + τ˜t+k)
≈ B¯∗r˜t +C¯∗
∞
∑
k=1
κkEt(∆c˜t+k)+(1−C¯∗)
∞
∑
k=1
κkEt(r˜t+k)−
∞
∑
k=1
κkEt(∆n˜ot+k)
−B¯∗τ˜t +(C¯∗−1)
∞
∑
k=1
κkEt(τ˜t+k)
B.2.3 Hoffmann’s extension (2013)
B.2.3.1 Baseline model with saving wedge
From Kano’s linearization with saving wedge in Section B.2.2, we have:
C˜A∗ ≈ B¯∗r˜t +C¯∗
∞
∑
k=1
κkEt(∆c˜t+k− r˜t+k)+
∞
∑
k=1
κkEt(r˜t+k−∆n˜ot+k)− B¯∗τ˜t +(C¯∗−1)
∞
∑
k=1
κkEt(τ˜t+k)
From Bergin and Sheffrin’s optimization problem with saving wedge in Section B.2.1.2, we have:
Et(∆ct+1) = ηEt
(
rt+1− τst +
1−η
η
(1−a)∆qt+1
)
+ const
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Note that in both expressions, r stands for world interest rate. Beware: the q corresponds to Bergin and
Sheffring’s p, the relative price of non-tradables.
Mind that the terms could be interpreted as deviation from steady-state (ignore the constant).
Et(∆c˜t+k) =
1
γ
Et r˜t+k− 1γ Et τ˜t+k +
γ−1
γ
(1−a)Et∆q˜t+k
Plug the former expression in Kano’s one:
C˜A∗ ≈ B¯∗r˜t +C¯∗
∞
∑
k=1
κk
(
1
γ
Et r˜t+k− 1γ Et τ˜t+k +
γ−1
γ
(1−a)Et∆q˜t+k−Et r˜t+k
)
+
∞
∑
k=1
κkEt(r˜t+k−∆n˜ot+k)− B¯∗τ˜t +(C¯∗−1)
∞
∑
k=1
κkEt(τ˜t+k)
Focus on the Et r˜t+k terms:
(
C¯∗
1
γ
−C¯∗+1
) ∞
∑
k=1
κkEt r˜t+k(
1−C¯∗(1− 1
γ
)
) ∞
∑
k=1
κkEt r˜t+k
Focus on the Et q˜t+k term, define (1−α)Et∆q˜t+1 = Et∆d˜t+1:
C¯∗
γ−1
γ
Et
∞
∑
k=1
κk(1−a)Et∆q˜t+k
C¯∗(1− 1
γ
)Et
∞
∑
k=1
κkEt∆d˜t+k
Focus on the (new) saving wedge terms:
−C¯∗
∞
∑
k=1
κk
1
γ
Et τ˜t+k− B¯∗τ˜t +(C¯∗−1)Et
∞
∑
k=1
κk(τ˜t+k)
−B¯∗τ˜t −
(
1−C¯∗(1− 1
γ
)
)
Et
∞
∑
k=1
κk(τ˜t+k)
The equation building the socle our empirical estimation is thus:
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C˜A∗ ≈ B¯∗r˜t
+
(
1−C¯∗(1− 1
γ
)
) ∞
∑
k=1
κkEt r˜t+k
+C¯∗(1− 1
γ
)
∞
∑
k=1
κkEt∆d˜t+k
−
∞
∑
k=1
κkEt∆n˜ot+k
−B¯∗τ˜t −
(
1−C¯∗(1− 1
γ
)
)
Et
∞
∑
k=1
κk(τ˜t+k)
With some differences in notation, it corresponds to equation (4.4) in the main text. Note that the saving
wedge enters with an opposite sign as we define it as excess return in the main text. Furthermore, it is
multiplied by δ k. The capital flows on the steady-state level of assets/debt disappear as we focus on net
exports. At last, given our definition of financial friction in the main text, the interest rate is the national
one.
We have five channels of current account adjustment. The first term measures the role of net income
flows. The second one is consumption-tilting due to expected variation in the world real rate of interest
(if high interest rate, want to save more). The third channel is the effect of expected real exchange rate
change (incentive to save more if price of domestic consumption bundle relative to tradable goods ex-
pected to rise). The fourth term is the classical consumption smoothing channel (if output is expected to
be above trend, the country should run a deficit). The last terms gather the impact of expected variation
in financial frictions. An expected increase in frictions (higher tax on savings) lowers the current account
(save less).
To proxy expectations, a VAR in ∆not , ∆qt , rwt , CAt/NOt and τst is estimated and can be written in
companion form as Zt = AZt−1+Ut . For a variable x we have:
∞
∑
k=1
κkEt(xt+k) = κEt(xt+1)+κ2Et(xt+2)+ . . .
= κAZt +κ2A2Zt + . . .
= (
1
1−κA −1)Zt
=
κA
1−κAZt
In matrix notation, use a selection vector ex to get:
∞
∑
k=1
κkEt(xt+k) = e′xκA(I−κA)−1Zt
Plug it in the expectation expressions:
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C˜A∗ ≈ B¯∗r˜t
+
(
1−C¯∗(1− 1
γ
)
)
e′rκA(I−κA)−1Zt
+C¯∗(1− 1
γ
)e′dκA(I−κA)−1Zt
−e′noκA(I−κA)−1Zt
−B¯∗τ˜t −
(
1−C¯∗(1− 1
γ
)
)
e′sκA(I−κA)−1Zt
Which, at last, gives:
C˜A∗ = B¯∗r˜t − B¯∗τ˜t +
[(
1−C¯∗(1− 1
γ
)
)(
e′r− e′s
)
+C¯∗(1− 1
γ
)e′d− e′no
]
κA(I−κA)−1Zt
It corresponds to equation (4.6) in the main text.
B.2.3.2 Model with CES case (I) and saving wedge
By using our result from Section B.2.1.4, the equation building the socle of the empirical estimation is:
C˜A∗ ≈ B¯∗r˜t
+
(
1−C¯∗(1− 1
γ
)
) ∞
∑
k=1
κkEt r˜t+k
+C¯∗(1− 1
γ
)
∞
∑
k=1
κk
Q¯1−θ
(1−α)+αQ¯1−θ Et∆d˜t+k
−
∞
∑
k=1
κkEt∆n˜ot+k
−B¯∗τ˜t −
(
1−C¯∗(1− 1
γ
)
)
Et
∞
∑
k=1
κk(τ˜t+k)
Empirical implementation:
C˜A∗= B¯∗r˜t− B¯∗τ˜t +
[(
1−C¯∗(1− 1
γ
)
)
(e′r− e′s)+C¯∗(1−
1
γ
)
Q¯1−θ
(1−α)+αQ¯1−θ e
′
d− e′no
]
κA(I−κA)−1Zt
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